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Abstract 
The question of how much governments should spend on social programs generally, or safety 
nets in particular, is of great obvious interest to policymakers but is extremely difficult to 
address empirically.  The approach in this paper differs from others by assuming that what 
governments can potentially do in terms of spending on social programs is given by what 
governments across the world are actually observed to be doing on average.   
After first briefly reviewing the existing methodologies, their limitations, and what can 
be learned, an analysis of 63 countries spending patterns from 1972-1997 is presented using a 
comparative benchmarking methodology. Unconditional rankings of spending on safety nets 
and other health and education social programs are refined by controlling for various factors 
which affect the ability to fund programs.  Two sets of factors are examined: (i) structural 
features captured by regional dummy variables and characteristics of the underlying 
populations; and (ii) quality of government as reflected in measures of corruption, rule of 
law, political pressure, and others. Separate analyses are conducted across countries for 
selected welfare indicators such as the infant mortality rate and life expectancy at birth and 
for states in India, for which additional information is available on macroeconomic factors 
and institutional features influencing safety nets spending. The approach generates a picture 
as to how states are performing relative to international expenditure norms and may be useful 
to policymakers in determining the appropriate level of overall spending.   
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I. Introduction 
The purpose of this paper is to provide some practical guidelines on how much governments 
should spend on social safety nets. There are a number of methods put forward in the current 
literature for addressing this question. The traditional public economics approach is based 
upon calculation of the costs and benefits of each safety net-related government activity. 
However, this type of analysis typically requires larger amounts of information than are 
typically available, even in countries with reliable household data. More complex approaches 
still would emphasize general equilibrium effects and behavioral responses.  
Thus while these are the core textbook approaches, in practice it is not clear that they 
provide a practical approach in many instances. They may also be difficult for policymakers 
to understand, and this can create suspicion about their value. 
We could imagine a more tractable approach that measures the objectives of 
government from an alternative, normative criterion which may be based upon various 
measures of needs—closing the poverty gap, or reducing variability of income to a given 
level, or some such thing. The drawback here is we usually don’t have nearly that amount of 
money available—we might know how much it costs to provide plausibly delivered targeted 
transfers to the whole needy population, just as we might know how much it would cost to 
provide a basic package of health services to the whole population. This will inevitably lead 
to trade-offs between alternative uses of resources, and we still therefore require some means 
of choosing between them. 
All of these methods suffer from two additional problems that we shall address in our 
methodology. First, they typically do not take account of how effective the government 
might be in meeting one need or another. For example, we can expect the quality of 
government to affect how efficient safety net resources are in targeting vulnerable groups 
rather than being used for rent seeking or other non-productive uses. Secondly, the ability to 
extrapolate from studies based on existing methodologies is limited. Thus, we are often 
unable to facilitate the comparison of countries to each other, and in particular of economies 
                                                           
1 The authors would like to thank Harold Alderman, Yisgedu Amde, John Blomquist, Kene Ezemenari, 
Margaret Grosh, William Jack, Manny Jimenez, Jeni Klugman, Jim Smith and Kalhindi Subbarao for helpful 
comments.  
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with similar income levels (and levels of institutional development). Such an analysis would 
not only be of use in and of itself, but in the context of a constructive policy dialogue with 
government officials. Telling policymakers how they perform relative to their economic 
neighbors may prove to be an effective means of providing the incentives to increase safety 
net expenditures by introducing a form of yardstick competition across economies. 
In our approach, we do not assume that governments are optimizing in terms of their 
levels of spending on social safety nets. Instead, we relate spending on different types of 
safety nets to some benchmark level of performance. This is determined by what countries 
are able to do on average for a given set of structural and institutional features of the 
economy. This gives us an indication of whether particular countries are spending more or 
less than this international norm, and provides a concrete basis for discussing whether 
governments ought to be spending more or less on various types of safety net. 
In fact, we are able to form three different benchmarks taking different factors into 
account. We first examine the share of gross domestic product (GDP) devoted to each type of 
safety net, and then rank countries according to this. We have enough variation in this data to 
suggest that policymakers cannot all be optimizing. We then try to account for this variation 
through certain structural characteristics of the economy, such as the level and distribution of 
income, the level of urbanization, etc. We then form a cross-country ranking where the 
benchmark is what countries are able to do on average, controlling for their structural 
characteristics. Finally, the third benchmark also takes into account the institutional features 
of the country, such as the levels of corruption, bureaucracy, and the rule of law. We can thus 
decompose the policy advice we can offer to governments into two forms—first, the effects 
of changes in the structural characteristics of the economy, and second, the effects of 
changing institutional features. We set out the benefits of altering both types of policy in 
terms of safety net spending, and what the resulting change would be in any given country’s 
performance. 
This approach is useful as it will generate a clear picture as to whether particular 
countries or states are over- or underperforming relative to international, regional, or national 
norms. In fact, our methodology allows us to present simple information to policymakers in 
the form of country rankings. This, in turn, enables us to make statements of the form 
“country i is spending less on safety nets than we would expect given its ability to finance 
such expenditures and the need for safety nets in the country, relative to the international 
norm.” We can make similar statements that also take into account the institutional quality of 
the country. Furthermore, we can benchmark country i’s performance relative to its 
neighbors, which may be perceived by policymakers to have similar structural features. This 
information, coupled with the arguments for investment in safety nets that are also outlined 
in the paper, can be used during dialogue with policymakers on the appropriate level of 
spending on safety nets. 
Benchmarks of this type are useful as they can generate incentives to improve 
performance to conform with international and regional norms. Pressure to do this can come 
both from the international community and from the domestic dialogue which is generated by 
the publication of such information. This has often been the case in such areas as labor and 
environmental standards, and it seem sensible that this process of  “yardstick competition” be 
extended to cover the case of social protection. 3 
The value of this benchmarking exercise is contingent on data being reflective of 
government activities in the safety net area and being comparable across countries. On both 
these counts, available data sets are somewhat lacking. This does not detract from the validity 
of our methodology but rather points out that gathering more accurate and comparable data 
on what is actually being spent on safety nets should be a priority in terms of thinking about 
what the appropriate levels of spending should be. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section two begins by defining 
safety nets, and here we emphasize a functional or objectives-based definition, rather than 
working with program-based definitions of safety nets. We think of safety nets as playing 
both redistributive and risk-reducing roles in the economy. We then detail who ought to be 
the recipients of safety net expenditures, and the benefits to the poor and the non-poor that 
such expenditures confer, before giving examples of which types of program we may think 
of as forming part of a safety net. Section three discusses how the existing methodologies 
address the question of how much governments ought to spend on safety nets, the limitations 
of each approach, and what we may learn from them. 
Section four then argues from first principles what determines the need for such 
programs, before providing the intuition behind our methodology and presentation of results. 
Section five formally presents our methodology of benchmarking country performance, both 
in terms of safety net expenditures, but also for welfare outcomes such as life expectancy and 
infant mortality rates. We do this both across countries and at the level of Indian states where 
one can more effectively control for common macroeconomic factors and institutional 
features. Section six then goes through each of these sets of results in turn. 
Section seven frames our discussion in the context of a constructive policy dialogue. First, 
it presents a clear way to argue the case for safety net expenditures and to get policymakers to 
not only think of such programs in terms of the costs of provision, but also in terms of their 
benefits. Secondly, we summarize how the results may be used in such a dialogue, and what 
policy implications follow. We show how our rankings can be used to justify increased safety 
net expenditures or policy reforms, through yardstick competition. 
II. Safety Nets 
What are Safety Nets and Who are They For? 
There is some debate over what constitutes a safety net. This is partly due to the fact that 
such programs have only existed for a half century, beginning in Western Europe and now 
gradually being implemented in some form in most developing economies. 
Authors such as Atkinson (1995) and Subbarao (1997) argue that the purpose of safety 
nets is to alleviate chronic and transient poverty. They identify the mechanisms that help to 
mitigate these adverse outcomes as being either private safety nets, which are informally 
organized or community-based, and public interventions covering health, education, social 
insurance, and publicly-funded transfers such as food subsidies. Alternative views of safety 
nets are, for example, those of Barr (1994), where their role is seen in a broader social 
context, to not only increase consumption per capita, but also to have a redistributive 
function and create political stability. Holzmann and Jorgensen (1999) argue that public 4 
interventions assist in better managing income risks, as well as contributing to social 
cohesion. 
We define safety nets as those public interventions which are designed to serve two key 
functions: (i) to play a redistributive role transferring resources toward the poorer members 
of society to bring them out of poverty, and (ii) to provide greater opportunities for 
individuals to mitigate risks from unforeseen contingencies. Such risks can operate at the 
level of the household, say through an unexpected death or unemployment of the household 
head, but also at the community or national level due to natural disasters, financial crisis, and 
terms-of-trade deteriorations. The correct balance between the redistributive and risk-
reduction roles of safety nets will ultimately depend upon country-specific factors. 
Safety nets therefore do not only protect individuals from transient periods of poverty, 
say due to loss of employment, sudden illness, or natural disasters, but also serve to protect 
individuals from lifetime poverty that can arise from, say, lack of education and poor health, 
particularly in childhood. Hence, when considering how much governments should be 
spending on such programs, the long-run intertemporal, intergenerational, and wider social 
benefits should all be taken into account as well as considering the short-run alleviation of 
poverty. 
In all countries, we observe three types of vulnerable individual. Different safety nets 
will be able to assist these different groups. First, there are the chronically poor whose 
income levels remains below an acceptable minimum, typically set through a poverty line. 
These individuals remain in such a state even during periods of economic growth and in the 
absence of microeconomic and macroeconomic shocks. The second vulnerable group 
consists of the temporarily poor whose income levels fluctuate above and below the poverty 
line in times of shocks. Thirdly, we also recognize the existence of those individuals who fall 
into poverty in phases of macroeconomic adjustment, for example, people who lost their jobs 
during the transition of Eastern European countries toward a market economy, e.g., due to 
privatization or the bankruptcy of government-owned enterprises. 
However, although safety nets should be targeted toward each of these groups, it should 
not be thought that the non-poor do not benefit from such social expenditures. We will 
discuss how the non-poor also benefit from such programs in the next section. 
The Benefits of Safety Nets 
Following on our definition of what types of social assistance constitute safety nets, we can 
now be clear about the exact benefits of such expenditures: 
•  Redistribution: safety nets aid in transferring resources to the poor, and thus in 
protecting them from poverty in both the short- and the long-run. It can be argued 
that this raises the welfare of both the poor and the non-poor if the society is averse 
to inequality. The programs can be targeted at the individual, household, or 
community level to raise the well-being of the poor to levels above the minimum 
standards that are accepted nationally and internationally. (Albania, for example, 
has a program of social assistance that operates through community-level 
institutions). Redistribution need not be at the expense of growth, and a growing 5 
body of literature identifies cases where redistributive policies have led to growth 
enhancements (see Benabou 1996). 
•  Economic efficiency: this can then be improved through each of the following 
mechanisms: 
(i)  We know that if the allocation of resources in a sector characterized by 
imperfect information, missing markets (especially in insurance), public 
goods, or externalities, is left to market forces, then the equilibrium 
allocation will be non-optimal due to these sources of market failure. Safety 
net expenditures often serve to correct these types of market failure (see 
Benabou 1996). 
(ii)  The poor will not have to resort to using short-run coping strategies, such as 
selling their assets in times of crisis, and so will be left better off in the long-
run. 
(iii) By becoming less vulnerable to income shocks, the poor will also be able to 
invest in their human and physical capital, namely they will be more willing 
to spend time and resources on education and machinery, for example. 
(iv) There will be reduced incentives for individuals to enter into marginalized 
economic activities such as working in the black economy or informal 
sectors, or engaging in criminal activities. This should not only save 
government resources in preventing such activities, but may generate higher 
tax revenues which can then be ploughed back into social assistance. 
•  Political economy: social assistance to the poor may empower them to engage in 
the policymaking process at both a local and national level. This may well reduce 
the probability of socially inefficient political decisions being made solely for the 
benefit of elites or certain special interest groups, or other types of political failure. 
The engagement of the poor in the policymaking process can have self-enforcing 
effects in that, if a government demonstrates a commitment to reducing poverty, 
incentives increase for political organizing by the poor—who, as we have argued, 
are a heterogeneous group. The poor are therefore in a better position to place 
policies designed specifically for themselves onto the political agenda. This may 
have the effect of raising support for the government in the long run. 
•  Social cohesion: safety nets can play an important role in providing for social 
cohesion in a number of ways: 
(i)  At times of macroeconomic crisis or adjustment processes, hard economic 
decisions often have to be made. By raising social cohesion, safety nets may 
raise the political acceptability of market-based reforms that often need to be 
made in the aftermath of economic crisis to enable a country to reach a path 
of sustainable growth. They also demonstrate a government’s commitment 
to social welfare issues. Venezuela, for example, introduced a package of 14 
programs to accompany its policy of structural adjustment. 
(ii)  If society is averse to having unequal opportunities available to individuals 
or income inequality per se, then safety nets can improve social cohesion. 
Empirical support is growing for this view of safety nets as a form of social cohesion. 
For instance, Sala-i-Martin (1997), using cross-country data, shows that public transfers have 
a positive correlation with growth and may therefore also be a productive input into national 
output. The mechanism by which public transfers affect output is argued to be that of social 
cohesion—increased transfers reduce social unrest, which enhances the conditions for growth 
and more than offsets any negative effects of the distortionary taxation required to fund the 6 
transfers in the first place. Rodrik (1998) provides cross-country evidence on the efficiency 
gains to be had from government provision of social services, and in particular their 
provision through effective government-level institutions. His empirical evidence appears to 
suggest that those economies with good institutional frameworks are most able to deal with 
external shocks in the long run. Economies with weak institutions tend to delay price and 
fiscal adjustments in response to shocks, thus diverting resources away from productive and 
entrepreneurial activities, and increasing uncertainty in the economic environment. In 
essence, high-quality institutions can be seen as one mechanism to deal with internal 
conflicts over resources when economies are hit by external shocks. 
Types of Safety Net 
We can now be precise about the types of programs that make up safety nets. These can take 
the form of cash or income transfers, such as pensions, child allowances, unemployment 
benefits, or microfinance, or they can be transfers in kind of commodities such as food 
subsidies, housing subsidies, or energy subsidies. They may provide income indirectly by 
offering vulnerable groups employment in public works programs or more broadly, by 
providing services such as health and education. Given our earlier definition of safety net 
programs as interventions that are designed to play a redistributive role and to provide greater 
opportunities for individuals to mitigate risks from unforeseen contingencies, we focus 
narrowly on the following types of policies. 
Cash Transfers 
The two most common types of cash transfers are forms of social assistance, targeted to 
vulnerable groups in society such as the unemployed, children, the disabled, or pensioners, 
and forms of financial assistance to families. Often these are based upon the number of 
children living in the household. 
The World Bank and others have carried out a number of studies of such programs 
including family allowances in Hungary, Russia and the Kyrgyz Republic; pensions in India; 
unemployment benefits in Jordan (the National Assistance Fund); the Janasaviya Program in 
Sri Lanka, which pays for two years of basic training for targeted household heads; and a 
Namibian scheme of transfers to children of AIDS-infected parents. 
In-Kind Transfers 
These can involve transfers of commodities, such as rice or kerosene. The advantage of such 
transfers is that they are less susceptible than cash transfers to periods of high inflation, when 
the value of the latter can be quickly eroded. By their nature, in-kind transfers are less 
fungible than cash transfers, so they are often argued to be a more cost-effective means by 
which to raise welfare if they are correctly targeted. 
Several types of in-kind transfers have been implemented—general price subsidies 
(predominantly in African and Middle-Eastern countries), quantity rationing (South Asia), 
food stamps (Latin America), and nutritional interventions such as direct food transfers, 
which are prevalent everywhere. In addition, there is also extensive use of housing subsidies 
throughout Eastern Europe. 
Public Works 
These programs are often implemented only during a downturn in the economic cycle. As 
well as providing employment for the poor, the programs also serve to build a nation’s 7 
infrastructure, an essential component of any development policy. It is important to keep the 
costs of participating in such programs low, e.g., by minimizing traveling distances, in order 
for them to be effective in reaching the poor. Hence there are non-poor gainers from such 
programs. Examples of such schemes include the public employment schemes in Argentina 
(the Trabajar Program), Bolivia (Emergency Social Fund), Chile, China, and India. 
Informal Safety Nets 
In many societies we also tend to observe the existence of informal networks of support, 
based perhaps on kinship or community ties, that also seek to mitigate against income 
shocks. For example, in many Islamic countries such as Pakistan, the informal institution of 
zakat acts as a tax on wealth, collected by mosques and redistributed to the poor. In many 
Sub-Saharan countries and in India, there is a system of labor transfers within communities. 
Finally, in China, there are structural features of the rural economy, such as universal and 
egalitarian access to land, which help to insure individuals against adverse outcomes. 
A key issue for policymakers is whether such private transfers are crowded out by 
publicly provided social expenditures and, if so, to what extent this crowding out occurs. 
There is a large body of literature that deals with exactly this issue and this will be discussed 
in more detail later in this paper. 
One of the main factors determining the effectiveness of safety nets is their ability to 
correctly target the poor. Targeting can be based either on self-reports from individuals 
(where incentives must be provided for individuals to truthfully report their well-being) or on 
measured household characteristics or regional characteristics. 
The other crucial issue regarding the ability of these programs to effectively reach and 
be able to help the poor, is the manner in which they are implemented. For effective 
implementation we require a supportive institutional framework, i.e., one that is not subject 
to corruption or rent-seeking, or that is not plagued by bureaucracy, and where the rule of law 
is respected. It is one of the key objectives of the empirical analysis in this paper to examine 
how well governments perform in the provision of safety nets, relative to international 
benchmarks when institutional quality is explicitly taken into account. 
III. Safety Nets and Welfare 
Policy Objectives 
To be able to address the question of how much countries should spend on safety nets, we 
require some objective function to be evaluated. There are two principle ways in which this 
can be done. First, we can take our basis from economic theory, which suggests that, when 
the marginal benefits of different types of social expenditure are equal to the marginal costs 
of raising public funds, an efficient outcome is reached. However, the data requirements for 
such an analysis are unreasonable, especially on the benefits side. 
An alternative way in which an objective may be defined is in terms of outcomes 
directly, such as reducing the poverty gap by x%, reducing income variability, reducing the 
percentage of the population affected by natural disasters or communicable diseases, 
increasing participation rates in the labor force, or reducing the incidence of child labor. 
However, it is still the case that in order to assess whether such a policy is feasible, cost 8 
considerations still come into play. Such policy targets may be unattainable given resource 
constraints that are not taken into account explicitly. 
A third method to address the question of how much governments ought to spend is to 
adopt some measure of where a safety net should be set (effectively setting the poverty line), 
such as a dollar per day or half the median income, and then see whether social expenditures 
do indeed reach those that they should, or identify which subgroups of the poor are most 
effectively targeted. Unlike the previous two approaches, there is no need to consider the 
costs of provision here as it is taken as given that what governments are observed to be doing 
is actually feasible. 
Defining and Measuring Poverty 
All of these three methods presuppose that poverty can be measured, but this is by no means 
a straightforward issue either. The first thing to decide upon is the metric we believe best 
approximates welfare, in order to be able to measure poverty. The alternatives available 
include income, needs, and capabilities. To take income as a measure of well-being is to 
focus on the commodity basis of well-being, but often our intuition suggests that claims over 
commodities are not the only factors that contribute to well-being. Uncertainty regarding 
one’s economic environment, the set of available opportunities, non-market sources of 
welfare, and one’s biological and physical status are not easily captured in the framework of 
commodity possession. Furthermore, as has been pointed out by Dreze and Sen (1990) it is 
typically at times of economic crisis such as drought or floods that the mapping between an 
individual’s income and entitlements to market-produced goods becomes most unclear. 
An alternative route is to measure well-being in terms of an individual’s needs. The 
issue then becomes what set of needs constitute an individual’s basic needs, which if not met 
would imply the individual was poor. Even if a consensus can be reached on this bundle of 
basic needs, in practice this approach often tends to revert to converting such a bundle into 
the equivalent amount of income required to purchase it. 
Using the capabilities of an individual, i.e., what an individual is able to do and be, was 
first introduced by Sen (1985). The aim is to be able to incorporate non-market sources of 
welfare such as available opportunities, political empowerment, and so forth. The notion of 
capabilities underpins the Human Development Index, and has thus been used to provide the 
basis of international comparisons in well-being. Measures such as the prevalence of diseases 
(such as AIDS or malaria), or hours worked by children, may be particular measures of 
capabilities that can be employed. 
Ultimately, however, until micro-data is collected on capabilities, it appears as if some 
income-related measures, such as consumption or expenditures, will be used in studies that 
address the question of how much governments ought to spend on safety nets. The case in 
favor of such income-related measures is not only made on the grounds of data availability, but 
also the strong evidence that exists that many other welfare outcomes, such as mortality, 
nutritional status, and life expectancy at birth, are all highly correlated with income levels. 
Hence, income, while far from being a perfect measure of well-being, captures at least to some 
degree some of the wider notions of well-being that these alternative metrics capture. Work is 
ongoing by the World Bank and others to construct indicators of poverty along the dimensions 
of risk and vulnerability, social exclusion, and access to social capital, which may all prove in 9 
the long run to be preferable measures of welfare when addressing the particular question of 
safety net spending. 
Given that we have established some measurement of poverty, we still have to 
determine where the poverty line must be set. The literature on this is huge (see Lipton and 
Ravallion (1995) or Ravallion (1998) for good reviews), but the main issues are whether the 
poverty line should be defined in absolute or relative terms and if, or how, to take account of 
the degree of inequality and heterogeneity amongst the poor. Armed with a poverty line, we 
are now in a position both to motivate policy and focus the attention of policymakers on the 
plight of the poor, and to address the effectiveness and distribution of benefits arising from 
safety net expenditures for a given objective. 
Existing Methodologies 
There is a large body of literature, discussed below, which attempts to assess whether 
governments spend the desired amount by assessing the welfare impacts of social 
expenditures and also whether such policies are efficiently targeted. The principal methods 
by which to assess the welfare impact of social expenditures are benefit incidence studies, 
behavioral approaches, and computable general equilibrium (CGE) models. See Selden and 
Wasylenko (1992), van de Walle and Neads (1995) and van de Walle (1998) for surveys of 
the literature, and Hammer (1997) for an alternative discussion of the issues. Data limitations 
have meant that these studies have been largely focused upon developed Central and South 
American economies. 
Benefit Incidence Studies 
Benefit incidence studies are the benchmark public economics cost-benefit approach to 
evaluating government interventions. These studies tend to focus on a particular type of 
expenditure, rather than public expenditures in general. They proceed by first grouping 
households or individuals according to some indicator of living standards. In order to make 
valid international and intertemporal distributional comparisons, this welfare indicator may 
be adjusted to take account of variations in the cost of living, say between rural and urban 
regions, and household demographics through some equivalence scale such as those 
discussed by Deaton and Muellbauer (1986) and Browning (1992). Earlier studies such as 
Meerman (1979) and Selowsky (1979) used household size as an equivalence scale. Later 
studies used equivalence scales but Jarvis and Micklewright (1995) argue that the results of 
benefit incidence studies are often found not to be robust to the equivalence scale used. 
The method then assumes that the benefit which accrues to households can be proxied 
by the value of government expenditures. Having obtained a poverty profile, we can use 
observations on the number of actual beneficiaries to form a distribution of social 
expenditure across the welfare groups, which is then taken to be an indicator of the benefit 
incidence. The method then allows us to classify a program as either being progressive or 
regressive and to examine the actual effectiveness of targeting policy. 
Benefit incidence studies have been employed for the past two decades, beginning with 
the papers by Reynolds and Smolensky (1977), Meerman (1979), Selowsky (1979), LeGrand 
(1982), and Gruske (1985). More recently, benefit incidence studies have been conducted by: 
Bahl, Kim, and Park (1986) in Korea: Riboud (1990) in Costa Rica; Ravallion, van de Walle, 
and Gautman (1995), who look at the distributional impacts of cash benefits introduced to 10 
compensate for policy reforms in Hungary; the collection of papers in van de Walle and 
Nead (1995) such as Alderman and others on education in Pakistan, Deolalikar on the 
impacts of health expenditures on children in different income groups in Indonesia, and 
Selden and Wasylenko on educational expenditures in Peru; Prescott (1997), who examines 
the efficiency of targeting of education, health, and social transfers in Vietnam; and Hanmer 
and others (1998), who examine health expenditures in Zimbabwe. 
Such studies are methodologically straightforward to implement and can provide 
information on how the benefits of public interventions are distributed across the poor, but 
give no clear indication of whether the efficiency criteria on levels of expenditure are 
satisfied. In practical terms, the data requirements can be severe, especially to construct 
welfare rankings. However, this method is also subject to a number of deeper criticisms. 
Most of these apply more broadly to most policy studies, not just those evaluating the 
benefits of safety nets. 
The fact that such studies take the benefits that accrue to an individual to be well 
proxied by the average cost of provision to that individual can also be called into question. 
For example, the unit cost of immunization can be considered to be small relative to the 
lifetime benefits. The issue is complicated both because well-being is multi-dimensional and 
because the estimation of outcomes in the counterfactual world without public spending is 
not straightforward. More specifically, this would require us to calculate the extent of the 
crowding out of private and informal transfers by public transfers. Such data are typically not 
available. 
Benefit incidence studies implicitly assume that there is a uniform cost of service 
provision over all households, or that the public good is homogeneous. To the extent that this 
is not the case, they may lead to incorrect inferences regarding the distribution of benefits of 
social expenditures. 
The method, being a partial equilibrium analysis, implicitly assumes that relative prices 
and real incomes do not change, and that marginal benefits are equal to average benefits. 
However, there may be a divergence between average and marginal benefits. For example, if 
there are increasing returns to scale from public expenditures, which may be the case for 
infrastructural investments such as roads or electrification, then the marginal benefit is likely 
to be greater than the average, as such public goods are provided to more households. A 
characteristic that this methodology has in common with behavioral approaches is that it 
assumes the geographical distribution of the population to be static. In the case of developing 
countries, regions well-endowed with public services can induce population inflows or cause 
wage differentials to arise which lead to worker migration (see Todaro 1969, Williamson 
1988). 
In the context of developing countries, benefit incidence studies have to take account of 
the possibility of resale of public goods, especially due to the presence of a large informal 
sector. Moreover, theory suggests that we can expect institutional structures such as 
interlinked factor markets, informal labor markets, to mean that the recipients of public 
services pass on any actual welfare benefits to moneylenders or landlords. We may expect 
this to be particularly the case in agricultural programs designed to raise farm incomes. 11 
Benefit incidence studies typically take no account of behavioral responses by 
households to the introduction of public programs. Theory suggests that households will 
change their behavior, for example with regard to labor supply (females in particular may be 
able to devote more time to home production activities such as child care if their spouses are 
able to devote more time to the labor market), investment (as households become better off 
they may be more able to invest in education, health services, and fixed productive assets), 
consumption (households may be able to transfer budgets toward more nutritious foods), and 
private transfers of resources or time either within or across households. Empirical evidence 
is found in favor of such crowding out by Barro (1974), Andreoni (1990),  Jimenez and Cox 
(1992) and Cox and Jimenez (1995), although such estimates do not suggest full crowding 
out. For example, Jimenez and Cox (1992) find that social security payments in Peru reduced 
private transfers from young to old by 20 percent. 
Another limitation of this approach is that the use of cross-sectional household data only 
allows for the identification of static effects. This means that we do not capture various other 
benefits of safety net expenditure. For example, policies that are designed to alleviate chronic 
poverty may well have lifetime benefits for the individual. There may also be spillover social 
effects on other individuals in the household or between households in a community. Finally, 
there may also be intergenerational benefits of social expenditures. If, for example, parents 
are provided with employment, they may be more willing to educate their children, which we 
would expect to raise the lifetime earnings of the children. In short, not only are short-term 
behavioral responses ignored, but also lifetime, social, and intergenerational effects. 
In addition, many of the forms of intervention that safety nets take are responding to the 
existence of some form of market failure, such as the presence of externalities or public 
goods. These elements are usually not captured in benefit incidence studies. 
Furthermore, most of the available data are at the household level, yet ultimately we are 
concerned with the effects on individual welfare. This requires us to make assumptions about 
intrahousehold allocation mechanisms. The most common assumption made in the literature 
is simply to take per capita (or some other equivalization) consumption levels. However, 
there is much evidence that we may not have such equitable intrahousehold distributions, 
especially based upon gender or age (see Haddad and Kanbur 1990, 1993, Deaton, Parikh, 
and Subramanian 1994, and Deaton and Paxson 1996). On the other hand, we can also argue 
that, if households are not credit-constrained, then consumption will track permanent income, 
and so by using consumption as a welfare measure, we are in fact capturing how households 
react to dynamic and stochastic income shocks. 
Such analysis does not establish the underlying mechanisms through which individuals 
respond to social expenditures. In essence, it is only the demand and supply of social 
expenditure, across welfare groups, that is identified, but such partial analysis does not allow 
us to recover equilibrating prices. Nor can we calculate the marginal incidence of policies. It 
is the average incidence which is identified, and this may hide much of the interesting 
information about the size of actual benefits across different welfare groups. 
Notwithstanding such criticisms, we can still draw some broad conclusions from this 
literature. First, most studies find that expenditures on health, education, social transfers, and 
food subsidies are progressive inasmuch as they are higher for the poor as a fraction of their 
initial income or expenditure. However, it is generally concluded that the absolute benefits 12 
tend to also increase with household income. It is also typically found, for those studies that 
make such a distinction, that benefits in urban regions are relatively greater than those in 
rural locations. However, most studies also highlight the need to disaggregate expenditures as 
much as possible. For instance, the progressivity of primary education expenditures is far 
greater than that of secondary education expenditures in most cases. The same issues arise 
when looking at different types of health service. 
Behavioral Approaches 
The second class of studies consists of behavioral approaches. These studies, while still 
operating in a partial equilibrium framework, do take explicit account of behavioral 
responses, and they also estimate the marginal and not the average incidence. The general 
methodology is to devise a means by which to evaluate the recipient’s own valuation of the 
benefits received. In early studies, this valuation was proxied by the consumer surplus the 
individual obtained. It has long been realized, however, that this ignores the income effects 
of relative price changes. If preferences are known or can be inferred, then a compensated 
demand curve, along which utility is held constant, can be used to calculate the underlying 
utility function of consumers (see McKenzie 1983) on which measures of welfare benefits 
can be based, such as the real income per adult equivalent, and equivalent and compensating 
variations. This is precisely what later studies have done. 
There are really two main issues concerning this approach. The first is how to obtain 
consistent estimates of estimated parameters from an econometric model and be sure that 
such estimated parameters actually correspond to the underlying structural parameters of the 
economy. The problems associated with this are again not unique to the analysis of safety 
nets, but apply to the evaluation of government policy in general. The second issue is the 
same as it was for benefit incidence studies, namely how to obtain some measures of benefits 
to undertake welfare analysis. This second factor has been discussed before, so for the 
remainder of this section we will concentrate on the first issue of recovering consistent 
parameter estimates. 
It is well known that problems can arise in identifying consistent preferences if, for 
example, behavior does not accord with the underlying assumptions of utility theory. Also, 
the very fact that no markets exist for public goods makes the identification of the utility 
derived from their consumption problematic. In response to these issues, a literature on 
identification of the willingness to pay has been established which specifically studies the 
demand for public goods (see, for example, Gertler and others 1987, 1989, 1990). These 
studies allow calculation of willingness to pay across income, or other, subgroups. Hence, it 
is possible to examine, for example, whether the poor gain more on the margin than the rich 
from a given type of social spending. They deal with the issue of missing markets by 
proxying prices by the totality of monetary and non-monetary costs of public provision. 
Another strand of the behavioral response literature uses non-monetary welfare metrics 
such as nutritional status, mortality, or literacy rates to assess the benefits of public 
expenditures. In practical terms, they do this by assessing the impact on such outcome 
measures of a set of inputs including socioeconomic background, income, prices, and public 
expenditures and complementary services. Examples of this approach are Deolalikar (1995) 
on health expenditures in Indonesia and Alderman and others (1995) on public schooling in 
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The main issue to be dealt with in such approaches is how to recover unbiased estimates 
of policy effects. The problem is that, by using policy variables as explanatory variables, we 
can typically expect these variables to be correlated with the error term, thus leading to 
biased estimates for ordinary least squares regressions. This correlation can arise from 
simultaneity, omitted variables, selection, or heterogeneity. We shall briefly discuss each of 
these in turn. 
If policy is targeted using the same welfare indicator as the dependent variable, or 
another indicator highly correlated with this one, then policy is actually simultaneously 
determined with the distribution of welfare. For example, Besley and Case (1994) suggest 
using political variables that influence policy outcomes but are uncorrelated with welfare 
levels as an identification strategy. The policy itself is endogenously determined and its 
inclusion as an explanatory variable thus leads to standard ordinary least squares (OLS) 
endogeneity bias. 
Pitt, Rosenzweig, and Gibbons (1995) look at the impact of government placement 
programs in Indonesia while explicitly controlling for the non-random allocation of this 
policy. They do this by examining the changes in outcomes over time in a given region 
(before and after the introduction of the policy). Such a fixed-effects procedure eliminates 
any unobservable program placement effects under the identifying assumption that the 
region-specific and time-varying shocks that affect program placement are uncorrelated with 
region-specific and time-varying shocks in the policy outcome equations. They find the 
simultaneity bias to be large enough to reverse the policy conclusions. 
Alternatively, there may be some omitted variable that determines both policy incidence 
and welfare levels. An example of this may be policies introduced to locations in close 
proximity to urban centers, where welfare indicators are higher per se, e.g., due to a higher 
level of community assets, even before the implementation of policy. 
Similar biases arise using OLS if there is a selection rule operating for those who 
receive the policy treatment so that the policy recipients are not a random sample of the 
population, or if there is some unobservable characteristic of individuals that influences 
whether they are subject to the policy, e.g., if only more able or well-motivated individuals 
seek to receive the policy treatment. Typically, the researcher can employ a Heckman 
procedure to introduce an additional selection variable in the equation of interest, which 
accounts for the potential correlation between the error term and the other covariates in the 
equation. 
In short, when using cross-sectional data, it is very difficult to separate the effects of 
policy on welfare from the effects of all other observables and unobservables. The issues of 
bias can be partly ameliorated using fixed-effects estimation in panel data, using instruments 
for policy incidence, or using natural experiments when individuals randomly receive the 
policy treatment. The use of panel data in theory allows us also to determine both dynamic 
and behavioral effects, but this is easier to say than actually implement. There is now a 
growing literature exploiting such data sets, such as van de Walle, Ravallion, and Gautman 
(1994) and Ravallion, van de Walle, and Gautman (1995) on safety nets in Hungary. 
There is also a growing number of studies that seek to exploit natural experiments. Here, 
the control and comparison groups occur naturally, and if we can observe all individuals 14 
before and after the policy intervention, then using a difference-in-difference estimating 
procedure, the researcher can recover consistent estimates of policy effects. The underlying 
assumptions required for this method to work are that the disturbance term is additive in 
fixed and time effects, that there are common time effects across all individuals, and that 
there are no compositional changes in either group over time. The best known of such studies 
is that of Card and Krueger (1994) on the introduction of minimum wage legislation in the 
United States, and in the United Kingdom there are papers on the welfare-to-work program 
that use the natural experiments framework. 
Despite having to deal with such a range of potential econometric difficulties, the 
literature on behavioral responses has shed light on a number of issues. A robust result from 
the majority of studies appears to indicate that demand for public services is price-inelastic 
and that there is much variation in this elasticity over income groups, with the poor being 
more price-sensitive, as we would expect. In a sense, these results shed little light directly on 
the question of how much governments ought to spend. The main conclusions have been 
mostly related to identifying the beneficiaries of safety net expenditures, and examining 
whether safety net expenditures have been effectively targeted toward the poor. 
Computable General Equilibrium Models 
Unlike the previously described methods, a general equilibrium model of social expenditure 
does not attempt to estimate parameters of the economy. Rather, computations are based 
upon given parameter values, and then the researcher attempts to discover how predicted 
outcomes change in response to these imputed parameter values. 
The key advantage of such a modeling approach is that the researcher can specify a 
complete model of behavioral responses to social transfers, and thus incorporate the 
crowding-out effects of safety nets, as well as recovering equilibrium prices and so forth. The 
issue remains the reliability of the imputed parameter estimates, and whether robust 
conclusions can be drawn. 
There are relatively few studies that have attempted such an analysis, one being Piggott 
and Whalley (1987). They are forced to make a number of simplifying assumptions, such as 
efficient provision of public services, in order to be able to make their model tractable. Their 
aim is to compare the two approaches above, hence they explicitly take into account how 
consumer surplus and the welfare costs of taxation change with increased social 
expenditures, and they also calculate the average and marginal welfare gains of public 
spending. Their results vary depending upon the imputed values of certain key parameters, 
which probably implies that more studies of the former types should be conducted to better 
empirically estimate such parameters. Other CGE papers include those of Hertel (1989) and 
Parikh and Srinivasan (1989) on agricultural policy. 
When asking how much governments ought to spend, this type of study really requires 
precisely estimated parameters to have been estimated in prior studies. It is hard to 
extrapolate general implications from each of these studies. Given all of the econometric 
problems to be dealt with in order to be able to do this, it seems as if there is a long way to go 
before we can confidently use such a class of models to form the basis of policy interventions 
across countries. 15 
IV. Our Contribution 
Summary of Previous Methodologies 
Ideally, in order to be able to answer the question of how much governments ought to 
optimally spend on safety nets, we would have the data available to estimate whether the 
marginal benefits of different types of social expenditure are equal to the marginal cost of 
raising public funds, thus ensuring resources are efficiently employed. In addition, we should 
be able to define poverty and measure welfare in ways that approximate the true well-being 
of individuals. However, as we have argued, it is unlikely to be the case that all of the 
conditions are adequately satisfied. Hence, we have a number of second best approaches 
which may be able to shed light on the same question. Before we detail our alternative 
methodological approach, let us summarize the previous discussion on how we may address 
the question of how much governments ought to spend on safety nets. 
The first approach of benefit incidence studies was seen to rely on the availability of 
large amounts of information, and was a partial equilibrium approach, ignoring the potential 
crowding-out effects on private transfers, or market failures in general. 
The behavioral approach attempts to determine the underlying demand function for 
safety net expenditures. The issues here relate to, first, how well such analysis controls for 
potential sources of econometric bias arising from omitted variables, the simultaneous 
determination of relevant outcomes and program placement, the non-random selectivity of 
individuals into a program, unobservable individual heterogeneity, and so forth. Secondly, 
we have concerns regarding how well estimated parameters map back to structural 
parameters of the economy in order for us to be able to extrapolate our experiences across 
programs and countries. 
Both of these approaches have been closer to addressing the questions of: (i) whether 
the poor are effectively targeted by safety net programs, and (ii) what the distribution of 
benefits of safety net expenditures is. We can relate such questions to the central question 
here of how much governments ought to spend by noting that, first, if the poor are not 
effectively being targeted then that would suggest that resources are being used non-
optimally in that the marginal benefits accruing to the non-poor would typically be less than 
those that would accrue to the poor. The policy lesson to be drawn from this is that 
governments should either cut back such expenditures or retarget them toward the poor using 
some alternative targeting mechanism. Secondly, if it appears that there is wide dispersion of 
marginal benefits across the population of the poor, this again suggests a non-optimal level of 
spending. A necessary condition for an efficient outcome to have been reached would be the 
equalization of marginal benefits across the poor. 
Our Methodology 
The methodology we employ to address what level of social spending governments ought to 
attain is quite different from those previously discussed. We resolve the difficulties of 
defining an objective function by taking the view that what governments can potentially do in 
terms of spending on various types of social safety net expenditures, as well as the total level 
of government expenditures, is given by what governments across the world are actually 
observed to be doing on average. We thus take as given that what countries are observed to 16 
be doing is an indication of what it is feasible to do. It is this underlying notion of 
benchmarking that both serves as the basis of our analysis and provides a useful framework 
to convince governments to put more effort into such policies. 
In essence, our aim is to be able to obtain some measure correlated with a government’s 
effort into effective spending on safety nets, relative to what other governments are seen to 
be doing. Suppose that the outcome that we observe on any policy for country s at time t, xst, 
can be written as 
xst = βest +γ yst +ηt +εst 
where est is some measure of government effort, yst is a vector of characteristics affecting the 
ability of the economy to produce these outcomes, ηt is a common “shock,” which all the 
economies in question experience and εst is an idiosyncratic shock uncorrelated with 
everything else. In general, data constraints mean that we can get only an imperfect set of 
controls (yst). Our methodology is to use these data to obtain information on the unobservable 
level of government effort (est). 
Suppose that government effort put into delivering policy is dependent on the costs and 
the payoffs that it faces for doing so. Let the payoff be denoted by r (e; i), where i is some 
measure of the information available to those designing the reward structure. This payoff can 
be interpreted by politicians as the value of holding office. The interesting case is where 
improved information raises the marginal benefit of putting in effort. However, this is by no 
means inevitable. 
The idea of designing meaningful benchmarking is to lead governments to increase the 
effort that they put into delivering outcomes. We propose using rank order information as a 
measure of government performance. This is useful provided that information about the rank 
conveys information about unobserved effort on the basis of which rewards can be designed. 
The conditions under which this will happen are that 
•  ηt ≠0. 






Our methodology produces rankings that allow us to benchmark country performance. 
Our first ranking is based upon the unconditional policy outcome, xst, namely the level of 
safety net spending. We then construct rankings conditional on observable features of the 
economy, and these will be based upon the information contained in the conditional level of 
safety net spending,  st st y x γˆ − . We do this controlling for structural features of the economy 
that determine the ability of the country to finance such expenditures, the need for such 
expenditures, and the quality of the country’s institutions. 
Each ranking gives us a series of benchmarks to which countries’ relative performance 
can be compared, as well as to their neighbors or economies at a similar stage of 17 
development. In a sense, we are not asking how much governments should spend; rather, our 
methodological approach is to form an impression of the benchmark performance of 
governments. We thus avoid many of the data requirements in tackling the question of how 
much it is optimal for governments to spend. We also avoid the need to form an indicator of 
welfare to assess the benefits of safety nets, because we look at how much governments 
actually are spending relative to some international norm. One way to think about our 
approach (moving from the unconditional ranking xst to the conditional ranking where we 
control for features of the economy,  st st y x γˆ − ) is to think of it as an attempt to estimate a 
demand function for social expenditures and then examine its properties. This equation 
embodies some features of the underlying decision process of policymakers. 
The first thing to note is that there is wide variation in the levels of expenditures on 
safety nets across countries. It is hard to justify these variations simply on the basis that some 
governments are better informed about the optimal level of expenditures than others. Rather, 
these differences across countries will clearly be related to the levels of poverty and needs for 
these social expenditures, to the ability of governments to meet these needs subject to 
resource constraints, but also to underlying differences in preferences and objective functions 
of policymakers across societies. Furthermore, these differences may be reflective of the 
varying institutional factors across countries that we have argued will influence the ability of 
governments to effectively reach the poor for a given level of social expenditures. Our 
methodology will attempt to account for the variation in the observed levels of expenditures 
by first accounting for features that can be considered to be structural to the economy, in the 
sense that these capture both the need for safety nets and a country’s ability to pay for them, 
and then additionally controlling for how much of the remaining observed variation in 
expenditure levels is due to differences in institutional features of each economy. 
To be able to disentangle these two sources of variation in safety net expenditures is 
important for two reasons. First, it allows us to see what structural features of an economy 
contribute to safety net expenditures, and so we uncover a basic demand function for social 
expenditures. Secondly, we can separate out these effects from those related to institutional 
quality. We can thus make policy prescriptions based upon both the underlying features of 
the economy and recommendations related to the reform of institutions. Being able to offer 
policy advice on both of these dimensions is not possible using the existing methodologies 
discussed earlier. Furthermore, our analysis uses benchmarking to motivate governments to 
act in accordance with policy recommendations. 
In order to make the relative performance of countries easily comparable, we prefer to 
report our results in terms of the ranking of countries relative to each other, when each is 
compared to the international norm. The ranks of each country provide a simple summary 
statistic that can be presented to governments to argue the case for more (or less) safety net 
expenditure. Furthermore, the currently available cross-country data series do not allow us to 
control for all the structural features that we believe would drive safety net spending. This 
may lead to concerns about potential sources of bias affecting our estimates. In this case, the 
use of rankings, rather than a literal interpretation of the parameter estimates, can make our 
results slightly more robust. We will discuss this in more detail in section five. 
The way in which this international norm is established, and the various rankings that 
we shall form, will also be discussed in further detail in section five. For the remainder of 
this section, we wish to focus attention upon the determinants of safety net programs. In 18 
attempting to fairly compare levels of safety net expenditures across countries, we will first 
need to be able to establish what these factors may be. 
Summary of Benchmarking 
•  Benchmarking allows governments to compare their own performance with that of 
their neighbors. This can motivate governments to act on policy advice. 
•  Benchmarking through the use of use of rankings conveys information on the 
underlying effort being put in by governments on these policy outcomes, in a very 
clear manner. The data requirements to construct these rankings are minimal 
compared to alternative methodologies. 
•  Our methodology allows for the policy debate to be conducted in terms of the 
structural features of an economy, as well as the design of institutions within the 
country, with a view toward improving rankings. 
•  We do this by constructing three ranks—first, a ranking based upon unconditional 
expenditures on safety nets; second, a ranking conditioning on structural features of 
the economy; and third, a ranking also conditioning on the institutional quality 
within the country. 
What Determines the Need for these Programs? 
The real primitives of any economy are tastes, production technology, endowments, and the 
distribution of information. From these primitives it is possible to identify situations when 
government intervention is either advisable or necessary. Rather than starting from these 
primitives, in our analytical framework we prefer to begin one step ahead by looking at 
various institutional and country-specific factors that determine the need for social safety 
nets. The four factors that will determine the appropriate level of safety net spending are 
discussed below. Though we recognize that these primitives may be endogenous to 
government intervention, they nonetheless have the advantage that they may (i) be directly 
linked to policies and (ii) are measurable in data. 
Factor A: Underlying Distribution of Productive Ability 
The distribution of such factors as physical assets (e.g., land), human capital, and labor 
power will influence the need for social safety nets. Access to assets, levels of education and 
skills, and labor will affect individuals' ability to avoid chronic poverty and to protect 
themselves from shocks. 
Factor B: Institutions for Private Provision 
Families, friends, and informal networks represent the main means of social protection in 
developing countries. Individuals can also rely on markets to protect themselves from 
specific contingencies such as poor health and downturns in income. How well these 
institutions of private provision function will therefore determine the need for social safety 
nets. This, in turn, will be a function of the degree of social and market development in a 
given economy. Therefore, the need for intervention will tend to be less when there is more 
equal distribution of productive ability and where institutions for private provision (both 
formal and informal networks) function well. 
Factor C: Quality of Government 
Factors A and B miss out on the fact that government is also an institution, the quality of 
which will determine the appropriate level of spending on social safety nets. Therefore, 19 
where bureaucratic integrity is low and preferences of the poor are not represented in the 
allocation of fiscal resources, it may be inappropriate to expand spending on social safety 
nets. 
In other words, if the institutional framework of an economy is misallocating resources, 
e.g., to special interest groups or those that are most vocal, as opposed to those in the greatest 
need, then the correct policy prescription to prescribe may be a reduction in such 
expenditures. For the reasons we made clear in section two, incorrectly targeted social 
expenditures that primarily benefit the non-poor will likely harm social cohesion and increase 
the resources spent on marginalized economic activities such as the black economy, which in 
the long run will only serve to reduce a country’s sustainable level of income growth and 
weaken its ability to respond effectively to external shocks and crisis. Furthermore, 
improving the functioning of institutions may be a necessary precondition before it is 
appropriate to increase expenditures on social safety nets. Also, it may be optimal for a 
country with a poor quality of government to spend little on social safety nets, as this 
expenditure will have only limited impact on poverty alleviation. 
Factor D: The Nature of Shocks Affecting the Region or Country 
Some countries are prone to natural calamities such as droughts and floods. Integration into 
the global economy via trade and other mechanisms may also make some countries more 
prone to financial and terms-of-trade shocks. Characterization of the shocks likely to affect a 
given region or country is thus necessary when deciding on the appropriate level of spending 
on social safety nets. The nature and frequency of shocks will affect both the aggregate need 
for safety net spending and the type of safety net spending that is appropriate. 
Scope for Institutional Reform 
The methodology we are proposing will allow us to assess whether countries or regions are 
spending too much or too little on social safety nets relative to some international 
benchmark, rather than through some objective function that we seek to optimize. This can 
be done both at the aggregate level and also within specific dimensions of safety net 
spending. However, it also raises the prospect of viewing direct institutional reform of areas 
(A) to (D) as an alternative policy to raising or lowering spending levels. It is difficult to 
directly cost institutional reforms and thus to quantitatively contrast their effectiveness in 
alleviating poverty with expenditure adjustments. The methodology we are proposing will 
nonetheless allow us to isolate important areas of institutional reform that may improve the 
efficiency of social safety net spending, as discussed above. The methodology we are 
proposing is powerful as it points both to the necessity of controlling for factors (A) to (D) 
when thinking about the appropriate level of social safety net spending in a given country 
and because it points to institutional reform as an alternative direction of policy reform to 
reduce poverty and vulnerability. 
Informal Explanation of the Rankings 
We begin with the actual levels of government expenditures on various types of safety net 
expenditures expressed as a share of GDP. As already noted, there are wide variations in 
these pure unconditional levels of expenditures. This forms the basis of the first rank, rank 
one (hereafter referred to as R1). In short, this corresponds to each country's starting rank in 
level of safety net expenditures. As we do not take account of any other features of the 
economy at this stage, neither structural nor institutional, we shall refer to this rank as the 20 
unconditional rank of countries. According to R1, the country with the highest ranking is that 
country which spends the most on safety net expenditures as a share of its GDP. This ranking 
provides a good starting point from which to then compare how a country’s relative 
performance changes as we account for the structural and institutional features of the 
economy. 
We then move on to the second rank. This is constructed by regressing a country’s level 
of safety net expenditures on factors we have argued to be structural to the economy, i.e., 
those factors that capture both the level of need for safety nets and the ability of a country to 
meet these needs given its resource constraints. Structural factors that we include in our 
analysis include: (i) the (log of) per capita income of the country which proxies for the 
government budget constraint; (ii) the fraction of the population of working age (between 15 
and 64), which captures the level of dependency in a country—in most countries, children 
and the elderly are particularly susceptible to poverty by various alternative measures of 
welfare that we may employ; (iii) the fraction of the population residing in urban regions, 
which again can capture an element of neediness in the population, given that the poor most 
often reside in rural locations; (iv) a measure of shocks to income per capita, i.e., how far a 
country is from its long-run sustainable income level in any given year, because such cyclical 
components could also be correlated with expenditures. 
Regressing the level of safety net expenditures on each of the factors gives us a simple 
demand function for social expenditures. We should be careful not to imply too much 
causality in the relationship between the covariates and the level of expenditures. Our 
approach is merely to identify likely correlates of social expenditure levels. Having 
controlled for these structural features, we are still left with an unexplained component of the 
level of expenditures. It is this unexplained component that is then ranked to form rank two 
(R2). The level of social expenditures that we cannot explain controlling for structural factors 
can be positive or negative. In other words, for a given set of structural features, a country 
may actually be spending more or less than we would predict, taking what the average 
country does as being the international norm. This is precisely what an OLS regression 
does—it calculates the average effects of each covariate on the outcome of interest. In our 
application, we calculate the predicted levels of social spending, controlling for the 
aforementioned structural features, relative to this international benchmark. 
It may be argued that the benchmark as set by a regression line is rather arbitrary, and 
unrelated to any welfare criteria. However, there are three points to be made on this. First, 
our approach is to deliberately move away from the optimizing approach in order to answer 
how much governments ought to spend, and to do this in a such a way as to avoid having to 
specify any welfare criterion. This is in order to be able to attempt to answer the question 
without requiring unfeasible amounts of data. Secondly, what countries are actually observed 
to be doing on average is a good indication of feasibility constraints and provides a natural 
focal point for what countries ought to be able to do. Thirdly, the method is easily 
implementable and provides simple summary statistics, in the form of rankings, to present to 
policymakers. This ease of presentation should facilitate a constructive policy dialogue and 
debate. 
If a country spends more than we would predict given its level of structural features, this 
would suggest it spends more on safety nets than needs or cost considerations alone would 
explain. The opposite is true if we find a country spends less than it should. According to R2, 21 
the country with the highest ranking is that country which spends the most in addition to 
what we would have predicted, controlling only for structural factors. 
We now take account of the institutional framework within a country, which we have 
also argued influences the levels of safety net spending and the effectiveness of a given level 
of expenditures. The set of institutional features we take into account are the following (all 
definitions are in the data appendix): (i) the level of repudiation of government contracts; (ii) 
the threat of expropriation of assets by government; (iii) the level of corruption in civil 
society; (iv) the effectiveness of the rule of law; and (v) the amount of government 
bureaucracy. These factors are argued to be correlated with the quality of government and so 
may indirectly affect social safety net spending. 
In order to form a cross-country ranking taking into account these institutional features, 
we take the amount of unexplained expenditures from R2, and regress these on these various 
quality-of-government indicators. We then examine how much of this disturbance still cannot 
be explained. Again, countries may be above or below the predicted levels—the benchmark 
is again given by the “average” country. 
We rank these unexplained components in R3, which now takes account of structural 
and institutional factors. A country with a positive unexplained component is interpreted to 
be spending more than we would expect given the quality of its institutions and structural 
characteristics of the economy. The opposite applies to countries with negative unexplained 
levels of spending. The highest rank for R3 is given to the country with the largest positive 
residual component. 
Summary 
The three cross-country rankings we employ are;
2 
•  R1  rank one: unconditional ranking of safety net expenditure 
•  R2  rank two: controlling for structural features of the economy (which proxy 
for the need for safety nets and the ability of the government to meet these given its 
resource constraints) 
•  R3  rank three: controlling for institutional features that proxy for the quality of 
government, as well as the structural features controlled for in rank two 
The presentation of our analysis in the form of rankings is useful because: 
•  It is a simple summary statistic on which to base arguments to policymakers for 
changes in spending. 
                                                           
2 Lindert (1994, 1996), using OECD data, examines the traditional view that the deadweight costs of increased 
taxation will limit social spending, and finds that this explanation cannot account for the observed variations in 
social spending within this group of countries. He finds that the levels of social spending are more determined 
by age distribution, level and distribution of income, and level of political participation. While it is clear that 
Lindert’s is not a positive analysis, it does suggest that the levels that governments ought to be spending is more 
determined by these underlying structural factors in an economy than the marginal cost of raising public 
expenditures through taxation. 22 
•  The use of rankings makes our results more robust to econometric concerns arising 
from the potential endogeneity of some covariates, as well as omitted variables due 
to lack of data. 
•  The data requirements for this approach are minimal. For instance, we do not need 
to define any welfare criterion by which to judge optimal levels of spending. 
•  International or regional norms provide a natural point of comparison for how much 
effort governments are seen to be putting into safety net spending. They can also be 
used to motivate policy discussions. 
Comparisons Across Rankings 
It will also be useful to compare how a country’s rank changes according to these three 
procedures. We may find, for example, that countries which appear to have high levels of 
social spending (high R1 rank) actually are not spending as much as we may expect them to 
once structural factors are taken into account. Similarly, there may be cases of countries that 
appear at first glance to be spending relatively little on safety nets but, once we account for 
their ability to pay for such goods and services, or their weak institutional framework, may 
actually be spending a lot relative to the international benchmark. Thus, the movements 
across rankings contain much information, as well as the rankings themselves. 
Of course it is possible not only to compare countries to the international benchmark as 
set by the regression fit, but also within regions, whereby we will be able to examine good 
and bad performers, and we will also be able to compare the relative performance of 
neighboring countries that may appear to have all of the same measurable economic 
characteristics. This may help to induce a form of yardstick competition when the results are 
presented to policymakers. Namely, policymakers may be induced to put more effort into 
safety net spending if they see that their neighbors, who may face similar resource constraints 
and levels of need, are able to perform better in the rankings we construct. In section six we 
will present a detailed analysis of all of our results, and in section seven we discuss how this 
paper can be used in a constructive policy dialogue.  
We have conducted this sort of analysis across Indian states, forming R1, R2, R3 across 
15 states. The set of covariates used there in the construction of these rankings is slightly 
different from that used in the cross-country analysis, although the methodology and 
interpretation of the results is identical. The details of both types of analysis are the subject of 
the next section. 
In comparison to benefit incidence studies or behavioral approaches, our data 
requirements are a lot less strenuous. While there are issues of endogeneity to perhaps be 
concerned with in our regression analysis, say because we may believe that the level of 
urbanization itself cannot be taken as exogenous but itself depends upon the level of safety 
net expenditures, nevertheless, unless these forms of bias vary systematically over countries, 
the analysis of the various rankings remains unchanged, although we should not then place 
too much literal interpretation on the actual regression estimates. We at least manage to make 
some crude attempt at taking account of the level of need, ability to pay, and quality of 
government in this analysis. 23 
Most importantly, when addressing the question of how much governments ought to be 
spending, we move away from an optimizing approach to this question altogether, and focus 
instead on country performances relative to international norms, and this gives an alternative 
way of thinking about the same problem, as well as being able to present policymakers with a 
simple summary statistic on how well they do compared to their neighbors, and at least an 
indication of why their rank relative to their neighbors is where it is. 
V. Making Benchmark Comparisons 
Cross-Country Analysis 
In this section we formally detail how our rankings are constructed. The data used in the 
analysis were drawn mainly from the World Development Indicators database 
(http://www.worldbank.org/data/wdi/home.html) and the IMF Government Finance Statistics 
Yearbook. These are the only sources of consistent and comparable statistics which are 
available over a reasonable time period (see data appendix for variable definitions). The 
drawback is that (i) different types of safety net statistics are not disaggregated and (ii) social 
assistance and social insurance measures are reported together, whereas our interest is mainly 
in the former. There is thus a clear need to build more detailed data sets on different aspects 
of safety net spending to which the analytic framework could be applied. This exercise is, 
however, beyond the scope of the current project. 
R1: Unconditional Safety Net Expenditures 
We constructed a cross-country panel data set over the period 1972–97 with data averaged 
over five-year periods. We have data on the levels of safety net spending in country i of type 
j in period t, as a share of GDP, denoted sijt. Rank one (R1) is simply the ranking of an 
individual country in sijt for each type of safety net spending (j), averaged over all time 
periods. We shall denote this time average of social spending of type j in country i as    sij. 
Hence, R1 corresponds to the unconditional ranking of the level of safety net expenditures as 
a share of GDP, across countries. The higher a country’s ranking, the higher the amount that 
nation spent on safety nets of type j on average over the time period 1972–97. 
The types of safety net expenditure variables that are available to us are (complete 
definitions are given in the data appendix): 
•  Transfers to Organizations and Households: transfer payments to private 
institutions which are not operated as enterprises; current payments in cash to 
households adding to their disposable income; and 
•  Social Security and Welfare: transfer payments to compensate for loss in income 
or inadequate earning capacity. 
In addition, for completeness, we also look at the two most commonly used observed 
forms of social spending—education and health. However, we would not typically think of 
these as constituting a safety net as defined in section two. For example, health spending 
includes expenditures on all medical instruments and medical research. Similarly, for 
education expenditures, one would not want to classify tertiary and university expenditures 
as safety nets. 24 
The remaining safety net categories are close to our earlier definition of safety nets, 
although the availability of more disaggregated data, consistently defined across countries 
and time, would be ideal, as this would enable a closer matching between our definition and 
the expenditure types actually considered. 
R2: Controlling for Structural Features 
Moving to the construction of rank two (R2), we run a linear OLS regression of the form; 
(1)  t ij i it ijt v s + + = Z X γ β  
where sijt denotes safety net expenditures in country i on safety net j at time t 
it X  = A vector including log(real per capita GDP per capita), a measure of shocks to 
GDP per capita, the fraction of the population aged between 15 and 64, the fraction of the 
population residing in urban regions. 
i Z  = Set of regional dummies for Latin America and the Caribbean, sub-Saharan Africa, 
North America, South Asia, Middle East and North Africa, East Europe and Central Asia, 
East Asia and Pacific, with Western Europe being the omitted category. 
We deliberately exclude country fixed effects precisely because we want to try to 
unpack what this fixed effect may be comprised of, and how in particular it may be related to 
institutional features. With the inclusion of the set of regional dummies, we are effectively 
calculating the regression (1) in terms of deviations from regional means. 
After having run (1) we obtained a residual,  t ij v ˆ . This is the variation in safety net 
spending that we are unable to explain after controlling for structural features of the 
economy—these variables have proxied for the ability of the country to pay for safety nets 
and the need for such expenditures. 
We then average this residual over the sample period for each country to form  ij v ˆ . It is 
this averaged residual that we use as the basis for our second ranking, R2. This time-
averaged residual gives us a single summary statistic for each country that facilitates 
comparisons across countries. To be clear, R2 is based upon the time-averaged unexplained 
component of safety net expenditures once the structural factors of the economy,  it X , which 
control for the needs and budget constraints of the economy, are taken into account. This 
averaged residual may be negative, implying that, over time, the country is spending less on 
safety nets of type j, given its structural parameters, than we would have expected given what 
other countries are spending on average. Given that we control for regional dummies ( i Z  ) in 
(1), the comparison group is the set of countries in the same region as i. The opposite applies 
if this averaged residual is positive. The lower the ranking by R2, the lower (more negative) 
the residual. 
R3: Controlling for Institutional Quality 
Finally, we move to the construction of the third ranking, R3, which summarizes how much 
of the unexplained variation in the level of safety net expenditure for country i can be 
explained by controlling for the quality of government in that country. 25 
More precisely, we regress the time-averaged fitted residual on a series of measures 
capturing institutional quality. These measures are averaged over time because there is not 
much variation in each of them over time. Thus, it is as if we are running a cross-sectional 
regression having averaged over all time periods. The specification of the regression that 
forms the basis of R3 is then given by: 
(2)  ij i ij Q v ω δ γ + + = ˆ  
where these measures of quality of government,  i Q , are: 
•  Repudiation of Government Contracts: indicates the risk of a modification in a 
contract taking the form of a repudiation, postponement, or scaling down; 
•  Expropriation Threat: risk of outright confiscation or forced nationalization; 
•  Corruption: special payments demanded by high officials, and illegal payments 
expected throughout lower levels of government; 
•  Rule of Law: reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to 
accept the institutions established to make and implement laws and adjudicate 
disputes; and 
•  Government Bureaucracy: autonomy from political pressure and strength and 
expertise to govern without drastic changes in policy. 
The data source for these measures is the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), a 
monthly publication of Political Risk Services. Full details are again found in the data 
appendix. All of these indices decrease as quality worsens. 
Having run equation (2) we obtain a fitted residual,  ij ω ˆ . This residual is the unexplained 
component of safety net spending that cannot be explained after controlling for both 
structural and institutional characteristics. 
The third ranking system, R3, is based upon this residual, ij ω ˆ . Again, it can be the case 
that this residual may be positive or negative. A positive residual implies that the country is 
spending more on social safety nets once structural features of its economy and institutional 
quality have been controlled for, than we would otherwise expect given the expenditures of 
other countries in the same region. The opposite is true if this residual turns out to be 
negative. The lower the ranking of R3, the lower (more negative) the value of  ij ω ˆ . 
Summary of Rankings 
We summarize the basis of our three alternative ranking systems below: 
R1  time-averaged unconditional ranking of safety net spending of type j, based on sij. 
A lower ranking means that the country unconditionally spends less on safety nets of 
type j. 
R2  ranking of social spending conditional on structural factors, ij v ˆ . A lower ranking 
means that safety net expenditures are lower than we would expect compared to the 
countries in the same region, controlling for structural features of the economy. 26 
R3  ranking taking into account quality of government,  ij ω ˆ . Again, a lower ranking 
means that safety net expenditures are lower than we would expect compared to the 
countries in the same region, controlling both for structural and institutional features of 
the economy. 
•  Once we take account of how much a country is actually able to spend on safety 
nets, we may find its international ranking increases (moving from R1 to R2), and if 
its ranking further increases as we move to R3, it may be possible to infer that the 
country has institutions that are effective in translating whatever resources it has 
into safety net spending. 
•  Similarly, if we find a country’s ranking to be falling as we move from R1 to R2 to 
R3, we could infer that, although at face value the country appears to perform well 
in terms of how much it spends, it actually performs worse than we would predict 
given the characteristics of its economy and the quality of its institutions, relative to 
the international or regional benchmark. 
Indian State Level Analysis 
We now turn our attention to the analysis at the level of Indian states. Again, we seek to use 
our methodology to make some benchmark comparisons across states regarding how much 
each state spends on safety nets relative to the others. We use panel data on 15 major Indian 
states over the period 1960–92. 
The approach closely mirrors that of the cross-country analysis, where we establish 
three rankings on states—R1, the unconditional ranking by the level of expenditure in 
various categories of safety nets; R2, the ranking conditional on structural features of the 
state economy which again are designed to capture both the level of need for safety nets in 
the state and the state government’s budget constraints; and R3, which conditions both on 
structural factors and on state institutional factors. The interpretation of each of the rankings 
remains identical to that for the cross-country analysis. 
The main differences between this analysis and that for the cross-country data set are 
that: (i) the classifications of safety net expenditures are different; (ii) the set of structural 
features we control for are different from those in the cross-country analysis; and (iii) our 
measures of the quality of government are also different from the earlier analysis. 
Unlike in the cross-country analysis, the use of panel data allows us to control for 
unobservable structural factors that are common to all states, in the construction of the 
ranking R2, and to control for common unobservable quality-of-government variables in the 
construction of R3. Furthermore, in this data set we can be confident of having controlled for 
all common macroeconomic shocks that may determine safety net expenditure levels. We do 
this through the inclusion of state-level fixed effects. In short, then, we probably have more 
reason than in the cross-country analysis to be confident in the actual estimated effects of 
structural and institutional features on the level of safety net expenditures, as well as the 
rankings themselves. 27 
R1: Unconditional Safety Net Expenditures 
We have data on the levels of safety net spending in state i of type j in period t, denoted as 
sijt. Rank one (R1) is simply the ranking of an individual state in sijt for each j, averaged over 
all time periods. We shall denote this time average of social spending of type j in state i as sij. 
Hence, R1 corresponds to the unconditional ranking of the level of safety net expenditures 
across states. As with the cross-country analysis, the higher a state’s rank, the higher the 
amount that state spends on safety nets of type j on average over the time period. 
The types of safety net expenditure variables that are available to us at this level of 
analysis are (complete definitions are given in the data appendix): 
•  Health 
•  Education 
•  Social Expenditures 
•  Food Subsidies 
•  Calamity Expenditures 
•  Development Expenditures 
•  Public Food Distribution
3 
R2: Controlling for Structural Features 
To form the second ranking, R2, we run a linear OLS regression of the form; 
(3)  t ij i it ijt v s + + = α βX  
where i α are state fixed effects, and it X is the set of structural variables proxying for the 
ability of the state to finance such expenditures, and the need for them. These include: state 
income per capita, which captures the budget constraints facing the state government; rural 
and urban headcount measures, which proxy for the level of need for safety nets; and rural 
and urban income gini coefficients, which again are included in an attempt to proxy the level 
of needs there may be for types of social spending—the greater the degree of inequality, the 
greater the number of individuals in poverty who would benefit from such expenditures. 
Estimating the state level safety net “demand” function (3), we obtained a residual, t ij v ˆ . 
After averaging this residual over t to form  ij v ˆ , we obtain the basis of R2. In other words, R2 
is based upon the time-averaged unexplained component of safety net expenditures once the 
structural factors of the economy are taken into account. 
Just as in the cross-country analysis, this averaged residual may be negative, implying 
that, over time, the state is spending less on safety nets of type j relative to other Indian 
states, given its structural parameters. The opposite applies if this averaged residual is 
positive. The lower the ranking by R2, the lower (more negative) the residual. 
                                                           
3 Unlike all of the other forms of safety net that we consider, which are in monetary terms, this transfer is in 
kind, and corresponds to public distribution primarily of rice and wheat. 28 
R3: Controlling for Institutional Quality 
We move to the construction of R3, which tries to see how much of the unexplained variation 
in the level of safety net expenditure for state i can be explained by controlling for the quality 
of government, once structural factors have also been controlled for. Again, the method is to 
regress the time-averaged fitted residual on a series of measures capturing institutional 
quality. The available measures for the state-level quality of government are: 
•  Voter turnout: the percentage of eligible voters in the state that actually voted in 
the last elections for the state legislature; 
•  Political competition: the relative number of seats in state legislatures of the 
Congress party vis-à-vis its closest rival political party; 
•  Literacy: male and female literacy rates; 
•  Variance of Social Spending: the variance of social spending that cannot be 
explained by the variance of state income and natural calamities; 
•  Deviation from State Means of Level of Social Spending: the deviation from 
state means of social spending, controlling for mean income levels and the 
occurrence of natural calamities. 
These measures are poorer proxies for the quality of government than those available at 
the cross-country level. The rationale behind their inclusion is the following. The level of 
voter turnout measures political participation, which we may expect to be higher if 
individuals feel that the political process accurately reflects their preferences. In some sense, 
voter turnout can be thought of as measuring the extent to which citizens feel political 
institutions are legitimate. The measure of political competition is designed to capture the 
responsiveness of state governments to the electorate’s preferences. State literacy rates may 
be used as a proxy for how well-informed individuals are about state government policies, 
and hence reflects the ability of state governments to make policy responsive to voters’ 
preferences. 
The final two measures reflect the variability of social spending, the argument being that 
lower-quality governments are more subject to pressures from special interest groups or rent-
seeking of government officials and therefore we may expect such governments to have more 
variable expenditure levels. Cyclical movements can also lead to variations in levels of 
spending, but as these are common to all states they should not affect the ranking we form 
across states. Full details of how these measures are constructed are given in the data 
appendix. Formally, to construct the third ranking R3, we run a regression of the form: 
(4)  ij i ij Q v ω δ γ + + = ˆ  
where the set of (safety-net-specific) quality-of-government measures are denoted as i Q . 
Note that, unlike the cross-country analysis, there is enough variation here in our quality-of-
government measures over time to be able to run the equation as a panel regression, rather 
than in cross-sectional form. 
R3 is based upon the time-averaged residual from (4), ij ω ˆ , i.e., that portion of the 
unexplained residual from regressing safety net expenditures on structural features that still 29 
cannot be explained by the quality of government. Again, this residual may be positive or 
negative. A positive residual implies that the state is spending more on social safety nets once 
structural features of its economy and institutional quality have been controlled for, relative 
to other Indian states, than we would otherwise predict just based on these factors. The 
opposite is true if this residual turns out to be negative. The lower the rank of R3, the lower 
(more negative) the value of  ij ω ˆ . 
We summarize the basis of our three alternative ranking systems below: 
R1  time-averaged unconditional ranking of safety net spending of type j, ijt s . 
R2  ranking of social spending conditional on structural factors, ij v ˆ . 
R3  Ranking also taking into account quality of government,  ij ω ˆ . 
As with the cross-country analysis, movements across each of these rankings can be 
used to make inferences regarding the structural features or institutional quality of the state in 
comparison with other states. 
Welfare Outcome Regressions 
Up until this point we have been concerned with benchmarking the relative performance of 
countries and Indian states with regard to safety net expenditures. We now follow a similar 
line of reasoning to benchmark their performance in terms of some key welfare indicators. 
We thus extend the analysis to see how structural and institutional features affect various 
welfare-related outcomes. We do this both across countries and at the Indian state level. 
The motivation for performing this type of analysis is similar to before—what we 
observe are large variations in welfare indicators across countries. We would like to be able 
to assess the relative performance of countries (or states) by taking account of (i) the 
structural features of the economy, which should include the level of a social safety net in the 
country as well as the budget constraints facing the economy; and (ii) the institutional 
features of the economy, which may by correlates of the effectiveness of safety net 
expenditures to be translated into welfare improvements for vulnerable groups. Our aim is 
thus to construct three rankings analogous to our earlier analysis: R1, which is the 
unconditional rank of the welfare indicator; R2, which is the rank once we have accounted 
for the level of safety net expenditures and income levels; and R3, which takes into account 
the quality of institutions. By doing this we should then be able to comment on the extent to 
which structural or institutional features are correlates of these welfare outcomes. 
Hence, it may be the case that we observe a country performing relatively poorly on a 
welfare indicator unconditionally. Once we take account of how much it is actually spending 
on safety nets, and what it is actually able to spend on safety nets, we may find its 
international ranking increases, and if its ranking further increases as we move to R3, it may 
be possible to infer that the country has institutions that are effective in translating whatever 
resources it is placing in safety nets into welfare enhancements. Similarly, if we find a 
country’s ranking to be falling as we move from R1 to R2 to R3, we could infer that, 
although at face value the country appears to perform well on welfare indicators, it actually 
performs worse than we would predict given the characteristics of its economy and the 30 
quality of its institutions, relative to the international benchmark set by what countries 
manage to do on average. 
We examine the following welfare outcomes—for the cross-country analysis, life 
expectancy at birth and the infant mortality rate (IMR) of children aged less than one (per 
1000 live births) are both available. At the Indian state level, only the latter of these is 
available. We briefly go through the construction of the rankings for these welfare outcomes. 
R1: Unconditional Welfare Outcomes 
We shall refer to our welfare indicator for country i in period t as    Ωit. R1 is based on simply 
ranking these unconditional levels. We construct R1 for both welfare indicators, so a country 
has a higher R1 ranking if its life expectancy is higher, and if its child mortality rate is lower. 
R2: Controlling for Structural Features 
In moving to this ranking we want to take account of the factors that we would typically 
expect to be correlated with these welfare outcomes. Again, due to econometric issues such 
as the potential endogeneity of some of the regressors, we would not place too literal an 
interpretation on the regression that sets the OLS benchmark. Again, for purposes of forming 
the correct ranking across countries, these potential sources of bias in the actual estimates are 
unproblematic as long as these biases do not differ across countries. Hence, in order to 
construct to a ranking which accounts for these structural features in the cross-country data, 
we run a regression of the form: 
(5)  t i i it it v + + = Ω Z X γ β  
where  it Ω  refers to either of our welfare outcome measures of life expectancy or the IMR; 
it X  includes the real per capita GDP per capita, a measure of shocks to GDP per capita, the 
fraction of the population aged between15and 64, the fraction of the population residing in 
urban regions, and the levels of per capita expenditures on health and education; and  i Z  is a 
set of regional dummies with Western Europe being the omitted category. 
The inclusion of income per capita in the set of regressors proxies for the government 
budget constraints, shocks to GDP account for cyclical movements, the measures of working 
population and the level of urbanization are both included to proxy for poverty levels (and it 
is the potential endogeneity of these regressors that may concern us most). We include health 
and education spending as these types of safety net would be expected to alleviate lifetime 
poverty. It was decided not to include the other forms of safety net expenditures in order to 
maintain as large a sample as possible. 
Again, we omit country fixed effects precisely because we wish to be able to shed light 
on how much country-specific factors derive from these structural features and how much 
they derive from institutional factors. 
The residual estimated from (5) thus captures how much of the variability in the welfare 
indicator cannot be explained by controlling for structural factors alone. The rank R2 is then 
based upon the time-averaged residual from (5), i v ˆ . The interpretation of this is as before—
lower rankings (more negative residual) indicating that the country performs worse on the 
welfare rank than we would predict given its structural characteristics, where we are 31 
comparing to the international benchmark as determined by how well countries are doing on 
average with regard to the same welfare indicator. 
R3: Controlling for Institutional Quality 
We now wish to construct R3 in order to assess how much of this unexplained component 
can in fact be accounted for by institutional features of the country. We do this by first 
regressing time-averaged residuals from (5) on the set of time-invariant cross-country 
quality-of-government measures discussed before: 
(6)  i i i Q v ω β + = ˆ  
R3 is then based upon the residual from this regression,. interpreted as the amount of the 
welfare outcomes that cannot be accounted for by either structural features of the economy or 
institutional features. This can be positive or negative, the interpretation of which is exactly 
as before. 
When we move to the analysis of welfare outcomes at the Indian state level, where we 
only have the welfare outcome of IMR, the set of structural factors we are able to control for 
in constructing R2 are: (i) safety net expenditures on health, education, social assistance, 
food subsidies, and calamities; (ii) state income per capita; (iii) urban and rural headcounts; 
(iv) rural and urban gini income inequality indices. In the construction of R3, we employ 
voter turnout, political competition, and literacy rates as our proxies for institutional quality. 
The interpretation of the three ranks is the same as that for the cross-country analysis. 
VI. Results 
Cross-Country Analysis 
We now turn to the analysis of our results, where we shall essentially go through the 
estimation of equations (1) to (3) both for cross-country data and the Indian state-level data, 
and interpret the rankings, R1 to R3, derived from them. We begin with the cross-country 
analysis. All the data are from the World Development Indicators and the IMF Government 
Finance Statistics Yearbook, available over the period 1972–97, averaged over five-year time 
intervals.  
Table 1 presents the levels of spending across countries for the two main types of safety 
nets that we consider, namely social spending and welfare, and transfers to organization and 
households, both as shares of total GDP. The table also gives the figures for health and 
education expenditures; discussion of these is in the appendix. There are two things of note in 
this table—first, the expenditure shares are broadly consistent with what we might have 
expected, with the shares of Western Europe and North America being the highest in most of 
the safety net categories, although when looking at the total size of the government sector, 
Eastern Europe and the Middle East spend shares comparable to those of developed 
countries. Secondly, there is much variation in the expenditure shares across countries, 
implying variation in the levels of expenditures across countries. This occurs both within and 
across each continent. This confirms our earlier point that, given such variation, there is 
clearly something to explain concerning the underlying determinants of such shares. In 32 
constructing R2 and R3 we will be trying to account for these levels of variation by the 
structural and institutional features of the economy. There is sufficient variation in the data to 
shed some light in the course of this analysis on how much governments ought to spending. 





Orgs/HH  Health Education 
Total Govt 
Exp 
Albania    6.729 7.171 1.739 0.712  31.007 
Argentina    5.673 6.159 0.274 0.922  13.947 
Australia    6.836 7.297 2.638 1.784  23.666 
Austria    16.822  16.448 4.695  3.594 37.232 
Bahamas    1.167 1.346 3.067 3.771  19.267 
Bahrain    0.855 0.642 2.607 3.988  32.171 
Barbados   4.696    3.707  6.131  30.902 
Belarus    12.216  10.361 1.372  2.771 35.792 
Belgium    20.028  23.281 0.864  6.888 48.450 
Belize   1.310    2.197  3.932  26.044 
Benin   1.625    1.097  3.424  17.706 
Bhutan    0.622 0.729 2.357 3.908  36.060 
Bolivia    3.534 2.643 0.960 3.562  18.764 
Brazil    7.468 7.282 1.775 1.029  26.538 
Bulgaria    11.074  11.089 1.271  1.601 45.872 
Burkina Faso   0.463    0.776  2.114  12.045 
Burundi    1.191 1.390 1.142 4.153  24.268 
Cameroon    0.890 1.096 0.787 2.621  18.556 
Canada    8.266 9.388 1.419 0.791  22.751 
Central African Republic   1.353    1.119  3.877  22.001 
Chad   0.199    0.446  1.527  17.173 
Chile   8.699    2.341  3.929  27.671 
Colombia    2.174 0.265 0.673 2.941  13.156 
Comoros   0.017    2.756  9.570  43.679 
Congo, Republic of   1.763    1.919  4.470  38.017 
Costa  Rica  4.086 6.341 4.865 5.204  24.041 
Cote d'Ivoire   1.079  0.927  1.228  6.539  27.836 
Croatia    14.104  12.032 6.695  2.800 43.661 
Cyprus    6.532 7.644 1.980 3.555  32.261 
Czech  Republic  16.588  17.586 6.203  0.201 33.608 
Denmark    15.139 7.030  0.965  4.079 37.179 
Djibouti         34.685 
Dominica   1.288    3.578  4.890  35.094 
Dominican Republic   0.830  0.150  1.603  1.910  15.561 
Egypt, Arab Republic of   4.634  6.056  1.124  4.539  42.779 
Estonia    9.712 12.283 4.665  2.828 30.437 
Ethiopia    1.222 0.881 0.840 2.558  23.390 
Finland   10.997    2.484  4.247  32.137 
France    17.973  22.119 6.774  3.304 41.312 
Gambia, The   0.740  0.967  1.903  3.044  25.034 
Greece   6.788  5.525 2.447 2.728  33.508 
Guatemala   0.651    0.853  1.663  11.612 





Orgs/HH  Health Education 
Total Govt 
Exp 
Guinea Bissau   1.944  0.684  3.555  4.699  52.123 
Guyana   2.805    3.111  6.360  62.661 
Haiti   0.657    1.077  1.243  16.935 
Honduras   0.985    1.828  3.277  16.233 
Hungary    14.343  17.623 2.189  1.110 51.419 
Iceland    5.375 6.463 6.150 3.619  28.997 
India       0.240  0.297  13.504 
Indonesia    0.954 0.883 0.410 1.615  18.590 
Iran, Islamic Republic  2.307    1.557  4.145  31.728 
Ireland   11.814    6.157  5.475  41.732 
Israel    10.518  14.897 3.182  5.688 60.504 
Italy    13.301  17.478 4.517  3.921 42.514 
Jamaica    1.178 0.270 2.857 6.514  37.372 
Japan    8.291 0.696 0.341 1.374  16.987 
Korea, Republic of  1.217  2.500  0.211  2.987  16.512 
Kuwait    4.661 9.071 2.507 4.840  46.505 
Latvia    12.674  14.193 2.309  3.428 30.713 
Lebanon    2.545 4.116 0.915 2.562  34.320 
Lesotho    0.709 0.585 3.574 8.073  47.083 
Liberia   0.294    1.705  3.404  23.532 
Lithuania    8.805 8.629 2.091 1.687  25.719 
Luxembourg    19.320  20.283 0.890  3.531 39.879 
Madagascar   0.611    1.002  2.060  16.700 
Malaysia    1.154 1.458 1.507 5.397  26.285 
Maldives   1.806    3.344  5.793  45.289 
Mali    0.965 1.056 0.697 2.766  21.703 
Malta    13.837  14.340 3.796  4.177 41.362 
Mauritania   1.470    1.157  4.001  43.003 
Mauritius   4.159  3.802 1.895 3.471  22.977 
México   2.880    0.465  2.948  17.317 
Mongolia    5.100 4.818 0.561 0.833  21.270 
Morocco   1.885    1.014  5.202  31.197 
Myanmar   0.702    0.828  1.794  13.924 
Namibia     1.451      37.222 
Nepal   0.088    0.719  1.751  15.098 
Netherlands    18.587  22.913 6.223  6.073 50.275 
Netherlands Antilles   7.502 6.595 1.679 1.339  25.805 
Nicaragua    2.709 4.184 3.024 3.496  33.537 
Niger   0.306    0.713  2.889  16.529 
Norway    12.306  14.100 2.251  2.420 35.837 
Pakistan   0.419    0.233  0.365  20.220 
Panama    4.120 6.147 4.707 4.870  28.608 
Paraguay    2.112 1.475 0.443 1.444  10.752 
Peru     2.210  0.950  3.121  16.239 
Poland    21.358  15.718 4.375  3.095 42.740 
Portugal    7.828 9.907 2.454 3.156  37.472 
Romania    7.865 10.630 1.394  1.923 38.113 
Russian Federation   7.386  7.222  0.406  0.722  26.291 





Orgs/HH  Health Education 
Total Govt 
Exp 
Senegal   1.163    1.125  4.225  21.394 
Seychelles    8.494 7.893 4.479 6.554  57.140 
Singapore    0.511 1.684 1.315 3.696  20.350 
South Africa   1.652  1.702  0.555  1.897  28.546 
Spain    13.166  14.154 1.579  1.783 28.302 
Sri Lanka   4.537  4.624  1.520  2.741  28.948 
St. Kitts   2.805  1.990 3.640 5.174  30.244 
St. Lucia   1.461  2.200  3.363  6.809  30.290 
Suriname   2.755    2.178  6.341  41.374 
Sweden    18.780  21.316 0.676  3.596 39.769 
Switzerland    10.152  10.506 3.039  0.667 20.955 
Syrian Arab Republic  1.417    0.488  2.780  32.734 
Thailand    0.587 0.597 0.972 3.417  16.710 
Togo    2.212 0.186 1.764 5.355  35.686 
Tonga   0.473    3.578  5.450  43.054 
Trinidad and Tobago   2.616  5.264  2.020  3.776  29.218 
Tunisia    3.949 6.820 2.148 5.958  32.275 
Turkey   0.538    0.523  3.122  20.292 
United Kingdom   10.513  12.622  5.020  1.094  37.777 
United States   14.122  14.786  1.254  2.182  26.738 
Uzbekistan    6.817 9.403 2.879 0.502   
Virgin Islands (U.S.)   1.333    1.847  3.576   
West Bank and Gaza   0.275  0.704  3.324  6.623   
Yemen   2.863  1.644  7.692  
Yugoslavia   1.722  1.169  5.776  
Latin America and the 
Caribbean   2.913 3.273 2.209 3.727  24.937 
Sub-Saharan Africa   1.443  1.525  1.582  4.093  28.597 
North America   11.194  12.087  1.336  1.486  24.744 
Western Europe   13.566  14.792  3.495  3.376  36.551 
South Asia   1.494  2.677  1.402  2.476  26.520 
Middle East and North 
Africa    4.661 6.725 1.846 4.779  38.363 
East and Central Europe   10.307  11.662  2.882  2.164  34.186 
East Asia and Pacific   2.373  2.293  1.426  3.179  22.902 
World average   5.494  6.998  2.139  3.493  30.060 
Standard deviation   5.606  6.382  1.570  1.873  11.399 
Note: Figures represent averages of five-year period averages for spending data from 1972-1997. Blank cells 
indicate data not available. 
ss = social security 
Orgs/HH = Organizations or households  
Source:IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook.  All years, 1972-1997. 
R1: Unconditional Safety Net Expenditures 
R1 is constructed from the ranking of the unconditional share of GDP of each type of social 
expenditure. This is given in table 2a. What we notice is that, following from table 1, it is the 
developed economies that unconditionally spend the highest shares of GDP on each type of 35 
safety net, although notable exceptions include Guyana, which actually has the highest share 
of government expenditures out of GDP in our data set, followed by Israel. In terms of 
neighboring countries, we find that, for instance, Sri Lanka and Pakistan have large 
differences in the shares of GDP they devote to social security; Mexico and Brazil have 
dramatic differences in terms of social security, as do Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in 
transfers to organizations and households. 
To see how much of these variations can be explained by structural and institutional 
factors, we then run regression (1), controlling for structural factors. This leads to the 
construction of the second ranking, R2. 
 
R2: Controlling for Structural Features 
We now control for structural features of the economy discussed earlier, namely, the log of 
per capita income (this enters in logarithmic form because we expect there to be diminishing 
marginal benefits of safety nets as income rises), shocks to income (as a proxy for business 
cycle effects), the fraction of the population of working age, the level of urbanization, and 
regional dummies. Having run this regression, which is reported in table 3, we obtain a 
residual which captures the unexplained component of safety net expenditures, controlling 
for these structural features. Taking the time average of the residuals for each country, we 
obtain the basis of R2, the ranking of countries controlling for structural characteristics. 
From table 2 we can see that most of the movement across countries moving from R1 to 
R2 is at the lower ranks of R1, i.e., having controlled for structural features, the countries that 
had the highest unconditional rank of social expenditures, still tend to have the highest ranks. 
However, there are some notable exceptions. Switzerland, Israel, and Cyprus both have large 
falls in their ranks moving to R2, implying that, according to the international benchmark of 
what the average country spends on safety nets given its structural characteristics, these 
countries spend less than we would predict. Conversely, Nicaragua and Indonesia improve 
their rankings moving to R2, implying that their performance relative to the international 
benchmark improves when taking account of their structural characteristics, i.e., the level of 
need and the ability to finance social expenditures. 
 
R3: Controlling for Institutional Quality 
We now examine how much of the unexplained residual from (1) can be explained by 
country-specific institutional factors. In order to do this, we run regression (2), obtain the 
residual,  ij ω ˆ  and then rank this to form R3. Again, we observe less variation for the countries 
ranked highest than for those below them. For social security, there are some dramatic falls 
for countries such as Denmark, Korea, and Honduras, implying that controlling for both 
institutional quality and structural features, they perform worse relative to regional norms 
than when only structural characteristics are controlled for. Other countries, such as Chile, 
Egypt, and Brazil improve their level of relative performance with respect to expenditures on 
social security. In terms of transfers, Paraguay and Mali do worse when we move to R3, 
indicating that, relative to the benchmark, these countries would appear to spend less than we 
would expect controlling for institutions and structure. Hence, this evidence may suggest that 
such countries ought to spend more on safety nets, all else equal. 36 
Table 2a: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/GDP) 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3  Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 
Belgium  1 1  1  Belgium  1  3 5  France  1 2 2  Belgium  1  1 2  Guyana  1  2 1 
Luxembourg  2  12  19  Netherlands  2  1 1  Netherlands  2 3 3  Cote  d'Ivoire  2  5 3  Israel  2  1 2 
Sweden  3 7  7  France  3  2 3  Germany  3 4 5  Jamaica  3  4 8  Guinea-Bissau  3  3 3 
Netherlands  4 2  5  Sweden  4  4 4  Ireland  4 1 1  Guyana  4  3 1  Netherlands  4  4 7 
France  5 4  3  Luxembourg  5 32  27  Iceland  5 5 7  Suriname  5  13  7  Belgium  5  6 8 
Austria 6  6  4  Austria  6  8  11  United 
Kingdom 
6 8 6  Netherlands  6  2 6  Kuwait  6 33  32 
Germany  7 10  9  Poland  7  6 10  Costa  Rica  7  9 12  Tunisia  7  7 11  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
7 8  5 
Denmark  8  13  10 Israel  8  16  12 Panama  8  6  4  Israel  8  10  13 Poland  8  5  4 
Uruguay  9 3  2  Uruguay  9  5 2  Austria  9  14  13  Ireland  9  8 4  Italy  9 14  23 
Malta  10  5 6  Spain  10  11  9  Italy  10 10  8  Malaysia  10  11 16  Ireland  10  15 21 
Italy  11 16  26  Norway  11  34 30  Malta  11 11 10  Togo  11  12 23  Suriname  11  16 11 
Spain  12  8  18 United  Kingdom  12  14  19 Guinea-Bissau  12  7  9  Costa  Rica  12  14  12 Malta  12  13  20 
Norway  13 51  39  Switzerland  13  43 45  Israel  13 27 19  Morocco  13  15 14  France  13  18 13 
Ireland  14 14  15  Portugal  14  10 14  Guyana  14 13 11  Zimbabwe  14  16 19  Luxembourg  14  46 58 
Finland  15 60  60  United  States  15  31 35  Switzerland 15 46 44  Panama  15  20 18  Sweden  15  39 39 
Israel  16 26  47  Canada  16  39 41  Nicaragua  16 12 16  Kuwait  16  9  10  Romania  16  19 16 
United 
Kingdom 
17 23  23  Cyprus  17  24 25  United  States  17 31 24  Guinea-Bissau  17  18 20  Congo,  Rep.  17  7  6 
Switzerland  18 68  64  Australia  18  48 47  Jamaica  18 15 14  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
18 17  9  United  Kingdom  18  20  22 
Chile  19 19  14  Brazil  19  7  8  Australia  19 32 34  Congo,  Rep.  19  22 21  Portugal  19  17 19 
Japan  20 35  56  Denmark  20  46 44  Kuwait  20 24 21  Finland  20  19 15  Jamaica  20  12 18 
Canada  21 65  63  Tunisia  21  12 16  Finland  21 44 50  Senegal  21  38 28  Austria  21  37 36 
Romania  22 17  11  Iceland  22  47 48  Portugal  22 26 37  Malta  22  27 35  Denmark  22  36 33 
Portugal  23 21  24  Costa  Rica  23  13 21  Greece  23 30 41  Iran,  Islamic 
Rep. 
23  23 17  Norway  23  41 42 
Brazil  24  9  12  Argentina  24  27 33  Chile  24 16 28  Denmark  24  24 26  Togo  24  11 12 
Australia  25 70  69  Panama  25  15  6  Norway  25 51 42  Chile  25  26 29  Gabon  25  9  9 
United 
States 
26 64  55  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
26  18 13  Suriname  26 28 20  Italy  26  21 32  Nicaragua  26  22 15 
Greece  27 43  40  Greece  27  36 18  Tunisia  27 18 23  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
27  31 41  Greece  27  21 10 
Cyprus 28  50  49  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
28 40  38  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
28 38 46  Singapore  28  32 27  Germany  28  40 45 
Argentina 29 49  48  Sri  Lanka  29  9  7  Cyprus  29 55 63  Iceland  29  34 38  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
29 23  28 
Iceland  30 71  72  Nicaragua  30  17 17  Congo,  Rep.  30 20 31  Sweden  30  25 25  Tunisia  30  26 24 
Kuwait  31 74  74  Korea,  Rep.  31  44 43  Gambia,  The  31 22 15  Austria  31  33 30  Cyprus  31  34 30 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
32 25  17  Peru  32  35  39  Venezuela  RB  32 36 39  Venezuela  RB  32  30 24  Finland  32  57 49 37 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3  Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 
Sri  Lanka 33 15  21  South  Africa  33  29  23  Honduras  33 21 17  Cyprus  33  41 34  Iran,  Islamic 
Rep. 
33 30  25 
Panama  34 33  22  Paraguay  34  33  34  Brazil  34 33 40  Luxembourg  34  28 36  Morocco  34  25 26 
Costa  Rica  35 36  43  Malaysia  35  37  31  Zimbabwe  35 23 29  Nicaragua  35  36 40  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
35 44  44 
Tunisia  36 38  31  Cameroon  36  30  22  Togo  36 17 22  Thailand  36  35 49  Iceland  36  54 55 
Mexico  37  58 65  Mali  37  21 20  Dominican 
Republic 
37 35 43  France  37  29 22  Sri  Lanka  37  24 35 
Guyana  38 44  41  Gambia,  The  38  23  15  Spain  38 62 65  Honduras  38  40 48  Panama  38  31 17 
Suriname  39  56 58  Cote  d'Ivoire  39  19 32  Iran,  Islamic 
Rep. 
39 34 32  Portugal  39  39 44  South  Africa  39  27 27 
Nicaragua 40 28  38  Indonesia  40  22  36  Sri  Lanka  40 29 25  Turkey  40  37 47  Spain  40  52 61 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
41 69  71  Japan  41  45  40  Malaysia  41 47 33  Peru  41  42 56  Cote  d'Ivoire  41  28 34 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
42 52  45  Guinea-Bissau  42  20  24  Canada  42 66 69  Gambia,  The  42  57 60  Zimbabwe  42  35 38 
Togo  43 22  29  Thailand  43  26  26  Romania  43 68 70  Korea,  Rep.  43  44 43  Chile  43  43 40 
Colombia 44 57  57  Guinea  44  25  28  Singapore  44 59 61  Mexico  44  45 53  Uruguay  44  45 37 
Paraguay  45 45  53  Gabon  45  41  42  Uruguay  45 56 51  Colombia  45  43 33  Brazil  45  29 29 
Guinea-
Bissau 
46 18  16  Jamaica  46  38  37  Cote  d'Ivoire  46 39 45  Niger  46  53 37  Malaysia  46  32 41 
Morocco  47  37 36  Colombia  47  42 46  Senegal  47  40  30  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
47  46 45  Gambia,  The  47  49 53 
Congo,  Rep.  48  46 37  Togo  48  28 29  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
48 42 38  Mali  48  48 57  Costa  Rica  48  47 46 
South  Africa  49 59  54          Haiti  49 43 35  Sri  Lanka  49  49 62  Australia  49  73 68 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
50 55  50          Morocco  50 49 52  Greece  50  47 31  Ethiopia  50  38 31 
Zimbabwe 51 39  52          Madagascar 51 37 27  Cameroon  51  55 46  Canada  51  69 71 
Venezuela 
RB 
52 72  70          Thailand  52 61 55  Ethiopia  52  50 54  United  States  52  61 54 
Ethiopia  53 11  8          Denmark  53 71 66  Norway  53  54 39  Guinea  53  42 51 
Korea,  Rep.  54 67  68          Peru  54 57 59  Uruguay  54  62 52  Mali  54  50 60 
Jamaica  55 61  67          Luxembourg  55 75 73  Burkina  Faso  55  60 58  Senegal  55  56 50 
Senegal  56 42  25          Belgium  56 70 75  Madagascar  56  58 55  Switzerland  56  79 78 
Malaysia  57 62  66          Guatemala  57 58 57  Romania  57  73 65  Singapore  57  70 65 
Cote  d'Ivoire  58 32  35          Ethiopia  58 25 47  Dominican 
Republic 
58  64 61  Turkey  58  55 57 
Honduras  59 48  46          Cameroon  59 50 53  South  Africa  59  66 59  Pakistan  59  51 52 
Mali  60 27  34          Burkina  Faso  60 41 56  Australia  60  56 50  Venezuela  RB 60  72 69 
Indonesia  61 40  27          Niger  61 48 36  Spain  61  61 66  Indonesia  61  48 43 
Cameroon 62 47  42          Mali  62 45 26  Guatemala  62  68 72  Cameroon  62  58 48 
Dominican 
Republic 
63 66  62          Sweden  63 74 72  Indonesia  63  52 42  Mexico  63  65 70 
Gambia, 
The 
64 29  32          Colombia  64 60 67  Paraguay  64  69 70  Japan  64  63 66 
Haiti  65 41  33          South  Africa  65 69 49  Japan  65  59 67  Haiti  65  62 59 38 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3  Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 
Guatemala  66 54  51          Turkey  66 64 68  Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
66  63 64  Thailand  66  60 63 
Madagascar 67  30  28          Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
67 63 54  Haiti  67  72 69  Madagascar  67  64 62 
Thailand  68 53  61          Mexico  68 67 64  United  Kingdom  68  67 73  Niger  68  53 47 
Turkey  69 63  59          Paraguay  69 65 62  Brazil  69  65 63  Korea,  Rep.  69  68 72 
Singapore 70 73  73          Indonesia  70 54 60  Argentina  70  74 68  Peru  70  67 77 
Burkina 
Faso 
71 34  44          Japan  71 76 76  Canada  71  70 71  Honduras  71  66 67 
Pakistan  72 31  30          Argentina  72 72 74  Switzerland  72  75 74  Dominican 
Republic 
72 71  74 
Niger  73 24  13          India  73 19 18  United  States  73  51 51  Argentina  73  75 75 
Congo, 
Dem. Rep. 
74 20  20          Pakistan  74 53 48  Pakistan  74  76 76  India  74  10 14 
              Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
75 52 58  India  75  6  5  Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
75 59  56 
                Korea,  Rep. 76 73 71  Germany  76  71 75  Colombia  76  76 73 
                           Burkina  Faso  77  74  64 
                           Guatemala  78  77  76 
                           Paraguay  79  78  79 
Correlation Matrix     Correlation Matrix     Correlation Matrix     Correlation Matrix     Correlation Matrix    
  rank1 rank2  rank3    rank1  rank2 rank3    rank1 rank2 rank3    rank1  rank2 rank3    rank1  rank2 rank3 
rank1  1     rank1  1     rank1  1      rank1  1     rank1  1     
rank2  .3931  1   rank2  .5488  1   rank2  .9064  1   rank2  .7470  1   rank2  .8058  1  
rank3 .3388  .9468  1  rank3  .5486  .9565 1  rank3  .8792  .9591 1  rank3  .6957 .9480 1  rank3  .8071  .9872 1 
Rank test (p-value)     Rank test (p-value)     Rank test (p-value)     Rank test (p-value)     Rank test (p-value)    
rank1=rank2  .9063     rank1=rank2       rank1=rank2 .0139      rank1=rank2  .2888     rank1=rank2  .2007     
rank2=rank3  .7122     rank2=rank3       rank2=rank3  1      rank2=rank3  1     rank2=rank3  .7163     
Orgs and HH = Organizations and households. 
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Table 2b: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/Total Expenditure) 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Uruguay  1 1 1  Uruguay  1 2 1  Iceland  1 1 1  Cote  d'Ivoire  1 2 2 
Germany  2 7 8  France  2 3  10  Costa  Rica  2 2 3  Costa  Rica  2 1 4 
Luxembourg  3  14  18  Luxembourg  3  36  26  Germany  3 4 4  Colombia  3 3 1 
Switzerland 4  15  12  Sweden  4  8  8  Panama  4  3  2  Malaysia  4  14  13 
Spain  5 2 2  Argentina  5 1 2  France  5 5 6  Honduras  5 10  10 
Sweden 6  5  9  Netherlands  6  12  6  Switzerland 6  11  12  Thailand  6  6  15 
Austria  7 4 3  Belgium  7  14  15  Ireland  7 9 7  Jamaica  7 16  14 
France 8  13  13  Austria 8  4  7  United  Kingdom  8  8  10  Tunisia 8  13  21 
Belgium 9  17  11  United  States  9  16  18  United  States  9 12  14  Senegal  9 18 7 
Argentina  10 3  4  Spain  10 7  4  Austria  10 20 15  Peru  10 11 12 
Denmark  11 16 10  Switzerland  11 24 30  Netherlands  11 13 11  Zimbabwe  11 21 20 
Japan 12  20  28  Norway  12  32  37  Italy  12  16  9  Singapore  12  5  5 
Netherlands 13  28  39  Canada  13  21  29 Honduras  13  7  5  Mexico  13  22  17 
Canada 14  22  22  Poland  14  15  21  Australia  14 15 23  Korea,  Rep.  14 15 11 
Norway  15  47  43  United Kingdom  15  22  20  Nicaragua  15  6  18  Venezuela RB  15  4  3 
Italy 16  36  49  Australia  16  41  42  Dominican 
Republic 
16 10 17  Burkina  Faso  16 17 29 
Malta  17 8  5  Israel  17 42 40  Venezuela  RB  17 14 22  Niger  17 37 23 
Finland  18 51 57  Portugal  18 11 12  Malta  18 19 13  Panama  18 31 37 
Chile  19 6  6  Panama  19 5  3  Chile  19 18 32  Morocco  19 24 24 
United  States  20 55 37  Brazil  20 10 14  Portugal  20 43 50  Guatemala  20 35 33 
Australia  21 59 61  Cyprus  21 20 36  Guatemala  21 24 26  Turkey  21 20 18 
Brazil  22 10 15  Costa  Rica  22 6  9  Jamaica  22 23 16  Togo  22 38 51 
United  Kingdom  23 45 38  Iceland  23 46 47  Finland  23 30 45  Suriname  23 32 25 
Ireland 24  49  55  Tunisia 24  13  11  Greece  24  31 53  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  24 27 19 
Portugal 25  24  27  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
25 38 27  Gambia,  The  25 17 8  Mali  25 30 38 
Greece  26  39  63  Egypt, Arab Rep.  26  18  24  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
26 34 49  Cameroon  26 45 48 
Romania  27 18 17  Denmark  27 47 45  Guinea-Bissau  27 21 30  Belgium  27 12 31 40 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Cyprus 28  52  62  Greece  28  37  38  Singapore  28 40 51  Nicaragua  28 39 50 
Paraguay  29 12 14  Sri  Lanka  29 9  5  Tunisia  29 28 43  Chile  29 25 34 
Iceland  30 72 72  Korea,  Rep.  30 40 41  Norway  30 52 40  Finland  30  9  6 
Mexico  31 38 51  Paraguay  31 17 17  Brazil  31 36 36  Paraguay  31 53 49 
Israel  32 69 70  Peru  32 26 22  Burkina  Faso  32 22 46  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
32 28 53 
Costa  Rica  33 23 29  Nicaragua  33 19 23  Zimbabwe  33 27 29  Iceland  33 26 41 
Sri Lanka  34  11  16  Gambia, The  34  23  13  Canada  34  54  56  Dominican 
Republic 
34 44 44 
Colombia  35 43 45  Cameroon  35 29 28  Cyprus  35 62 64  Madagascar  35 47 45 
Panama 36  34  32  Malaysia  36  39  33  Haiti  36 29 27  Netherlands  36 23 28 
Tunisia 37  44  24  Indonesia  37  35  43  Madagascar  37 25 21  Gambia,  The  37 56 55 
Nicaragua  38 19 30  South  Africa  38 34 32  Kuwait  38 44 37  Ireland  38 42 26 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
39 33 35  Japan  39 48 46  Malaysia  39 53 31  Kuwait  39  8  9 
Kuwait  40 73 74  Mali  40 27 16  Thailand  40 51 48  Denmark  40 34 42 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
41 68 68  Cote  d'Ivoire  41 25 34  Suriname  41 37 33  Guyana  41 50 30 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
42 54 56  Thailand  42 31 19  Peru  42 46 34  Ethiopia  42 62 71 
Korea,  Rep.  43 70 69  Guinea  43 30 31  Israel  43 65 44  Cyprus  43 55 47 
Suriname  44  60  65  Colombia  44  45  48  Iran, Islamic Rep.  44  39  35  Egypt, Arab Rep.  44  43  39 
Venezuela RB  45  71  71  Gabon  45  44  44  Sri Lanka  45  41  28  Congo, Rep.  45  61  58 
Togo  46 25 21  Guinea-Bissau  46 28 35  Senegal  46 26 25  Italy  46 33 32 
Guatemala  47 53 42  Jamaica  47 43 39  Togo  47 35 38  Portugal  47 59 62 
Morocco  48 50 47  Togo  48 33 25  Guyana  48 38 19  Malta  48 51 56 
Honduras  49 35 33          Colombia  49 45 54  Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
49 48 52 
Indonesia  50 58 52          Spain  50 63 55  Israel  50 54 57 
South Africa  51  66  64          Cote d'Ivoire  51  48  41  Sri Lanka  51  65  68 
Dominican 
Republic 
52 61 54          Uruguay  52 55 62  Austria  52 46 36 41 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Ethiopia  53  9  7       Congo,  Rep.  53  49  57  Sweden  53  29  22 
Zimbabwe  54  42  48       Niger  54  47  39  Greece  54  58  54 
Senegal  55  40  31       Cameroon  55  50  58  Luxembourg  55  19  16 
Cameroon  56  48  53       Paraguay  56  57  42  Guinea-Bissau  56  70  69 
Guyana  57  56  50       Romania  57  69  73  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
57 63 59 
Mali  58  27  19       Mali  58  42  20  Indonesia  58  52  46 
Malaysia  59  65  66       Ethiopia  59  33  65  Uruguay  59  64  64 
Burkina  Faso  60  26  44       Morocco  60  61  63  France  60  40  27 
Cote  d'Ivoire 61  46  41       Mexico  61  64  47  Australia  61  36  35 
Congo,  Rep. 62  57  58       Denmark  62  70  69  Argentina  62  69  60 
Guinea-Bissau  63  21  23       Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  63  56  60  Norway  63  49  40 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
64  62  46       Turkey  64  66  70  Haiti  64  73  74 
Madagascar  65  32  26       Luxembourg  65  75  67  Spain  65  57  61 
Haiti  66  41  40       Indonesia  66  59  68  South  Africa  66  74  70 
Thailand  67  63  59       Argentina  67  68  74  Japan  67  60  66 
Jamaica  68  64  67       South  Africa  68  72  59  Romania  68  76  73 
Gambia,  The 69  29  25       Sweden  69  74  71  Brazil  69  72  72 
Singapore  70  74  73       India  70  32  24  Canada  70  66  65 
Turkey  71  67  60       Belgium  71  73  76  Switzerland  71  67  63 
Pakistan  72  37  36          Congo, Dem. Rep.  72  58  66  United Kingdom  72  71  75 
Niger  73  30  20       Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
73 67 61  United  States  73 41 43 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
74  31  34       Japan  74  76  75  India  74  7  8 
           Pakistan  75  60  52  Pakistan  75  75  76 
           Korea,  Rep.  of 76  71  72  Germany  76  68  67 
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix     
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1  1    Rank1  1    Rank1  1    Rank1  1    
Rank2  .5605  1    Rank2 .6806  1    Rank2  0.8431  1    Rank2 0.8075  1   
Rank3  .4924  .9459  1  Rank3  .6504  .9295  1  Rank3  0.7438 0.9179 1  Rank3  0.7594 0.9393 1 
                    
Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    
rank1=rank2  .9063    rank1=rank2  .7660    rank1=rank2  0.4096    rank1=rank2  .4160    
rank2=rank3  .8043    rank2=rank3  .3368    rank2=rank3  0.5446    rank2=rank3  .4704    
Orgs and HH = Organizations and households. 
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Table 2c: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/Tax Revenues) 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Kuwait  1 1 1  Sweden  1 9 6  Kuwait  1 1 1  Kuwait  1 1 1 
Germany  2  17  16  France  2 7  14  Guinea-Bissau  2 2 2  Guinea-Bissau  2 2 3 
Uruguay  3 3 3  Uruguay  3 2 1  Panama  3 3 4  Iran,  Islamic 
Rep. 
3 3 2 
Spain  4 4 6  Argentina  4 1 2  Iceland  4 5 5  Cote  d'Ivoire  4 6 5 
Sweden  5 19  20  Belgium  5 16  16  Costa  Rica  5  4 3  Colombia  5 20  11 
Romania  6 2 2  Netherlands  6  15  11  Germany  6 8 8  Costa  Rica  6 4 4 
Switzerland  7  23  17  Austria  7 6  10  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  7 6 7  Panama  7  11  23 
Austria  8 12  10  Canada  8 14  17  France  8 11 9  Malaysia  8  8  9 
Malta  9 8 5  United  States  9  19  18  Ireland  9 7 6  Honduras  9  24  31 
Luxembourg  10 64 66  Switzerland  10 20 21  Nicaragua  10 15 29  Jamaica  10 13 20 
Argentina  11  7  9  Spain  11 11 8  Switzerland  11 16 16  Suriname  11 60 67 
Belgium  12 35 22  Luxembourg  12 39 38  United  Kingdom  12 12 19  Peru  12 12 10 
France  13 26 21  Brazil  13  3  5  United  States  13 19 24  Zimbabwe  13 21 18 
Denmark  14 25 19  Norway  14 32 37  Italy  14 24 15  Mali  14 38 46 
Canada  15 28 29  Poland  15 26 31  Honduras  15  9 10  Morocco  15 17 15 
Japan  16 11 14  Panama  16  5  4  Austria  16 21 14  Niger  16 23 22 
Italy  17 36 51  Israel  17 34 32  Malta  17 28 22  Tunisia  17 22 26 
Brazil  18  5  4  United  Kingdom  18 24 22  Netherlands  18 33 39  Thailand  18  7  7 
Netherlands 19  50  57  Portugal  19  8  9  Dominican 
Republic 
19 26 30  Senegal  19 36 29 
Chile  20 21 23  Australia  20 41 41  Australia  20 55 64  Mexico  20 19 24 
Finland  21 58 64  Cyprus  21 17 36  Gambia,  The  21 25 20  Burkina  Faso  21 46 57 
Norway  22  65  62  Egypt, Arab Rep.  22 10 12  Greece  22 13 26  Turkey  22 10 12 
United  States  23 54 49  Greece  23 22 27  Jamaica  23 20 17  Singapore  23 28 28 
Ireland  24 29 33  Costa  Rica  24 12 15  Chile  24 41 60  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
24 39 35 
Portugal 25  9  8  Tunisia  25  13 7  Haiti  25 22 18  Togo  25 40 44 
United Kingdom  26  51  48  Sri Lanka  26  4  3  Madagascar  26 29 25  Madagascar  26 33 38 
Greece  27 20 34  Iceland  27 45 45  Brazil  27 14 11  Ethiopia  27 64 63 44 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Australia 28  70  72  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
28 37 28  Portugal  28 10 12  Nicaragua  28 61 60 
Cyprus  29 16 43  Denmark  29 47 43  Guatemala  29 17 27  Guatemala  29 25 32 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
30 15 18  Peru  30 25 23  Venezuela  RB  30 57 65  Korea,  Rep.  30 18 17 
Israel  31 69 68  Nicaragua  31 21 26  Cyprus  31 23 40  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
31 49 50 
Guinea-Bissau 32  6  7  Paraguay  32 23 20 Finland  32  54  61 Cameroon  32  41  39 
Sri  Lanka  33 10 13  Korea,  Rep.  33 43 42  Zimbabwe  33 27 21  Guyana  33 59 47 
Panama  34 22 26  Guinea-Bissau  34 18 24  Guyana  34 51 35  Gambia,  The  34 66 71 
Mexico  35 33 53  Cameroon  35 28 29  Suriname  35 68 71  Venezuela  RB 35 55 59 
Paraguay  36 13 12  Mali  36 27 13  Tunisia  36 34 44  Chile  36 58 65 
Iceland  37 71 71  Malaysia  37 38 35  Sri  Lanka  37 35 37  Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
37 14 13 
Costa  Rica  38 18 15  South  Africa  38 35 30  Burkina  Faso  38 42 68  Cyprus  38 16 14 
Colombia  39 55 54  Indonesia  39 40 46  Israel  39 65 47  Belgium  39 44 48 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
40 39 39  Gambia,  The  40 29 19  Canada  40 62 57  Congo,  Rep.  40 51 43 
Tunisia  41 46 28  Japan  41 48 47  Singapore  41 56 63  Malta  41 71 69 
Nicaragua 42  38  41  Cote  d'Ivoire  42 31 39  Peru  42 37 31  Ireland  42 27 19 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
43 53 31  Thailand  43 33 25  Malaysia  43 30 23  Sri  Lanka  43 56 66 
Suriname  44 67 69  Guinea  44 30 33  Romania  44 66 59  Finland  44 29 30 
Ethiopia  45 14 11  Gabon  45 44 44  Congo,  Rep.  45 45 51  Paraguay  45 35 33 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
46 72 70  Colombia  46 46 48  Togo  46 39 45  Dominican 
Republic 
46 62 56 
Morocco  47 41 40  Jamaica  47 42 40  Norway  47 70 62  Iceland  47 30 25 
Togo  48 30 27  Togo  48 36 34  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
48 61 72  Israel  48 53 58 
Mali  49 31 30          Ethiopia  49 48 58  Netherlands  49 47 55 
Guyana  50 61 60          Thailand  50 31 34  Italy  50 43 42 
Honduras  51 44 45          Mali  51 53 42  Portugal  51 15 16 
Korea, Rep.  52  68  65          Senegal  52 43 33  Greece  52 26 21 45 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Zimbabwe  53  37  37       Colombia  53  52  53  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
53 63 72 
Guatemala  54 42 46          Niger  54 32 38  Denmark  54 34 45 
Venezuela  RB 55 73 73          Cote  d'Ivoire  55 36 36  Haiti  55 65 64 
South  Africa  56 52 50          Spain  56 63 52  Romania  56 67 51 
Dominican 
Republic 
57 66 61          Cameroon  57 49 49  Austria  57 31 27 
Congo,  Rep.  58 57 58          Uruguay  58 59 74  Sweden  58 45 41 
Senegal  59 49 36          Morocco  59 47 46  Indonesia  59 57 53 
Haiti  60 34 32          Paraguay  60 40 28  Uruguay  60 69 73 
Cameroon  61 48 47          Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  61 69 73  Luxembourg  61 75 75 
Indonesia  62 59 59          Mexico  62 58 50  France  62 48 34 
Malaysia  63 60 63          Turkey  63 50 48  Argentina  63 50 37 
Madagascar 64  45  42       Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
64 71 56  Australia  64 74 74 
Cote  d'Ivoire  65  40  38       Congo,  Dem. 
Rep. 
65 38 41  South  Africa  65 32 40 
Burkina  Faso  66 43 56          Denmark  66 72 69  Spain  66 54 54 
Gambia,  The  67 32 44          Argentina  67 64 55  Norway  67 68 61 
Jamaica  68  62  67       India  68  18  13  Japan  68  9  8 
Thailand  69 47 35          Indonesia  69 60 67  Brazil  69 42 36 
Turkey  70 63 55          Luxembourg  70 76 76  Canada  70 73 68 
Pakistan  71 56 52          South  Africa  71 46 32  Switzerland  71 52 52 
Singapore  72 74 74          Sweden  72 74 70  United  Kingdom  72 70 70 
Niger  73  24  24       Belgium  73  75  75  India  73  5  6 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
74 27 25          Pakistan  74 73 66  Pakistan  74 76 76 
           Japan  75  44  43  United  States  75  37  49 
           Korea,  Rep  76  67  54  Germany  76  72  62 
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix      Correlation Matrix     
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3   Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1  1     Rank1  1     Rank1  1     Rank1  1    
Rank2  0.6419 1    Rank2  0.7434 1    Rank2  0.9341 1    Rank2  0.7163 1   
Rank3  0.5765 0.9337 1  Rank3  0.6743 0.9313 1  Rank3  0.8614 0.9143 1  Rank3  0.6848 0.9712 1 
                
Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    Rank test (p-value)    
rank1=rank2  0.8151      rank1=rank2  0.5515      rank1=rank2 1     rank1=rank2  1    
rank2=rank3  0.7035     rank2=rank3  0.7493     rank2=rank3  0.6254     rank2=rank3  0.457     
Orgs and HH = Organizations and households. 
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Table 2d: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/GDP), by continent 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 




                             
Uruguay  9 3  2  Uruguay  9 5 2  Costa  Rica  7 9  12  Guyana  4 3 1  Guyana  1  2 1 
Chile  19  19  14  Brazil  19  7  8 Panama  8  6  4 Suriname  5  13  7 Suriname  11  16  11 
Brazil  24  9  12  Costa  Rica  23 13 21  Guyana  14 13 11  Costa  Rica  12 14 12  Jamaica  20  12 18 
Argentina  29 49  48  Argentina  24 27 33  Nicaragua  16 12 16  Panama  15 20 18  Nicaragua  26  22 15 
Panama  34 33  22  Panama  25 15  6  Jamaica  18 15 14  Chile  25 26 29  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
35 44  44 
Costa Rica  35  36  43  Trinidad and 
Tobago 
28 40 38  Chile  24 16 28  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
27 31 41  Panama  38  31 17 
Mexico  37 58  65  Nicaragua  30 17 17  Suriname  26 28 20  Venezuela  RB  32 30 24  Chile  43  43 40 
Guyana  38 44  41  Peru  32 35 39  Trinidad  and 
Tobago 
28 38 46  Nicaragua  35 36 40  Uruguay  44  45 37 
Suriname  39 56  58  Paraguay  34 33 34  Venezuela  RB  32 36 39  Honduras  38 40 48  Brazil  45  29 29 
Nicaragua  40 28  38  Jamaica  46 38 37  Honduras  33 21 17  Peru  41 42 56  Costa  Rica  48  47 46 
Trinidad and 
Tobago 
41 69  71  Colombia  47 42 46  Brazil  34 33 40  Mexico  44 45 53  Venezuela  RB  60  72 69 
Colombia 44  57  57        Dominican 
Republic 
37 35 43  Colombia  45 43 33  Mexico  63  65 70 
Paraguay  45 45  53          Uruguay  45 56 51  Uruguay  54 62 52  Haiti  65  62 59 
Venezuela  RB  52 72  70          Haiti  49 43 35  Dominican 
Republic 
58 64 61  Peru  70  67 77 
Jamaica  55 61  67          Peru  54 57 59  Guatemala  62 68 72  Honduras  71  66 67 
Honduras  59 48  46          Guatemala  57 58 57  Paraguay  64 69 70  Dominican 
Republic 
72 71  74 
Dominican 
Republic 
63 66  62          Colombia  64 60 67  Haiti  67 72 69  Argentina  73  75 75 
Haiti  65 41  33          Mexico  68 67 64  Brazil  69 65 63  Colombia  76  76 73 
Guatemala  66 54  51          Paraguay  69 65 62  Argentina  70 74 68  Guatemala  78  77 76 
             Argentina  72  72  74        Paraguay  79  78  79 
                               
Sub-Saharan 
Africa 
                             
Togo  43 22  29  South  Africa  33 29 23  Guinea-Bissau  12  7  9  Cote  d'Ivoire 2  5  3  Guinea-Bissau  3  3  3 
Guinea-Bissau  46 18  16  Cameroon  36 30 22  Congo,  Rep.  30 20 31  Togo  11 12 23  Congo,  Rep.  17  7  6 
Congo,  Rep. 48 46  37  Mali  37 21 20  Gambia,  The  31 22 15  Zimbabwe  14 16 19  Togo  24  11 12 
South  Africa 49 59  54  Gambia,  The  38 23 15  Zimbabwe  35 23 29  Guinea-Bissau  17 18 20  Gabon  25  9  9 
Zimbabwe  51 39  52  Cote  d'Ivoire  39 19 32  Togo  36 17 22  Congo,  Rep.  19 22 21  South  Africa  39  27 27 
Ethiopia  53 11  8  Guinea-Bissau 42 20 24  Cote  d'Ivoire  46 39 45  Senegal  21 38 28  Cote  d'Ivoire  41  28 34 
Senegal  56 42  25  Guinea  44 25 28  Senegal  47 40 30  Gambia,  The  42 57 60  Zimbabwe  42  35 38 
Cote  d'Ivoire  58 32  35  Gabon  45 41 42  Madagascar  51 37 27  Niger  46 53 37  Gambia,  The  47  49 53 
Mali  60 27  34  Togo  48 28 29  Ethiopia  58 25 47  Mali  48 48 57  Ethiopia  50  38 31 
Cameroon  62 47  42          Cameroon  59 50 53  Cameroon  51 55 46  Guinea  53  42 51 48 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 
Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 
Gambia,  The  64 29  32          Burkina  Faso  60 41 56  Ethiopia  52 50 54  Mali  54  50 60 
Madagascar 67 30  28          Niger  61 48 36  Burkina  Faso  55 60 58  Senegal  55  56 50 
Burkina  Faso  71 34  44          Mali  62 45 26  Madagascar 56 58 55  Cameroon  62  58 48 
Niger  73 24  13          South  Africa  65 69 49  South  Africa  59 66 59  Madagascar  67  64 62 
Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
74  20  20          Congo, Dem. Rep.  75  52  58  Congo, Dem. 
Rep. 
66 63 64  Niger  68  53 47 
                         Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  75  59  56 
                         Burkina  Faso  77  74  64 
                               
North America                               
Canada  21 65  63  United  States  15 31 35  United  States  17 31 24  Canada  71 70 71  Canada  51  69 71 
United  States  26 64  55  Canada  16 39 41  Canada  42 66 69  United  States  73 51 51  United  States  52  61 54 
Western 
Europe 
                             
Belgium  1 1  1  Belgium  1 3 5  France  1 2 2  Belgium  1 1 2  Netherlands  4  4 7 
Luxembourg  2  12  19  Netherlands  2 1 1  Netherlands  2 3 3  Netherlands  6 2 6  Belgium  5  6 8 
Sweden  3 7  7  France  3 2 3  Germany  3 4 5  Ireland  9 8 4  Italy  9 14  23 
Netherlands 4 2  5  Sweden  4 4 4  Ireland  4 1 1  Finland  20  19  15  Ireland  10 15  21 
France  5 4  3  Luxembourg  5  32  27  Iceland  5 5 7  Denmark  24  24  26  France  13 18  13 
Austria  6 6  4  Austria  6 8  11  United  Kingdom  6 8 6  Italy  26  21  32  Luxembourg  14 46  58 
Germany  7  10  9  Spain  10 11  9  Austria  9  14 13  Iceland  29 34 38  Sweden  15  39 39 
Denmark  8  13  10  Norway  11 34 30  Italy  10 10  8  Sweden  30 25 25  United  Kingdom 18  20 22 
Italy  11 16  26  United  Kingdom  12 14 19  Switzerland  15 46 44  Austria  31 33 30  Austria  21  37 36 
Spain  12  8  18  Switzerland  13 43 45  Finland  21 44 50  Cyprus  33 41 34  Denmark  22  36 33 
Norway  13 51  39  Cyprus  17 24 25  Norway  25 51 42  Luxembourg  34 28 36  Norway  23  41 42 
Ireland  14 14  15  Denmark  20 46 44  Cyprus  29 55 63  France  37 29 22  Germany  28  40 45 
Finland  15 60  60  Iceland  22 47 48  Spain  38 62 65  Norway  53 54 39  Cyprus  31  34 30 
United 
Kingdom 
17 23  23          Denmark  53 71 66  Spain  61 61 66  Finland  32  57 49 
Switzerland  18 68  64          Luxembourg  55 75 73  United 
Kingdom 
68 67 73  Iceland  36  54 55 
Cyprus  28 50  49          Belgium  56 70 75  Switzerland 72 75 74  Spain  40  52 61 
Iceland  30 71  72          Sweden  63 74 72  Germany  76 71 75  Switzerland  56  79 78 
South Asia                               
Sri Lanka  33  15  21  Sri Lanka  29  9  7  Sri Lanka  40  29  25  Sri Lanka  49  49  62  Sri Lanka  37  24  35 
Pakistan  72 31  30          India  73 19 18  Pakistan  74 76 76  Pakistan  59  51 52 
             Pakistan  74  53  48  India  75  6  5  India  74  10  14 




                             
Malta  10  5  6  Israel  8  16  12 Malta  11  11  10 Tunisia  7  7  11 Israel  2  1  2 
Israel  16 26  47  Portugal  14 10 14  Israel  13 27 19  Israel  8  10 13  Kuwait  6  33 32 
Portugal  23 21  24  Tunisia  21 12 16  Kuwait  20 24 21  Morocco  13 15 14  Egypt,  Arab  Rep. 7  8  5 49 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education  Total Government Expenditure 
Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3 Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name Rank1  Rank2  Rank3 
Greece 27  43  40  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
26  18  13 Portugal  22  26  37 Kuwait  16  9  10 Malta  12  13  20 
Kuwait  31 74  74  Greece  27 36 18  Greece  23 30 41  Egypt,  Arab 
Rep. 
18 17  9  Portugal  19  17 19 
Egypt, Arab 
Rep. 
32 25  17          Tunisia  27 18 23  Malta  22 27 35  Greece  27  21 10 
Tunisia  36 38  31          Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  39 34 32  Iran,  Islamic 
Rep. 
23 23 17  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
29 23  28 
Iran, Islamic 
Rep. 
42 52  45          Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  48 42 38  Portugal  39 39 44  Tunisia  30  26 24 
Morocco  47 37  36          Morocco  50 49 52  Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
47 46 45  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  33  30 25 
Syrian Arab 
Republic 
50 55  50          Syrian  Arab 
Republic 
67 63 54  Greece  50 47 31  Morocco  34  25 26 




                             
Romania  22 17  11  Poland  7  6  10  Romania  43 68 70  Turkey  40 37 47  Poland  8  5  4 
Turkey  69 63  59          Turkey  66 64 68  Romania  57 73 65  Romania  16  19 16 
                         Turkey  58  55  57 
                               
East Asia and 
the Pacific 
                             
Japan  20 35  56  Australia  18 48 47  Australia  19 32 34  Malaysia  10 11 16  Malaysia  46  32 41 
Australia  25 70  69  Korea,  Rep.  31 44 43  Malaysia  41 47 33  Singapore  28 32 27  Australia  49  73 68 
Korea,  Rep. 54 67  68  Malaysia  35 37 31  Singapore  44 59 61  Thailand  36 35 49  Singapore  57  70 65 
Malaysia  57 62  66  Indonesia  40 22 36  Thailand  52 61 55  Korea,  Rep. 43 44 43  Indonesia  61  48 43 
Indonesia  61 40  27  Japan  41 45 40  Indonesia  70 54 60  Australia  60 56 50  Japan  64  63 66 
Thailand  68 53  61  Thailand  43 26 26  Japan  71 76 76  Indonesia  63 52 42  Thailand  66  60 63 
Singapore 70  73  73        Korea,  Rep.  76 73 71  Japan  65 59 67  Korea,  Rep.  69  68 72 
Orgs and HH = Organizations and households. 
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Table 2e: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/Total Expenditure), by continent 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
• • •  •                     
Uruguay  1 1 1  Uruguay  1  2  1  Costa  Rica  2  2  3  Costa  Rica  2  1  4 
Argentina  10 3  4  Argentina  5 1 2  Panama  4  3  2  Colombia  3  3  1 
Chile 19  6  6  Panama  19  5  3  Honduras  13  7  5  Honduras  5  10  10 
Brazil  22 10 15  Brazil  20  10  14  Nicaragua  15  6  18  Jamaica  7  16  14 
Paraguay  29 12 14  Costa  Rica  22 6  9  Dominican  Republic 16  10  17  Peru  10  11  12 
Mexico  31 38 51  Trinidad  and  Tobago  25  38  27  Venezuela  RB  17  14  22  Mexico  13  22  17 
Costa  Rica  33 23 29  Paraguay  31  17  17  Chile  19  18  32  Venezuela  RB  15  4  3 
Colombia  35 43 45  Peru  32  26  22  Guatemala  21  24  26  Panama  18  31  37 
Panama  36 34 32  Nicaragua  33  19  23  Jamaica  22  23  16  Guatemala  20  35  33 
Nicaragua  38 19 30  Colombia  44  45  48  Trinidad  and  Tobago 26  34  49  Suriname  23  32  25 
Trinidad  and  Tobago 41 68 68  Jamaica  47  43  39  Brazil  31  36  36  Nicaragua  28  39  50 
Suriname  44 60 65          Haiti  36  29  27  Chile  29  25  34 
Venezuela  RB  45 71 71          Suriname  41  37  33  Paraguay  31  53  49 
Guatemala  47 53 42          Peru  42  46  34  Trinidad  and  Tobago  32  28  53 
Honduras  49 35 33          Guyana  48  38  19  Dominican  Republic  34  44  44 
Dominican  Republic 52 61 54          Colombia  49  45  54  Guyana  41  50  30 
Guyana  57 56 50          Uruguay  52  55  62  Uruguay  59  64  64 
Haiti  66 41 40          Paraguay  56  57  42  Argentina  62  69  60 
Jamaica  68 64 67          Mexico  61  64  47  Haiti  64  73  74 
                             
              Argentina  67  68  74  Brazil  69 72 72 
Sub-Saharan  Africa                            
Togo  46  25  21  Gambia, The  34  23  13  Gambia, The  25  17  8  Cote d'Ivoire  1  2  2 
South  Africa  51 66 64  Cameroon  35  29  28  Guinea-Bissau  27  21  30  Senegal  9  18  7 
Ethiopia  53  9  7  South Africa  38  34  32  Burkina Faso  32  22  46  Zimbabwe  11  21  20 
Zimbabwe  54 42 48  Mali  40  27  16  Zimbabwe  33  27  29  Burkina  Faso  16  17  29 
Senegal  55 40 31  Cote  d'Ivoire  41  25  34  Madagascar  37  25  21  Niger  17  37  23 
Cameroon  56 48 53  Guinea  43  30  31  Senegal  46  26  25  Togo  22  38  51 
Mali  58 27 19  Gabon  45  44  44  Togo  47  35  38  Mali  25  30  38 
Burkina  Faso  60 26 44  Guinea-Bissau  46  28  35  Cote  d'Ivoire  51  48  41  Cameroon  26  45  48 
Cote  d'Ivoire  61 46 41  Togo  48  33  25  Congo,  Rep.  53  49  57  Madagascar  35  47  45 
Congo,  Rep.  62 57 58          Niger  54  47  39  Gambia,  The  37  56  55 
Guinea-Bissau  63 21 23          Cameroon  55  50  58  Ethiopia  42  62  71 
Madagascar  65 32 26          Mali  58  42  20  Congo,  Rep.  45  61  58 
Gambia, The  69  29  25          Ethiopia  59  33  65  Congo, Dem. Rep.  49  48  52 
Niger  73 30 20          South  Africa  68  72  59  Guinea-Bissau  56  70  69 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  74  31  34          Congo, Dem. Rep.  72  58  66  South Africa  66  74  70 
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
North America                             
Canada  14 22 22  United  States  9 16  18  United  States  9  12  14  Canada  70  66  65 
United  States  20 55 37  Canada  13  21  29  Canada  34  54  56  United  States  73  41  43 
                             
Western  Europe                             
Germany  2 7 8  France  2  3  10  Iceland  1  1  1  Belgium  27  12  31 
Luxembourg  3  14  18  Luxembourg  3  36  26  Germany  3 4 4  Finland  30  9  6 
Switzerland  4 15  12  Sweden  4 8 8  France  5  5  6  Iceland  33  26  41 
Spain  5 2 2  Netherlands  6  12  6  Switzerland  6 11  12  Netherlands  36  23  28 
Sweden  6 5 9  Belgium  7  14  15  Ireland  7  9  7  Ireland  38  42  26 
Austria  7 4 3  Austria  8  4  7  United  Kingdom  8  8 10  Denmark  40  34  42 
France  8 13  13  Spain  10  7 4  Austria  10 20 15  Cyprus  43  55  47 
Belgium  9 17  11  Switzerland  11  24  30  Netherlands  11 13 11  Italy  46  33  32 
Denmark  11 16 10  Norway  12  32  37  Italy  12  16  9  Austria  52  46  36 
Netherlands  13 28 39  United  Kingdom  15  22  20  Finland  23  30  45  Sweden  53  29  22 
Norway  15 47 43  Cyprus  21  20  36  Norway  30  52  40  Luxembourg  55  19  16 
Italy  16 36 49  Iceland  23  46  47  Cyprus  35  62  64  France  60  40  27 
Finland  18 51 57  Denmark  27  47  45  Spain  50  63  55  Norway  63  49  40 
United  Kingdom  23 45 38          Denmark  62  70  69  Spain  65  57  61 
Ireland  24 49 55          Luxembourg  65  75  67  Switzerland  71  67  63 
Cyprus  28 52 62          Sweden  69  74  71  United  Kingdom  72  71  75 
Iceland  30 72 72          Belgium  71  73  76  Germany  76  68  67 
South  Asia                             
Sri Lanka  34  11  16  Sri Lanka  29  9  5  Sri Lanka  45  41  28  Sri Lanka  51  65  68 
Pakistan  72 37 36          India  70  32  24  India  74  7  8 
              Pakistan  75  60  52  Pakistan  75 75 76 
                             
Middle East and North 
Africa 
                           
Malta  17 8  5  Israel  17  42  40  Malta  18 19 13  Tunisia  8  13  21 
Portugal  25 24 27  Portugal  18  11  12  Portugal  20  43  50  Morocco  19  24  24 
Greece  26 39 63  Tunisia  24  13  11  Greece  24  31  53  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  24  27  19 
Israel  32 69 70  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  26  18  24  Tunisia  29  28  43  Kuwait  39  8  9 
Tunisia  37 44 24  Greece  28  37  38  Kuwait  38  44  37  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  44  43  39 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  39 33 35          Israel  43  65  44  Portugal  47  59  62 
Kuwait  40 73 74          Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  44  39  35  Malta  48  51  56 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  42 54 56          Morocco  60  61  63  Israel  50  54  57 
Morocco  48 50 47          Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  63  56  60  Greece  54  58  54 
Syrian Arab Republic  64  62  46          Syrian Arab Republic  73  67  61  Syrian Arab Republic  57  63  59 
                             
Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia 
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Romania  27 18 17  Poland  14  15  21  Romania  57  69  73  Turkey  21  20  18 
Turkey  71 67 60          Turkey  64  66  70  Romania  68  76  73 
                             
East Asia and the 
Pacific 
                           
Japan  12 20 28  Australia  16  41  42  Australia  14  15  23  Malaysia  4  14  13 
Australia  21 59 61  Korea,  Rep.  30  40  41  Singapore  28  40  51  Thailand  6  6  15 
Korea,  Rep.  43 70 69  Malaysia  36  39  33  Malaysia  39  53  31  Singapore  12  5  5 
Indonesia  50 58 52  Indonesia  37  35  43  Thailand  40  51  48  Korea,  Rep.  14  15  11 
Malaysia  59 65 66  Japan  39  48  46  Indonesia  66  59  68  Indonesia  58  52  46 
Thailand  67 63 59  Thailand  42  31  19  Japan  74  76  75  Australia  61  36  35 
Singapore  70 74 73         Korea,  Rep.  76  71  72  Japan  67  60  66 
Orgs and HH = Organizations and households. 
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Table 2f: Spending On Social Safety Nets (SS/Tax Revenues), by continent 
Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3 
Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
                      
Uruguay  3 3 3  Uruguay  3  2  1  Panama  3 3 4  Colombia  5 20  11 
Argentina  11  7  9  Argentina  4 1 2  Costa  Rica  5  4  3  Costa  Rica  6  4  4 
Brazil  18 5  4  Brazil  13  3  5  Nicaragua  10 15 29  Panama  7  11  23 
Chile  20 21 23  Panama  16  5  4  Honduras  15  9  10  Honduras  9  24  31 
Panama  34 22 26  Costa  Rica  24  12  15  Dominican  Republic  19 26 30  Jamaica  10  13  20 
México  35 33 53  Trinidad  and  Tobago  28  37  28  Jamaica  23 20 17  Suriname  11  60  67 
Paraguay  36 13 12  Peru  30  25  23  Chile  24 41 60  Peru  12  12  10 
Costa  Rica  38 18 15  Nicaragua  31  21  26  Haiti  25 22 18  Mexico  20  19  24 
Colombia  39 55 54  Paraguay  32  23  20  Brazil  27 14 11  Nicaragua  28  61  60 
Nicaragua  42 38 41  Colombia  46  46  48  Guatemala  29 17 27  Guatemala  29  25  32 
Suriname  44 67 69  Jamaica  47  42  40  Venezuela  RB  30 57 65  Guyana  33  59  47 
Trinidad  and  Tobago  46 72 70          Guyana  34 51 35  Venezuela  RB  35  55  59 
Guyana  50 61 60          Suriname  35 68 71  Chile  36  58  65 
Honduras  51 44 45          Peru  42 37 31  Paraguay  45  35  33 
Guatemala  54 42 46          Trinidad  and  Tobago  48 61 72  Dominican  Republic  46  62  56 
Venezuela  RB  55 73 73          Colombia  53 52 53  Trinidad  and  Tobago  53  63  72 
Dominican  Republic  57 66 61          Uruguay  58 59 74  Haiti  55  65  64 
Haití  60 34 32          Paraguay  60 40 28  Uruguay  60  69  73 
Jamaica  68 62 67          Mexico  62 58 50  Argentina  63  50  37 
              Argentina  67  64  55  Brazil  69  42  36 
                           
Sub-Saharan  Africa                           
Guinea-Bissau  32  6 7  Guinea-Bissau  34 18 24  Guinea-Bissau  2 2 2  Guinea-Bissau  2  2  3 
Etiopía  45 14 11  Cameroon  35  28  29  Gambia,  The  21 25 20  Cote  d'Ivoire  4  6  5 
Togo  48 30 27  Mali  36  27  13  Madagascar  26 29 25  Zimbabwe  13  21  18 
Mali  49 31 30  South  Africa  38  35  30  Zimbabwe  33 27 21  Mali  14  38  46 
Zimbabwe  53 37 37  Gambia,  The  40  29  19  Burkina  Faso  38 42 68  Niger  16  23  22 
South  Africa  56 52 50  Cote  d'Ivoire  42  31  39  Congo,  Rep.  45 45 51  Senegal  19  36  29 
Congo,  Rep.  58 57 58  Guinea  44  30  33  Togo  46 39 45  Burkina  Faso  21  46  57 
Senegal  59 49 36  Gabon  45  44  44  Ethiopia  49 48 58  Togo  25  40  44 
Cameroon  61 48 47  Togo  48  36  34  Mali  51 53 42  Madagascar  26  33  38 
Madagascar  64 45 42          Senegal  52 43 33  Ethiopia  27  64  63 
Cote  d'Ivoire  65 40 38          Niger  54 32 38  Cameroon  32  41  39 
Burkina  Faso  66 43 56          Cote  d'Ivoire  55 36 36  Gambia,  The  34  66  71 
Gambia, The  67  32  44          Cameroon  57  49  49  Congo, Dem. Rep.  37  14  13 
Niger  73  24  24          Congo, Dem. Rep.  65  38  41  Congo, Rep.  40  51  43 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  74  27  25          South Africa  71  46  32  South Africa  65  32  40 
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3 
North  America                           
Canada  15 28 29  Canada  8  14  17  United  States  13 19 24  Canada  70  73  68 
United States  23  54  49  United States  9  19  18  Canada  40  62  57  United States  75  37  49 
                           
Western  Europe                           
Germany  2  17  16  Sweden  1 9 6  Iceland  4  5  5  Cyprus  38  16  14 
Spain  4 4 6  France  2  7  14  Germany  6 8 8  Belgium  39  44  48 
Sweden  5 19  20  Belgium  5  16 16  France  8 11 9  Ireland  42 27 19 
Switzerland  7  23  17  Netherlands  6 15 11  Ireland  9 7 6  Finland  44  29  30 
Austria  8 12 10  Austria  7  6  10  Switzerland  11 16 16  Iceland  47 30  25 
Luxembourg  10 64 66  Switzerland  10  20  21  United  Kingdom  12 12 19  Netherlands  49  47  55 
Belgium  12 35 22  Spain  11  11  8  Italy  14 24 15  Italy  50  43  42 
France  13 26 21  Luxembourg  12  39  38  Austria  16 21 14  Denmark  54  34  45 
Denmark  14 25 19  Norway  14  32  37  Netherlands  18 33 39  Austria  57  31  27 
Italy  17 36 51  United  Kingdom  18  24  22  Cyprus  31 23 40  Sweden  58  45  41 
Netherlands  19 50 57  Cyprus  21  17  36  Finland  32 54 61  Luxembourg  61  75  75 
Finland  21 58 64  Iceland  27  45  45  Norway  47 70 62  France  62  48  34 
Norway  22 65 62  Denmark  29  47  43  Spain  56 63 52  Spain  66  54  54 
Ireland  24 29 33          Denmark  66 72 69  Norway  67  68  61 
United  Kingdom  26 51 48          Luxembourg  70 76 76  Switzerland  71  52  52 
Cyprus  29 16 43          Sweden  72 74 70  United  Kingdom  72  70  70 
Iceland  37 71 71          Belgium  73 75 75  Germany  76  72  62 
                           
South Asia                                
Sri Lanka  33  10  13  Sri Lanka  26  4  3  Sri Lanka  37  35  37  Sri Lanka  43  56  66 
Pakistan  71 56 52          India  68 18 13  India  73  5  6 
              Pakistan  74  73  66  Pakistan  74  76  76 
                           
Middle East and North Africa                                
Kuwait  1 1 1  Israel  17 34 32  Kuwait  1 1 1  Kuwait  1  1  1 
Malta  9 8 5  Portugal  19  8  9  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  7 6 7  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  3  3  2 
Portugal  25  9 8  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  22 10 12  Malta  17  28  22  Morocco  15  17  15 
Greece  27 20 34  Greece  23  22  27  Greece  22 13 26  Tunisia  17  22  26 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  30 15 18  Tunisia  25  13  7  Portugal  28 10 12  Syrian  Arab  Republic  24  39  35 
Israel  31 69 68          Tunisia  36 34 44  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  31  49  50 
Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  40 39 39          Israel  39 65 47  Malta  41  71  69 
Tunisia  41 46 28         Morocco  59 47 46 Israel  48 53  58 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  43 53 31         Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  61 69 73 Portugal  51 15  16 
Morocco  47 41 40         Syrian  Arab  Republic  64 71 56 Greece  52 26  21 
                        
Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia  
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Social Security and Welfare  Transfers to Orgs and HH  Health  Education 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2  Rank3 
Romania  6 2 2  Poland  15 26 31  Romania  44  66  59  Turkey  22  10  12 
Turkey  70 63 55          Turkey  63 50 48  Romania  56  67  51 
                           
East Asia and the Pacific                                
Japan  16 11 14  Australia  20  41  41  Australia  20 55 64  Malaysia  8  8  9 
Australia  28 70 72  Korea,  Rep.  33  43  42  Singapore  41 56 63  Thailand  18  7  7 
Korea,  Rep.  52 68 65  Malaysia  37  38  35  Malaysia  43 30 23  Singapore  23  28  28 
Indonesia  62 59 59  Indonesia  39  40  46  Thailand  50 31 34  Korea,  Rep.  30  18  17 
Malaysia  63 60 63  Japan  41  48  47  Indonesia  69 60 67  Indonesia  59  57  53 
Thailand  69 47 35  Thailand  43  33  25  Japan  75 44 43  Australia  64  74  74 
Singapore  72 74 74          Korea,  Rep.  76 67 54  Japan  68  9  8 




At the bottom of table 2a, we report the correlation matrices between R1, R2, and R3 for 
each of the types of safety nets. It is interesting to note that, first, the unconditional rank is 
not highly correlated with R2 and R3 for social security and transfers. This indicates that 
only looking at the unconditional shares spent by governments on safety nets can be 
misleading—countries may be spending more or less than we may expect them to, and R2 
and R3 allow us to judge the extent to which this is the case. On the whole, R2 and R3 are 
highly correlated, although it is typically in exactly those cases when they are not that the 
most can be inferred for policy prescriptions. The fact that, in our sample, R2 and R3 are so 
highly correlated comes in part from the fact that our measures of institutional quality have 
had to be averaged over the entire sample period. 
Below the correlation matrices, we report a test of the equality of the ranks using the test 
described in Snedecor and Cochrane (1989). The null hypothesis of the test is that the median 
of the differences in rank across countries is zero. The test makes no further assumptions. We 
report the p-value of the test at the foot of tables 2a to 2c. We generally find no significant 
differences across the ranks. On the whole, given the relatively small sample and the lack of 
movement of countries, particularly at the highest ranks, this is not altogether surprising. It is 
of more interest to look at the movements of individual countries, as opposed to the ranking 
as a whole. 
So far, we have been expressing safety net expenditures as a share of GDP. In tables 2b 
and 2c, we consider the robustness of our results using two alternative normalizations: (i) 
expenditures as a share of total government expenditures, and (ii) expenditures as a share of 
total government tax revenues. We use these to further capture the notion of a government 
budget constraint. On the whole we find our rankings to be largely unchanged when we use 
any of these normalizations, although certain oil-dependent economies such as Kuwait 
perform better when we take expenditures as a share of total tax revenues. The correlation 
between R1 and the other rankings tends to rise when we use total expenditures as the 
numeraire, and tend to fall if we use tax revenues. 
Tables 2d to 2e repeat the results from tables 2a to 2c except that rankings are given 
within each regional grouping. We have done this in order to facilitate analysis of close 
neighbors, in the spirit of benchmark competition. Concentrating on table 2d, where we use 
safety net expenditures as a share of GDP, we see that Argentina, relative to its neighbors, 
performs well with a rank of R1 when we only look at unconditional social security 
expenditures. Taking account of structural features, we find that it performs far worse 
relative to what Latin American countries are able to do on average. However, once its 
institutional features are also taken into account, it again performs relatively well. Other 
interesting cases are Indonesia, which appears to perform better than most of its neighbors 
when institutional quality is controlled for, and Kuwait, which moves in the opposite 
direction relative to its neighbors as we move from R1 to R3. In sub-Saharan Africa, it is 
Senegal that appears to have an improved relative performance once institutional quality is 
controlled for, and Mali which generally moves down as we move to R3. 
Graphical Representation 
The information contained in ranks one to three can also be summarized in a simple graph, as 
given in figure 1. The graphs show the movements across the three rankings for countries 
with respect to the different components of social spending, where the spending measures are 57 
expressed as fractions of GDP. The graphs in the leftmost panels plot the R1 ranking against 
the R2 ranking, while the right panels plot R2 against R3.  The countries far away from the 
leading diagonal (diagonal lines not shown) have the greatest shifts moving from one rank to 
another. From figure 1 we see clearly that there is more dispersion moving from rank one to 
rank two than from rank two to rank three on all spending measures. If a country lies a long 
way below the leading diagonal, then it fallen in ranking after controlling for structural (in 
the case of R2) or quality of government (in the case of R3).  Conversely, if a country lies 
above the diagonal, it has improved its ranking. 
The topmost panels in figure 1 plot rankings for social security and welfare 
expenditures. There is quite wide dispersion evident in the left top panel, indicating large 
changes in ranking moving from R1 to R2.  For example, Norway, Canada, Cyprus, Finland, 
Iceland and Kuwait, among others, all appear far below the diagonal line.  This suggests that 
after controlling for structural characteristics, these countries perform far worse than we 
would expect relative to the international norm—i.e., rankings fall dramatically from R1 to 
R2.  
Countries that lie above the leading diagonal have the opposite interpretation—they 
spend more on social security and welfare than we would expect, controlling for structural 
characteristics. Countries in this category for social security and welfare spending include Sri 
Lanka, Senegal, and Niger. 
The right topmost panel plots rank two against rank three on social security and welfare 
spending. As most countries lie close to the leading diagonal here, we see that the correlation 
between the two ranks is high. The data on quality of government is simply not able to 
introduce that much variation. Nevertheless, in the case of social security and welfare (the 
top rightmost panel) it would suggest that countries such as Italy, Israel, Zimbabwe, and Mali 
all do worse than we would expect given their level of institutional quality. Panama, 
Indonesia, and Niger appear to do better than the international norm, controlling for these 
institutional factors in addition to structural characteristics. 
The next two panels in figure give the same ranking information for expenditures on 
transfers, again expressed as a fraction of GDP. Consistent with the correlation matrix shown 
in table 2a, we see that most of the movement is from rank one to rank two. The panels 
highlight that countries such as Switzerland and Australia do worse than expected given 
structural characteristics, and countries such as Egypt and Costa Rica do better than 
expected. Similarly, the last two sets of panels show the rankings for health and education 
expenditures as a share of GDP. 
The third set of panels in figure 1 presents rankings for education expenditures. As most 
countries lie close to the leading diagonals, we see that there are not many strong movements 
across the ranks. However, there are some notable exceptions—Malta, Bahrain, and Bolivia 
all devote a greater share of GDP to education than we would expect given the structural 
features of their economy. India, Indonesia, and the United States devote fewer resources 
than we would expect. Controlling for institutional quality in the bottom left panel suggests 
that countries such as Italy, Thailand, and Peru perform worse than expected controlling for 
institutions. Greece, Egypt, and Norway are among the countries that perform better once 
institutions are controlled for. 58 
Figure 1: Cross-Country Movements Across Rankings 
Social Security and Welfare (share of GDP) 
   
Transfers to Organizations and Households (share of GDP) 
   
Education (share of GDP) 
   
Health (share of GDP) 
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The final set of panels in figure 1 give the corresponding information for health 
expenditures. Again, most of the movement is from rank one to rank two. This is confirmed 
by the correlation coefficients for the health rankings given in table 2a. 
Regression Results 
Table 3 reports the actual regression results from (1) and (2), which are used to construct R2 
and R3. These results are instructive in and of themselves. The R2 regression (equation (1)) 
can be thought of as estimating a demand function for safety net expenditure. We see that, for 
each type of safety net expenditure as a share of GDP, income is positive and significant. 
This suggests that as countries grow richer they spend a greater share of GDP on types of 
safety nets. The shock-to-GDP variable is also significant and negative, suggesting that 
cyclical factors play a role in determining safety net spending. In particular, safety net 
spending appears to be anti-cyclical, as we would expect. The other variables capture societal 
needs. The fraction of the population of working age tends to be negative and significant only 
for social security. The level of urbanization significantly increases both social security and 
transfers spending. This may suggest that the urban poor are better able to get the 
government to respond to their interests than are the rural poor. 
In table 3, we also report regression (2), which is used to construct R3. This regresses 
the time-averaged residual from (1) on various quality-of-government measures. We see that 
the increased threat of expropriation and corruption significantly increase government safety 
net expenditures, while worsening rule of law and increased government bureaucracy 
decrease expenditures. The fact that expenditures may increase as quality of government 
decreases may suggest that there is some rent-seeking behavior occurring, or some other non-
productive use of funds. 
 
Table 3: Cross-Country Safety Net Regressions (standard errors in parentheses) 
Dependent Var SS/GDP 





Orgs & HH  Health Education 
Total 
Expenditure 
Log(GDP per capita)  2.70  2.83  0.641  0.041  2.47 
 (0.288)  (0.560)  (0.122)  (0.134)  (0.77) 
Shock to GDP per capita  –13.8  –16.7  0.048  –0.644  –25.4 
 (1.98)  (3.78)  (0.849)  (0.931)  (5.23) 
Frac. of popn aged 15-64 
(millions) 
–0.018 –0.010  –0.003  –0.012  –0.045 
 (0.010)  (0.019)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.013) 
Frac. of popn residing in 
urban regions 
0.032 0.050  –0.014  –0.004  0.056 
 (0.018)  (0.033)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.048) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.6166  0.5497  0.1715  0.1058  0.1937 




ij. = γ + δQi. + ωij. 










0.048 0.782  0.507  0.291  –0.626 
 (0.394)  (0.740)  (0.164)  (0.159)  (0.981) 
Expropriation Threat  0.328  –0.905  –0.264  –0.388  –0.129 
 (0.401)  (0.816)  (0.166)  (0.161)  (1.04) 
Corruption 0.336  1.69  0.030  –0.233  0.769 
 (0.360)  (0.766)  (0.196)  (0.146)  (0.960) 
Rule of Law  –0.873  0.194  –0.025  –0.072  –0.807 
 (0.406)  (0.882)  (0.161)  (0.156)  (1.03) 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
–0.368 –0.955  –0.294  0.136  0.315 
 (0.401)  (0.709)  (0.166)  (0.161)  (1.04) 
Constant –6.15  –4.65  –2.29  0.739  –1.02 
 (3.03)  (6.85)  (0.125)  (1.208)  (7.94) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0295  0.0233  0.0243  0.0527  0.0000 
Observations 224  90  233  233  265 
 
Dependent Var SS/Total Government Expenditure 
R2 Regressions: sijt = βXit + γZi +vijt 
Independent Variables  Social Spending 
Transfers to Orgs 
& HH  Health Education 
Log(GDP per capita)  0.068  0.054  0.015  –0.009 
 (0.008)  (0.013)  (0.003)  (0.004) 
Shock to GDP per capita  –0.210  –0.334  0.056  0.108 
 (0.054)  (0.088)  (0.024)  (0.026) 
Frac. of popn aged 15–64 
(millions) 
0.0001 0.0001  –0.0001  –0.0004 
 (0.0003)  (0.0004)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Frac. of popn residing in 
urban regions 
0.0008 0.002  –0.001  –0.0005 
 (0.0005)  (0.001)  (0.0002)  (0.0002) 
Adjusted R–squared  0.5845  0.5366  0.1259  0.2982 






ij. = γ + δQi. + ωij. 
(dependent variable is time-averaged residual from R2 regression) 
Independent Variables  Social Spending 
Transfers to Orgs 
& HH  Health Education 
Repudiation of 
Government Contract 
–0.005 –0.007  0.021  0.018 
 (0.011)  (0.017)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Expropriation Threat  0.030  0.012  –0.012  –0.018 
 (0.011)  (0.019)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Corruption 0.010  0.040  –0.003  –0.009 
 (0.010)  (0.017)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Rule of Law  –0.019  0.008  0.001  0.003 
 (0.011)  (0.020)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
–0.025 –0.044  –0.006  0.005 
 (0.011)  (0.016)  (0.005)  (0.005) 
Constant –0.242  –0.224  –0.053  –0.012 
 (0.081)  (0.156)  (0.036)  (0.037) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0465  0.0629  0.0871  0.0776 
Observations 224  89  233  233 
 
Dependent Var SS/Total Tax Revenues 
R2 Regressions: sijt = βXit + γZi +vijt 
Independent 
Variables  Social Spending 
Transfers to Orgs 
& HH  Health Education 
Log(GDP per 
capita) 
0.066 0.061  0.010 –0.033 
 (0.010)  (0.016)  (0.006)  (0.009) 
Shock to GDP per 
capita 
–0.268 –0.312  0.007  0.003 
 (0.070)  (0.110)  (0.043)  (0.061) 
Frac. of popn aged 
15–64 (millions) 
0.0003 0.0004  –0.0002  –0.0001 
 (0.0004)  (0.001)  (0.0001)  (0.0001) 
Frac. of popn 
residing in urban 
regions 
0.002 0.002 –0.0003  0.0002 
 (0.0006)  (0.001)  (0.0004)  (0.001) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.5270  0.4847  0.0176  0.1941 




ij. = γ + δQi. + ωij. 
(dependent variable is time-averaged residual from R2 regression) 
Independent 
Variables  Social Spending 
Transfers to Orgs 




–0.011 –0.001  0.024  0.011 
 (0.014)  (0.021)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Expropriation 
Threat 
0.041 0.014 –0.011  –0.012 
 (0.014)  (0.023)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Corruption 0.011  0.050  –0.010  –0.014 
 (0.012)  (0.022)  (0.008)  (0.011) 
Rule of Law  –0.011  0.009  0.004  –0.001 
 (0.014)  (0.025)  (0.008)  (0.012) 
Government 
Bureaucracy 
–0.040 –0.064  –0.006  0.011 
 (0.014)  (0.020)  (0.009)  (0.012) 
Constant –0.273  –0.336  –0.040  0.060 
 (0.105)  (0.193)  (0.065)  (0.089) 
Adjusted R-squared  0.0576  0.0792  0.0176  0.0000 
Observations 224  90  266  233 
Note: All first-stage regressions also include a set of continental dummies, the omitted group being Western 
Europe. 
 
The remainder of table 3 gives the same set of results with safety nets expressed as 
shares of total government expenditures and total tax revenues, respectively. The results are 
broadly in line with the previous ones. Income continues to have positive and significant 
effects on safety net spending, as does the level of urbanization; when expenditures are 
normalized by tax revenues, they are also found to be anti-cyclical. Both social security and 
transfers increase with the size of the working-age population. 
In terms of the quality-of-institutions regression (2), social security increases as the 
threat of expropriation increases and decreases significantly as the rule of law worsens or 
government bureaucracy increases. Transfers decrease as government bureaucracy or 
corruption worsens. Overall, it is clear that institutional quality can explain some of the 
variation in safety net expenditures that cannot be explained when we control only for 
structural features of the economy. Even using such poor data with no variation over time, 
we find these effects to be present. 
Similarly, it is also reassuring to find that, on the whole, the results are robust to the 
exact normalization used to measure social safety net expenditures, be it as a share of GDP, 
total expenditures, or total tax revenues. 63 
To summarize, although at first glance it is somewhat surprising that we find weak 
income effects on the whole, this may not be altogether unexpected given that we have 
dependent variables expressed as shares. This is also true for the lack of cyclicality that we 
find in most safety net expenditures, and generally we find that safety nets do respond to the 
level of need in a country. 
On the institutional side, the fact that we find some expenditures increasing with 
corruption may well be indicative of rent-seeking behavior in that, if government officials are 
corrupt, they may make payments to themselves by inflating expenditure levels. The fact that 
we control for this in (2) ensures that this possibility is also accounted for in R3. The single 
best measure of institutional quality appears to be government bureaucracy, whereas the 
repudiation of government contracts has no significant effect on any type of safety net. Given 
that our measure of government bureaucracy may be more closely related to governments' 
ability to effectively target expenditures on the poor, while repudiation of government 
contracts has more influence on the activities of the private sector, our regression results 
from (2) are in line with expectations. 
Welfare Outcome Ranks 
Tables 4a and 4b report the cross-country welfare outcome ranks for life expectancy at birth 
and infant mortality rates, respectively. Again, the interpretation is exactly as that for safety 
net expenditures. On life expectancy, we see Iceland has the highest unconditional life 
expectancy (the time-averaged life expectancy over our sample period), while Ethiopia has 
the lowest. As expected, Western Europe and North America are at the top of the ranking, 
with sub-Saharan Africa and South Asian countries forming the lowest unconditional 
rankings. 
 
Table 4a: Cross-Country Welfare Outcome Regressions: Life Expectancy at Birth 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Iceland 1  51  58  Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
   
Sweden 2  58  57  Costa  Rica  28  3  2 
Norway  3  35  27  Uruguay  29 34 47 
Netherlands 4  62  81  Jamaica  32  2  7 
Switzerland  5  59  38  Argentina  35 71 73 
Japan 6  64  82  Panama  37  8  9 
Canada  7  42  46  Trinidad and Tobago  38  32  29 
France  8  60  39  Venezuela  RB  41 49 48 
Spain  9  26  54  Chile  42 47 50 
Australia  10 66 67  Paraguay  43 6 6 
Denmark  11 74 49  Mexico  46  61  77 
Italy  12 36 63  Suriname  47  10  14 
Greece  13 13 19  Colombia  50  28  26 
Israel  14 46 65  Dominican  Republic  52  22  15 
Cyprus  15  5  16  Ecuador  54 21 23 
Belgium  16 81 70  Brazil  55  83  90 
United  Kingdom  17 72 64  Guyana  57 9 10 
New  Zealand  18 63 66  El  Salvador  62  39  45 64 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Hong Kong, China  19  40  44  Peru  65  87  97 
United  States  20 91 75  Honduras  66  24  21 
Austria  21 65 56  Nicaragua  67  23  32 
Germany  22 79 83  Guatemala  71  69  68 
Ireland  23 19 25  Haiti  81  68  60 
Malta  24 18 12         
Finland  25 43 61  Sub-Saharan Africa     
Luxembourg  26 89 94  South  Africa  70  93  85 
Singapore  27 86 79  Botswana  76  31  22 
Costa  Rica  28  3  2  Ghana  77 53 62 
Uruguay  29 34 47  Zimbabwe  78  30  34 
Poland  30  11  5  Kenya  79 16 18 
Portugal  31 12 13  Madagascar  82  38  33 
Jamaica  32  2  7  Cameroon  84 78 72 
Kuwait  33 82 86  Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  85  80  80 
Hungary 34  14  8  Gabon  86  103  103 
Argentina  35 71 73  Congo,  Rep.  87  94  95 
Romania  36  4  3  Uganda  88 27 36 
Panama  37  8  9  Sudan  89 41 55 
Trinidad and Tobago  38  32  29  Togo  90  73  71 
Sri Lanka  39  1  1  Cote d'Ivoire  91  95  96 
Jordan  40 15 20  Nigeria  92  84  69 
Venezuela  RB  41 49 48  Senegal  93  97  87 
Chile  42 47 50  Mozambique  94  67  74 
Paraguay  43  6  6  Mali  95 90 88 
United  Arab  Emirates  44 99 98  Malawi  96  70  84 
Qatar  45 100 99  Burkina  Faso  97 77 92 
México  46 61 77  Gambia,  The  98  92  93 
Suriname  47 10 14  Ethiopia  99  44  35 
Malaysia  48 17 17  Niger  100  96  89 
Korea,  Rep.  49 48 43  Guinea  101  98  100 
Colombia  50 28 26  Guinea-Bissau  102  88  91 
China  51 29 42  Sierra  Leone  103  102  101 
Dominican  Republic  52 22 15         
Thailand 53  7  4  North America     
Ecuador  54 21 23  Canada  7 42  46 
Brazil  55 83 90  United  States  20  91  75 
Philippines  56 25 30         
Guyana 57  9  10  Western Europe     
Tunisia  58 55 28  Iceland  1 51  58 
Turkey  59 54 31  Sweden  2 58  57 
Syrian  Arab  Republic  60 20 11  Norway  3 35  27 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  61 37 37  Netherlands  4 62  81 
El  Salvador  62 39 45  Switzerland  5 59  38 
Saudi Arabia  63  101  102  France  8  60  39 
Algeria  64 50 59  Spain  9 26  54 
Peru  65 87 97  Denmark  11  74  49 
Honduras  66 24 21  Italy  12  36  63 
Nicaragua  67 23 32  Cyprus  15 5 16 
Oman  68 85 78  Belgium  16  81  70 65 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Morocco  69 52 52  United  Kingdom  17  72  64 
South  Africa  70 93 85  Austria  21  65  56 
Guatemala  71 69 68  Germany  22  79  83 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  72  57  40  Ireland  23  19  25 
Indonesia  73 56 51  Finland  25  43  61 
India  74 75 76  Luxembourg  26  89  94 
Pakistan  75 33 24         
Botswana  76 31 22  South Asia     
Ghana  77 53 62  Sri  Lanka  39 1 1 
Zimbabwe  78 30 34  India  74  75  76 
Kenya  79 16 18  Pakistan  75  33  24 
Papua New Guinea  80  76  53  Bangladesh  83  45  41 
Haiti  81 68 60         
Madagascar  82 38 33  Middle East and North Africa     
Bangladesh  83 45 41  Greece  13  13  19 
Cameroon  84 78 72  Israel  14  46  65 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  85  80  80  Malta  24  18  12 
Gabon  86 103 103  Portugal  31 12 13 
Congo,  Rep.  87 94 95  Kuwait  33  82  86 
Uganda  88 27 36  Jordan  40  15  20 
Sudan  89 41 55  United  Arab  Emirates  44  99  98 
Togo  90 73 71  Qatar  45  100  99 
Cote  d'Ivoire  91 95 96  Tunisia  58  55  28 
Nigeria  92 84 69  Syrian  Arab  Republic  60  20  11 
Senegal  93 97 87  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  61  37  37 
Mozambique  94 67 74  Saudi  Arabia  63  101  102 
Mali  95 90 88  Algeria  64  50  59 
Malawi  96 70 84  Oman  68  85  78 
Burkina  Faso  97 77 92  Morocco  69  52  52 
Gambia, The  98  92  93  Egypt, Arab Rep.  72  57  40 
Ethiopia  99 44 35         
Niger 100  96  89  Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
   
Guinea 101  98  100  Poland  30  11  5 
Guinea-Bissau 102  88  91  Hungary  34  14  8 
Sierra  Leone  103 102 101  Romania  36  4  3 
      Turkey  59  54  31 
Correlation matrix             
  rank1 rank2 rank3  East Asia and the Pacific     
rank1 1      Japan  6  64  82 
rank2  0.3011  1    Australia  10 66 67 
rank3  0.2581  0.9327  1  New  Zealand  18 63 66 
      Hong  Kong,  China  19  40  44 
Rank test (p-value)      Singapore  27  86  79 
rank1=rank2  0.0756     Malaysia  48 17 17 
rank2=rank3  1      Korea,  Rep.  49 48 43 
      China  51  29  42 
      Thailand  53  7  4 
      Philippines  56  25  30 
      Indonesia  73  56  51 
      Papua  New  Guinea  80  76  53 66 
 
Table 4b: Cross-Country Welfare Outcome Regressions: Infant Mortality Rate 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Sweden 1  56  58  Latin America and the 
Caribbean 
   
Iceland 2  52  60  Costa  Rica  33  8  7 
Finland  3  29  35  Uruguay  35 40 67 
Netherlands  4  66  81  Trinidad and Tobago  37  30  29 
Norway  5  39  33  Panama  38 16 14 
Japan 6  65  77  Jamaica  39  6  16 
Switzerland  7  63  40  Argentina  41 75 83 
Denmark  8  67  44  Venezuela  RB  42 44 48 
Australia 9  62  66  Suriname  44  7  18 
France  10 60 42  Paraguay  45  9 9 
United  Kingdom  11 64 50  Chile  46  69  68 
New  Zealand  12 50 56  Colombia  47  28  25 
Canada  13 45 47  Mexico  50  73  85 
Singapore  14 53 45  Guyana  56  17  13 
Luxembourg  15 80 86  Brazil  57  90  93 
Ireland  16 21 23  Ecuador  58  43  54 
Hong Kong, China  17  36  34  Dominican Republic  59  58  39 
Belgium  18 77 61  El  Salvador  64  49  62 
United  States  19 85 69  Honduras  65  32  28 
Germany  20 76 74  Peru  66  93  97 
Austria  21 54 46  Nicaragua  67  31  36 
Israel  22 46 65  Guatemala  69  57  51 
Malta  23 19 11  Haiti  90  83  80 
Spain  24 34 64         
Cyprus  25 13 26  Sub-Saharan Africa     
Italy  26 48 72  South  Africa  54  70  49 
Greece  27 24 37  Botswana  60  22  15 
Hungary  28 18 10  Zimbabwe  62  10  12 
Poland 29  11  4  Kenya  70  5  8 
Korea,  Rep.  30 23 21  Ghana  74  33  53 
Malaysia  31  4  5  Congo,  Rep.  76 55 55 
Portugal  32 20 22  Sudan  78  15  17 
Costa  Rica  33  8  7  Cameroon  79 47 52 
Kuwait  34 79 82  Uganda  81  26  27 
Uruguay  35 40 67  Togo  82  59  57 
Romania  36  2  2  Senegal  83 51 30 
Trinidad and Tobago  37  30  29  Nigeria  85  61  43 
Panama  38 16 14  Congo,  Dem.  Rep.  86  74  70 
Jamaica  39  6  16  Cote  d'Ivoire  87 86 84 
Sri Lanka  40  1  1  Gabon  91  102  102 
Argentina  41 75 83  Burkina  Faso  93  38  71 
Venezuela  RB  42 44 48  Madagascar  94  68  59 
Jordan  43 12 20  Ethiopia  95  42  32 
Suriname  44  7  18  Gambia,  The  96 91 92 67 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Paraguay  45  9  9  Niger  97 94 89 
Chile  46 69 68  Mozambique  98  71  76 
Colombia  47 28 25  Guinea  99  98  100 
Qatar  48 95 95  Guinea-Bissau  100  88  87 
Philippines  49 14 19  Malawi  101  92  96 
Mexico  50 73 85  Mali  102  99  98 
China  51 27 41  Sierra  Leone  103  103  101 
Thailand  52 3 3       
United Arab Emirates  53  100  99  North America     
South  Africa  54 70 49  Canada  13  45  47 
Syrian Arab Republic  55  25  6  United States  19  85  69 
Guyana  56 17 13         
Brazil  57 90 93  Western Europe     
Ecuador  58 43 54  Sweden  1  56  58 
Dominican  Republic  59 58 39  Iceland  2  52  60 
Botswana  60 22 15  Finland  3  29  35 
Saudi Arabia  61  101  103  Netherlands  4  66  81 
Zimbabwe  62 10 12  Norway  5  39  33 
Oman  63 84 78  Switzerland  7  63  40 
El  Salvador  64 49 62  Denmark  8  67  44 
Honduras  65 32 28  France  10  60  42 
Peru  66 93 97  United  Kingdom  11  64  50 
Nicaragua  67 31 36  Luxembourg  15  80  86 
Tunisia  68 82 63  Ireland  16  21  23 
Guatemala  69 57 51  Belgium  18  77  61 
Kenya  70  5  8  Germany  20 76 74 
Indonesia  71 35 31  Austria  21  54  46 
Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  72 72 73  Spain  24  34  64 
Papua New Guinea  73  37  24  Cyprus  25  13  26 
Ghana  74 33 53  Italy  26  48  72 
Algeria  75 87 88         
Congo,  Rep.  76 55 55  South Asia     
Morocco  77 78 79  Sri  Lanka  40  1 1 
Sudan  78 15 17  India  84  89  91 
Cameroon  79 47 52  Bangladesh  89  41  38 
Turkey  80 97 90  Pakistan  92  81  75 
Uganda  81 26 27         
Togo  82 59 57  Middle East and North Africa     
Senegal  83 51 30  Israel  22  46  65 
India  84 89 91  Malta  23  19  11 
Nigeria  85 61 43  Greece  27  24  37 
Congo, Dem. Rep.  86  74  70  Portugal  32  20  22 
Cote  d'Ivoire  87 86 84  Kuwait  34  79  82 
Egypt, Arab Rep.  88  96  94  Jordan  43  12  20 
Bangladesh  89 41 38  Qatar  48  95  95 
Haiti  90 83 80  United  Arab  Emirates  53  100  99 
Gabon 91  102  102  Syrian  Arab  Republic  55  25  6 
Pakistan  92 81 75  Saudi  Arabia  61  101  103 
Burkina  Faso  93 38 71  Oman  63  84  78 
Madagascar  94 68 59  Tunisia  68  82  63 68 
Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  Name  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Ethiopia  95 42 32  Iran,  Islamic  Rep.  72  72  73 
Gambia,  The  96 91 92  Algeria  75  87  88 
Níger  97 94 89  Morocco  77  78  79 
Mozambique  98 71 76  Egypt,  Arab  Rep.  88  96  94 
Guinea  99  98  100       
Guinea-Bissau 100  88  87  Eastern Europe and Central 
Asia 
   
Malawi  101  92  96  Hungary  28 18 10 
Mali 102  99  98  Poland  29  11  4 
Sierra  Leone  103 103 101  Romania  36 2  2 
      Turkey  80  97  90 
Correlation matrix             
  rank1 rank2 rank3  East Asia and the Pacific     
Rank1 1      Japan  6  65  77 
Rank2 0.3329  1    Australia  9  62  66 
Rank3  0.3148  0.9267 1  New  Zealand  12 50 56 
      Singapore  14  53  45 
Rank test (p-value)      Hong  Kong,  China  17  36  34 
Rank1=rank2  0.1933    Korea,  Rep.  30 23 21 
Rank2=rank3 0.9179      Malaysia  31  4  5 
      Philippines  49  14  19 
      China  51  27  41 
      Thailand  52  3  3 
      Indonesia  71  35  31 
      Papua  New  Guinea  73  37  24 
When we control for structural characteristics, we find that many developing countries, 
such as Paraguay, Jamaica, Sri Lanka, and Madagascar, do far better than we would expect 
compared to the regional norm, and most developed economies drop significantly in rank 
from R1 to R2. This is in part driven by the fact that there is a biological upper bound on life 
expectancy, so that the there are probably diminishing marginal benefits from increases in 
safety net expenditures on this welfare indicator. However, this does not disguise the fact that 
many developing countries actually do have higher life expectancies, conditional on 
structural characteristics relative to regional norms, than we would typically believe from just 
examining unconditional figures (R1). There tends to be relatively little movement from R2 
to R3 (these ranks have a correlation of .95), suggesting that most of the variation that we 
observe in life expectancy figures across countries is due to differences in these structural 
characteristics rather than being driven by institutional factors. 
The pattern of analysis is very similar in table 4b when we look at IMR. Again, most of 
the variation in the welfare indicator is due to structural features, not institutions. Examining 
the regional results, we see that Malaysia, despite having a high unconditional level of IMR, 
actually is one of the best performers in its region once we condition for structural factors. 
This is in contrast to Indonesia, which, although it does improve its rank moving to R2, it 
falls further behind Malaysia. In Latin America and the Caribbean, Trinidad and Tobago’s 
apparently good unconditional record on IMR actually is far worse than we would expect 
once structural factors are accounted for, i.e., given its economic characteristics, we would 
expect it to perform far better than it does given what other countries manage to achieve on 
average. 69 
Welfare Outcome Regression Results 
Table 5 reports the regressions (5) and (6) from which we have derived R2 and R3 above. 
For life expectancy at birth, we see that this is increasing in both health and education 
spending, state income per capita, it is pro-cyclical, and increases as the proportion of the 
population that is of working age increases, or the level of urbanization increases. In 
regression (6) when we see how much of the unexplained variation from (5) can be 
accounted for by quality of government factors, none of the factors turn out to be significant. 
This is consistent with our earlier observation that most of the movement across ranks occurs 
between R1 and R2. A similar set of factors is significant in the IMR regressions, although 
here the threat of expropriation surprisingly decreases IMR, while worsening rule of law and 
government bureaucracy increase it. Again, in line with our earlier results on safety net 
expenditures, it is the level of government bureaucracy which is the single most important 
determinant among the quality-of-government variables controlled for. 
 
Table 5: Cross-Country Outcome Regressions 
  Life Expectancy at Birth  Infant Mortality Rate 
Independent Variables  R2 Regression  R3 Regression R2  Regression R3  Regression 
Log(GDP per capita)  4.48    –19.6   
  (0.304)  (10.54)  
Shock to GDP per capita  –3.30    20.5   
  (2.01)  (10.2)  
Frac. of popn aged 15–64 
(millions) 
0.023   –0.094   
  (0.004)  (0.018)  
Frac. of popn residing in urban 
regions 
0.151   –0.621   
  (0.018)  (0.092)  
Adjusted  R-squared  0.7517  0.6812  
Observations  618  618  
      
Repudiation of Government 
Contract 
 0.184  0.074 
   (0.362)    (1.85) 
Expropriation Threat    1.14    –7.39 
   (0.413)    (2.10) 
Corruption   –0.172    0.897 
   (0.351)    (1.79) 
Rule of Law    –0.449    3.29 
   (0.413)    (2.10) 
Government  Bureaucracy   –1.64   6.89 
   (0.389)    (1.98) 
Adjusted  R-squared   0.0667  0.0557 
Observations   525  526 70 
Robustness Checks 
In order to see how sensitive our rankings were to our data, we decided to re-run our analysis 
using a slightly different set of quality-of-government indices. This was done in two ways: (i) 
using different subsets of the existing quality indices; and (ii) using a measure of corruption 
taken from a more independent source than the ICRG, namely Transparency International 
(TI). 
There was no significant difference created in each of the cross-country ranks reported, 
either in terms of safety net expenditure or welfare outcome rankings. Using the corruption 
measure from TI also gave similar results. Typically, the correlation coefficient between the 
rankings using the corruption index from the ICRG data and that from the TI data was over 
0.94. 
Indian State-Level Analysis 
We now turn to the same analysis but at the level of Indian states. Our data set runs over the 
period 1960–92, and because of the much more complete series that we have at this level 
compared to the cross-country-level analysis, there was no need to average the data into five-
year time periods. The data series come from Indian government sources, details of which are 
in the data appendix. This analysis allows us to control for common macroeconomic shocks 
and institutional features across Indian states. The analysis suggests how our methodology 
can apply equally to sub-national policy, where the notions of benchmarking and yardstick 
competition apply equally as to across neighboring countries. 
 
 
Table 6: Indian State Safety Net Expenditures (as percentage of state GDP) 
States  Food Calamity  Health  Education Social  Development
1 
Andhra Pradesh  0.171  3.941  11.254  28.800  78.707  101.001 
Assam  0.269  3.420  10.379 32.780  69.769 95.211 
Bihar 0.089  1.491  5.827  18.881  42.460  52.372 
Gujarat 1.226  5.217  11.898  33.496  80.301  110.321 
Haryana 0.524  2.840  14.429  37.040  77.812  137.947 
Jammu & Kashmir  5.503  3.585  24.090  47.263  110.165  203.648 
Karnataka  1.028  1.663  11.188 30.727  73.647 99.715 
Kerala  0.304  1.662  12.660 45.097  87.682 97.656 
Madhya  Pradesh  0.201  1.383  10.030 23.239  59.176 80.183 
Maharashtra 0.371  2.752  13.087  32.640  76.794  106.728 
Orissa  0.347  4.673  10.815 25.597  69.502 91.134 
Punjab 0.057  4.978  15.386  43.145  95.059  134.557 
Rajasthan  0.252  4.997  11.279 25.408  59.127 79.201 
Tamil Nadu  2.641  1.479  13.313  34.087  83.611  110.387 
Uttar Pradesh  0.015  1.505  8.133  21.720  49.783  66.795 
West  Bengal  0.104  3.430  12.594 29.704  74.706 84.795 
All States  0.819  3.064  12.273  31.851  74.269  103.228 
1. Development expenditures can be greater than 100% of state GDP if net development transfers are 
positive. 71 
  Public Food Distribution ('000 tons)  Voter Turnout 
States  Mean Sd  Min  Max  Mean Sd 
Andhra Pradesh  618.14  595.17  33  2451  68.719  3.515 
Assam  402.09 209.79  68  823  62.978 11.530 
Bihar 665.58  304.74  304  2092  51.764  5.903 
Gujarat 572.39  363.08  142  1402  55.906  5.678 
Haryana 121.74  53.94  15  209  67.431  5.108 
Jammu & Kashmir  225.72  105.65  71  447  68.965  5.533 
Karnataka 532.94  343.11  43  1165  63.372  5.825 
Kerala 1075.47  568.18  90  2088  77.572  3.772 
Madhya Pradesh  365.44  276.74  4  1102  49.089  6.056 
Maharashtra 1515.11  501.15  521  2404  59.347  4.384 
Orissa 270.03  164.93  17  625  44.939  7.489 
Punjab 227.44  195.73  4  1209  66.139  4.077 
Rajasthan 327.86  341.63  4  1263  52.992  6.219 
Tamil Nadu  969.58  641.58  89  2269  69.700  4.160 
Uttar Pradesh  781.78  329.45  166  1893  52.075  6.034 
West Bengal  1620.08  573.54  232  2944  66.573  8.616 
All States  643.213  348.026  112.688  1524.125  61.098  5.869 
 
R1, R2, and R3 
Table 6 reports the (time-averaged) expenditures on each of these types of safety net, as a 
percentage of state GDP. The figures for public food distribution, an in-kind transfer of 
grains, is given in thousands of tons. Again, the first point to note is that there are large 
variations across states in each of these series, although, on the whole, if we ignore Jammu 
and Kashmir, the variation drops considerably and is less than that we observed across 
countries. 
Table 7a reports the rankings R1 to R3 for each type of safety net with the exception of 
public food distribution (PFD), which we consider separately because it is the only in-kind 
transfer we have. In table 7a, we take our dependent variable to be safety net expenditures as 
a share of state production. We will focus on the food subsidy and calamity expenditures 
here, as these are really targeted at the most vulnerable subpopulation of the poor, the 
chronically poor.  
When we run regression (3) and use this to form R2, we find that the movements across 
R1 to R2 are far more stark for food subsidy than for calamity expenditures. For instance, 
although unconditionally it appears as if Assam performs well in the level of food subsidies it 
provides, once we take account of its ability to pay and the level of needs in that state, it 
performs poorly relative to the benchmark comparison of what Indian states are able to do on 
average. The same applies to Gujarat and Orissa. When we control for institutional quality 
and construct R3, states such as Tamil Nadu and Kerala slip down in rank, suggesting that 
they are now spending less than we would have predicted, while other states such as 
Rajasthan improve their rankings. 
The movements for calamities are much less pronounced moving across the rankings—
the correlation coefficient between R1 and R2 is 0.9393, and between R2 and R3 it is 0.9107. 72 
This is as we may well expect, given that calamity expenditures are only responsive to 
natural disasters, which are randomly distributed across states, and so accounting for 
structural and institutional features should have less effect on relative performance. 
A similar pattern emerges when we consider other Indian state-level types of safety net 
expenditures. Noticeably, there are large movements across all three rankings for social 
security expenditures and development expenditures. 
Tables 7b and 7c repeat the analysis except now we use safety net expenditures as 
shares of total state government expenditures and state tax revenues, respectively. On the 
whole, these lead to higher correlation coefficients across the rankings than using state GDP, 
although the pattern of movements across rankings is robust to using any of these three 
normalizations. 
The result for public food distribution (PFD) is in table 7d. Here there is remarkably 
little movement between ranks one and two, implying that again there is little that structural 
factors have to do with the levels of provision of these in-kind transfers. When we run (4) to 
control for institutional features, we do find some large falls in rank (Tamil Nadu, Andrha 
Pradesh) and some large rises (Bihar, Orissa). We may use this result to argue that, because 
this latter group of states appears to be underperforming relative to the state norm, they 
should increase their levels of PFD. Furthermore, the reasons that these states appear to 
underperform have more to do with their poorer-quality institutions than a less favorable 
economic situation. 73 
Table 7a: Indian State Social Safety Net Expenditures (SS/State production) 
 Food  Subsidy    Calamity   Health 
State Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  State  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1 
Tamil  Nadu  2 3 8  Orissa  2  3  6  Kerala  2 6 8 
Kerala  3 6 6  Rajasthan  3  4  5  Assam  3 2 2 
Assam 4  10  10  Assam  4  2  2  Orissa 4  10  7 
Karnataka  5 9  11  Gujarat  5  7  8  Rajasthan  5 4 6 
Gujarat 6  14  12  Punjab  6  5  3  Punjab 6  3  10 
Orissa  7 13 9  West  Bengal  7 6  7  Karnataka  7  9 11 
Rajasthan 8  5  5  Andhra  Pradesh  8  8  9  Gujarat  8  13  12 
Madhya Pradesh  9  8  3  Karnataka  9  10  11  Madhya Pradesh  9  11  5 
West Bengal  10  4  4  Madhya Pradesh  10  12  10  Tamil Nadu  10  8  9 
Maharashtra  11 2  2  Maharashtra  11  9 4  Andhra  Pradesh  11 12 15 
Andhra  Pradesh  12 11 13  Kerala  12  14  13  West  Bengal  12  7  4 
Punjab  13 12 14  Bihar  13  13  14  Maharashtra  13  5  3 
Bihar  14  7  7  Tamil  Nadu  14 11 12  Bihar  14  14  13 
Uttar  Pradesh  15 15 15  Uttar  Pradesh  15 15 15  Uttar  Pradesh  15  15  14 
                   
Correlation matrix        Correlation matrix        Correlation matrix       
  rank1 rank2 rank3    rank1  rank2  rank3    rank1 rank2 rank3 
rank1 1      rank1  1      rank1 1     
rank2 0.3929  1    rank2  0.9393  1    rank2 0.6607  1   
rank3 0.3393  0.8536  1  rank3  0.8179  0.9107  1  rank3 0.4750  0.7643  1 
Rank  test(p-value)      Rank  test(p-value)      Rank  test(p-value)       
rank1=rank2 1      rank1=rank2  1      rank1=rank2 1     
rank2=rank3 1      rank2=rank3 0.3877      rank2=rank3 1     
 74 
 
 Education    Social   Development 
State Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  State  Rank1  Rank2  Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1 
Kerala  2 3 7  Kerala  2  3  6  Assam  2 2 2 
Assam 3  2  2  Orissa  3  6  4  Orissa 3  10  5 
Orissa  4 12 9  Rajasthan  4 4  9  Kerala  4  4  7 
Rajasthan 5  5  12  Karnataka  5  7  10  Rajasthan  5 6 8 
Punjab 6  4  10  Punjab  6  2  11  Karnataka  6  9  11 
Karnataka  7  9  14  Gujarat  7 11 5  Punjab  7  3  12 
Gujarat  8 13 5  Tamil  Nadu  8 8  7  Gujarat  8 13 10 
Tamil Nadu  9  8  8  Andhra Pradesh  9  9  13  Tamil Nadu  9  8  9 
Madhya Pradesh  10  11  15  Madhya Pradesh  10  12  8  Madhya Pradesh  10  12  6 
Andhra Pradesh  11  10  13  West Bengal  11  5  3  Andhra Pradesh  11  11  15 
West Bengal  12  7  6  Bihar  12 13 14  West  Bengal  12  7  4 
Maharashtra 13  6  3  Maharashtra  13  10  2  Maharashtra 13  5  3 
Bihar  14  14  4  Uttar  Pradesh  14 14 12  Bihar  14  14  13 
Uttar  Pradesh  15 15 11          Uttar  Pradesh  15 15 14 
                   
Correlation matrix        Correlation matrix        Correlation matrix       
 Rank1  Rank2  Rank3    Rank1  Rank2  Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1      Rank1  1      Rank1 1     
Rank2 0.6857  1    Rank2  0.7890  1    Rank2 0.6536  1   
Rank3 0.1857  0.375  1  Rank3  0.3187  0.4066  1  Rank3 0.5107  0.6429  1 
Rank  test(p-value)      Rank  test(p-value)      Rank  test(p-value)       
rank1=rank2 1      rank1=rank2 0.5078      rank1=rank2 1     
rank2=rank3 1      rank2=rank3  1      rank2=rank3 1     
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Table 7b: Indian State Social Safety Net Expenditures (SS/Total state expenditures) 
 Food  Subsidy    Calamity    Health 
State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Rajasthan  1 1 1  Rajasthan  1 3 2 
Tamil  Nadu  2 2 2  Gujarat  2  3  3  West  Bengal  2  1  1 
Gujarat  3 7 7  Orissa  3  4  6  Kerala  3  4  10 
Karnataka  4 5 6  West  Bengal  4  5  5  Madhya  Pradesh  4  7  3 
Kerala  5 6 8  Andhra  Pradesh  5  6  4  Tamil  Nadu  5  5  5 
Orissa 6  13  10  Bihar  6  10  14  Andhra  Pradesh  6  9  11 
Rajasthan  7 4 4  Assam  7  7  7  Orissa  7  11  9 
Madhya  Pradesh  8 8 5  Punjab  8  2  2  Maharashtra  8  10  8 
Maharashtra  9 3 3  Maharashtra  9  12  8  Jammu  &  Kashmir  9  8  6 
Assam  10  11  14  Madhya  Pradesh  10 11  9  Gujarat  10 12 12 
West Bengal  11  9  11  Uttar Pradesh 11  9  10  Punjab  11  2  4 
Andhra  Pradesh  12  12  12  Karnataka  12 13 13  Karnataka  12 13 14 
Bihar  13  10  9  Tamil  Nadu  13 15 12  Uttar  Pradesh  13 14 13 
Punjab  14  15  15  Jammu & Kashmir  14  8  15  Assam  14  6  7 
Uttar  Pradesh  15  14  13  Kerala  15 14 11  Bihar  15 15 15 
                     
Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix       
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1  Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1      Rank1  1      Rank1  1     
Rank2 0.7714  1    Rank2  0.8000  1    Rank2  0.6500  1   
Rank3 0.7571  0.9321  1  Rank3  0.7607  0.8000  1  Rank3  0.6500  0.8643  1 
Rank  Test(P-Value)      Rank  Test(P-Value)      Rank  Test(P-Value)     
Rank1=Rank2 1      Rank1=Rank2  0.2668     Rank1=Rank2  0.2668    
Rank2=Rank3 1      Rank2=Rank3 1      Rank2=Rank3 1     
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State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1  Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Kerala  1 1 2  Kerala  1  1  5  Kerala  1  3  9 
Assam  2 3 1  West  Bengal  2  2  2  Andhra  Pradesh  2  5  1 
Bihar  3 7 3  Andhra  Pradesh  3  4  6  Tamil  Nadu  3  2  2 
Tamil Nadu  4  5  8  Tamil Nadu  4  3  7  Madhya Pradesh  4  4  7 
West  Bengal  5 4 7  Gujarat  5  5  8  Gujarat  5  7  6 
Punjab  6 2 9  Orissa  6  7  9  Assam  6  1  3 
Rajasthan  7 6 4  Bihar  7  8  4  Karnataka  7  8  10 
Madhya Pradesh  8  8  5  Rajasthan  8  9  3  Jammu & Kashmir  8  10  11 
Karnataka  9  9 10  Madhya  Pradesh  9  10  1  Orissa  9 6 4 
Gujarat  10  11  12  Punjab  10  6  10  Rajasthan  10 12 13 
Andhra  Pradesh  11  10  11  Karnataka  11 11 11  Punjab  11 15 12 
Uttar  Pradesh  12  12  6  Maharashtra  12 12 13  West  Bengal  12 11  8 
Maharashtra  13  13  14  Uttar  Pradesh  13 13 12  Bihar  13  9  5 
Orissa  14  14  13  Jammu & Kashmir  14  14  14  Uttar Pradesh  14  13  14 
Jammu & Kashmir  15  15  15  Maharashtra  15  14  15         
                     
Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix       
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1  Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1  1 Rank1 1          Rank1  1     
Rank2 0.9321  1    Rank2  0.9516  1    Rank2  0.8286  1   
Rank3 0.8357  0.7464  1  Rank3  0.6659  0.5604  1  Rank3  0.6107  0.8000  1 
Rank  Test(P-Value)      Rank  Test(P-Value)      Rank  Test(P-Value)     
Rank1=Rank2 1      Rank1=Rank2  0.4531     Rank1=Rank2  1     
Rank2=Rank3 0.7905      Rank2=Rank3  0.5488     Rank2=Rank3  0.3953    77 
Table 7c: Indian State Social Safety Net Expenditures (SS/Total state tax revenues) 
 Food  Subsidy    Calamity    Health 
State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Rajasthan  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1 
Tamil  Nadu  2 2 3  Orissa  2 2 4  Rajasthan  2 2 3 
Gujarat  3  11  10  Gujarat  3 7 5  Orissa  3 4 5 
Karnataka  4 7 9  Assam  4 3 3  Assam  4 3 2 
Kerala  5 5 6  West  Bengal  5 6 7  Kerala  5 7 8 
Orissa  6  13  11  Andhra  Pradesh  6 8 6  Madhya  Pradesh  6 8 6 
Rajasthan  7 4 5  Bihar  7 11  15  West  Bengal  7 5 4 
Assam  8  10  12  Punjab  8 5 2  Tamil  Nadu  8 9 9 
Madhya Pradesh  9  8  4  Jammu & Kashmir  9  4  9  Andhra Pradesh  9  10  13 
Maharashtra  10 3  2  Madhya  Pradesh  10 10 11  Karnataka  10 12 12 
West Bengal  11  6  7  Maharashtra  11  13  8  Uttar Pradesh  11  13  11 
Bihar  12 9  8  Karnataka  12 12 14  Maharashtra  12 11  7 
Andhra  Pradesh  13 12 13  Uttar  Pradesh  13  9  13  Gujarat  13 14 14 
Punjab  14 14 15  Tamil  Nadu  14 14 12  Punjab  14  6  10 
Uttar  Pradesh  15 15 14  Kerala  15 15 10  Bihar  15 15 15 
                 
Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix       
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1      Rank1  1      Rank1  1     
Rank2 0.6071  1    Rank2  0.8357  1    Rank2  0.8393  1   
Rank3 0.5643  0.9321  1  Rank3  0.7214  0.7536  1  Rank3  0.8393  0.9036  1 
Rank Test(P-Value)        Rank Test(P-Value)        Rank Test (P-Value)       
Rank1=Rank2 0.7539      Rank1=Rank2 1      Rank1=Rank2  0.3877     
Rank2=Rank3 0.7905      Rank2=Rank3 1      Rank2=Rank3 1     
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State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3  State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  2  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1  Jammu & Kashmir  1  1  1 
Kerala  2 3 3  Orissa  2 2 2  Assam  2 2 2 
Assam  3 2 1  Rajasthan  3 4 4  Orissa  3 3 3 
Rajasthan  4 4 6  Kerala  4 3 3  Rajasthan  4 4 6 
Orissa  5 6 7  West  Bengal  5 5 5  Kerala  5 5 4 
Madhya Pradesh  6  8  13  Madhya Pradesh  6  6  6  Madhya Pradesh  6  6  13 
Karnataka  7  10  15  Andhra  Pradesh  7 7 7  Andhra  Pradesh  7 7  12 
Bihar 8  13  4  Bihar  8  13  13  Karnataka  8  8  11 
Tamil  Nadu  9 9 9  Gujarat  9 9 11  Tamil  Nadu  9 9 8 
West Bengal  10  7  8  Tamil Nadu  10  10  10  Gujarat  10  13  10 
Punjab  11 5 14  Punjab  11  8  14  Punjab  11 10 14 
Andhra  Pradesh  12 11 11  Uttar  Pradesh  12 11  8  Bihar  12 14 15 
Gujarat  13 14 12  Karnataka  13 12 12  Uttar  Pradesh  13 12  9 
Uttar Pradesh  14  12  5  Maharashtra  14  14  9  West Bengal  14  11  7 
Maharashtra  15 15 10  Maharashtra  15 15  5         
                 
Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix        Correlation Matrix       
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3    Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1      Rank1  1      Rank1  1     
Rank2 0.8357  1    Rank2  0.9165  1    Rank2  0.9571  1   
Rank3 0.5286  0.4679  1  Rank3  0.8198  0.8374  1  Rank3  0.5143  0.5714  1 
Rank Test(P-Value)        Rank Test(P-Value)        Rank Test (P-Value)       
Rank1=Rank2 1      Rank1=Rank2  0.6875     Rank1=Rank2  1     
Rank2=Rank3 0.7744      Rank2=Rank3 1      Rank2=Rank3 1     
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Table 7d: Indian State Social Safety Net Expenditures: Public Food Distribution 
State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Kerala  1 1 5 
Jammu & Kashmir  2  2  1 
West  Bengal  3 3 2 
Maharashtra  4 4 3 
Assam  5 5 4 
Tamil Nadu  6  6  11 
Gujarat  7 7 6 
Punjab 8  9  15 
Karnataka 9  8  12 
Andhra  Pradesh  10 10 14 
Bihar 11  13  7 
Orissa 12  11  8 
Rajasthan  13 12 10 
Uttar Pradesh  14  14  9 
Madhya  Pradesh  15 15 13 
     
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1     
Rank2 0.9857  1   
Rank3 0.6607  0.6571  1 
Rank  test(p-value)     
Rank1=Rank2 1     
Rank2=Rank3 0.3018     
 
The estimates for the regressions (3) and (4), which lie behind tables 7a through 7d are 
omitted for brevity. There are generally negative income effects for all types of safety net. 
Higher rural headcount measures decrease spending while urban headcount increases 
spending, which may be suggestive of an urban bias in government responses to poverty 
alleviation. Both rural and urban income ginis tend to decrease expenditures, implying that, 
as income inequality widens, spending as a share of state GDP rises. Consistent with the 
results from table 7a, none of these structural factors except urban headcounts are significant 
determinants of calamity spending.  
The levels of voter turnout increase health, education, social, and development 
expenditures in the regression. Political competition, surprisingly, reduces expenditures. 
However, across all expenditure types, we consistently find that increased literacy rates, both 
among males and females, significantly increase the levels of safety net expenditures. 
Finally, as shocks become more variable, they tend to decrease education and social 
spending, but the average level of shocks plays no role.  
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Finally, the regression findings for public food distribution (PFD) suggest that richer 
states distribute more, and that urban headcounts and income inequality have greater effects 
than the same rural factors. Voter turnout has a very strong positive impact on PFD, as well 
as both shock variables. Political competition has no effect and, in line with the earlier 
results, male and female literacy rates significantly increase food distribution. 
Welfare Outcome Results 
The final part of our analysis concerns the construction of rankings R1 to R3 for the welfare 
outcome of infant mortality rates across Indian states. These are reported in table 8. States 
such as Jammu and Kashmir and Punjab which appear to have low IMR actually do much 
worse given their structural features relative to other Indian states, implying they ought to 
spend more, while Gujarat and Bihar all manage to outperform the Indian benchmark level, 
controlling for structural economic factors. Controlling for institutional quality as we move 
to R3, there is still a high degree of movement—West Bengal and Mahrashtra would appear 
to have poor-quality institutions, while Bihar and Rajasthan move up the rankings once 
institutional quality is controlled for. 
Table 8: Indian State-Level Outcome Measures 
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1000 live births, urban and rural combined) 
State  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Kerala  1 1 3 
Jammu & Kashmir  2  14  13 
Maharashtra  3 2 6 
West Bengal  4  7  14 
Karnataka  5 3 4 
Punjab 6  13  12 
Tamil  Nadu  7 5 9 
Andhra  Pradesh  8 6 5 
Bihar  9 4 1 
Gujarat 10  8  8 
Rajasthan 11  9  2 
Madhya Pradesh  12  10  7 
Orissa  13 11 11 
Uttar  Pradesh  14 12 10 
     
  Rank1 Rank2 Rank3 
Rank1 1     
Rank2 0.4286  1   
Rank3 -0.0505  0.6484  1 
Rank  test(p-value)     
Rank1=Rank2 0.0923     
Rank2=Rank3 0.7744     
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The regression from which these rankings are derived (not shown), seem to suggest that 
income levels will decrease infant mortality rates, and urban and rural poverty both increase 
IMR. In terms of the institutional controls, political competition, voter turnout, and literacy 
rates all significantly reduce infant mortality rates. 
VII. Toward a Constructive Policy Dialogue 
The Case for Safety Nets 
There is much debate regarding how much government ought to spend on safety nets both in 
developing and developed countries. However, there are no easy answers to this question. 
What we have attempted to do in this paper is to create a framework in which a more 
constructive policy debate can take place. We lay out this structure below. 
The first issue to settle concerns what safety nets are, who they are for, and what are the 
benefits of providing them. We summarize our earlier discussion in a simple matrix form in 
table 9. 
Table 9: A Policy Dialogue 
Definition of Safety Nets  (i) redistributive role transferring resources toward the poorer members of 
society to bring them out of poverty 
  (ii) provide greater opportunities for individuals to mitigate risks from 
unforeseen contingencies 
Who Are They For?  (i) chronically poor 
  (ii) temporarily poor 
  (iii) movers into poverty during periods of adjustment or crisis 
The Benefits of Safety Nets  Equity  - societal aversion to inequality 
    - redistribution need not be at the expense of growth 
  Efficiency  - correction of market failures 
   - insurance mechanisms for the poor in place of short-
term coping strategies 
   - reduced uncertainty may increase human and physical 
capital investments by the poor 
   - less incentive to engage in marginalized economic 
activities 
  Political 
Economy 
- reduces probability of political failure 
   - raises participation of the poor in policymaking 
process 
   - demonstrates government's commitment to tackling 
poverty 
 Social  Cohesion  - raises the political acceptability of market-based 
reforms that often need to be made in the aftermath of 
economic crisis 
    - societal aversion to inequality of opportunity 
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We hope that the approach to safety nets taken here helps us to move away from a 
program-based definition of safety nets and toward a more objective-based or functional 
definition of what safety nets are. 
Table 9 also helps us to provide government officials with a clear way of thinking 
through what benefits may be conferred to the economy through the expansion of safety nets, 
in terms of both equity and efficiency objectives. This set of arguments, many of which are 
recent in the literature, provide a case for safety nets that is independent of how we think of 
how much governments ought to spend, and whether or not we use the benchmarking 
exercise advocated here. Presenting the arguments in favor of safety net expenditures in this 
way allows policymakers to stop thinking of such programs purely in terms of the costs of 
provision. 
Benchmarking 
The approach here addresses the question of how much governments ought to spend by 
establishing what governments are able to do on average and then using this as a point of 
comparison for what any given government is actually doing. This is the notion of 
benchmarking, whereby a summary statistic is created by which one country's performance 
can be compared to that of its neighbors in a straightforward manner. 
Comparison across the different rankings provides a powerful and easily presented tool 
for officials to help determine how their country is performing relative to other countries, and 
perhaps more pertinently, relative to their closest economic neighbors. In discussing the 
results, we have emphasized many cases where neighboring countries had radically different 
rankings. This result in itself might sometimes motivate safety net expenditures. 
We have applied this idea of benchmarking both to safety net expenditures and to 
welfare outcomes. We have done this in terms of cross-country comparisons, but we have 
also shown how the methodology can be equally well applied at the sub-national level by 
analyzing Indian states. 
We have made the following arguments as to why benchmarking can be an effective 
tool for policymakers. First, benchmarking allows governments to compare their own 
performance to that of their neighbors. Benchmarking through the use of rankings very 
clearly conveys information on the underlying effort being made by governments on these 
policy outcomes. The data requirements to construct these rankings are minimal compared to 
alternative methodologies. 
The methodology we have described may enhance the policy debate by presenting 
expenditure rankings in terms of the underlying structural features of country economies and 
the design of institutions. This is important if governments believe that the structural factors 
are only influenced by policy in the long run, while the institutional factors can be subject to 
short- and medium-run constitutional reform. It is probably often going to be advisable to 
think of the two types of reform as complementary, rather than viewing any single potential 
policy reform as always of a higher priority than another. We hope to have demonstrated that 
the exact policy prescription will depend on both country-specific factors and the type of 
safety net we are talking about. 83 
Constructing the Rankings 
We have benchmarked countries by constructing three ranks—first, a ranking based on 
unconditional expenditures on safety nets; second, a ranking conditioning on structural 
features of the economy; and third, a ranking also conditioning on the quality of institutions 
within the country. 
We have argued that the presentation of our analysis in the form of rankings is useful for 
several reasons. First, it is a simple summary statistic on which to base arguments to 
policymakers for changes in spending. Second, the use of rankings makes our results more 
robust to econometric concerns arising from the potential endogeneity of some covariates, as 
well as omitted variables due to lack of data. The data requirements for this approach are also 
minimal. For instance, we do not need to define any welfare criterion by which to judge 
optimal levels of spending. Third, international or regional norms provide a natural point of 
comparison for how much effort governments are seen to be putting into safety net spending. 
They can also be used to motivate policy discussions. 
Formally, our three ranking systems have been the following: 
R1  Time-averaged unconditional ranking of safety net spending. A lower 
ranking means that the country unconditionally spends less on safety nets. 
R2  Ranking of social spending conditional on structural factors. A lower ranking 
means that safety net expenditures are lower than we would expect compared 
to the countries in the same region, controlling for structural features of the 
economy. 
R3  Ranking also taking into account quality of government. Again, a lower 
ranking means that safety net expenditures are lower than we would expect 
compared to the countries in the same region, controlling both for structural 
and institutional features of the economy. 
Movements across these rankings as well as the ranks themselves provide information 
on the recommended policy prescriptions. The comparison between R1 and R2 is instructive 
as it demonstrates that the level of safety net spending, what we have previously referred to 
as the demand function for safety nets, is dependent partly on structural features of the 
economy such as the distribution of income as well as its per capita level, or the level of 
urbanization, which are probably factors that can only be changed through government 
policy in the very long run. 
Comparing rankings R2 and R3 indicates how controlling for institutional factors, which 
are subject to influence through policy, can change a country’s relative performance. The 
comparison of rankings R2 and R3 thus points to institutional reform as a means of 
improving a country’s/state’s performance relative to the benchmark. 
An Example of Benchmarking 
An illustrative example can be given here of the type of dialogue that may follow from this 
analysis. Consider the relative performance of South Asian countries with regard to life 
expectancy. Looking at the unconditional rankings (R1) in table 4a, Sri Lanka is ranked 39th 
in the world, India is 73rd, Pakistan is 75th, and Bangladesh is 83rd, out of a total of 103  
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countries. At face value, this suggests that Sri Lanka appears to put much more effort into 
improving welfare as measured by life expectancy than do the other South Asian countries. 
India, Pakistan, and Bangladesh have much more similar performance, unconditional on any 
other factors. 
Moving to R2, where we control for structural features of the economy, we find that the 
relative performance of South Asian countries changes, and to dramatically different extents. 
Pakistan rises to 33rd in the world, India falls to 76th and is overtaken by Bangladesh, which 
rises to 45th. This suggests that, given India’s ability to finance such welfare improvements, 
and the need for them, it performs poorly compared to its neighbors. In this respect, Sri 
Lanka’s performance is impressive—controlling for structural factors, Sri Lanka moves to 
first place, suggesting its government puts the most effort into welfare improvement as 
measured in this dimension. 
Moving to rank three, where we also control for institutional factors, we see that Sri 
Lanka remains first, and Pakistan and Bangladesh continue to improve their international 
rankings, while India’s performance remains around the same level at 76. 
We would argue that the presentation of such information makes it clear that 
unconditional rankings can give a misleading perception to the relative performance of 
countries. In addition, the method is able to say where the strengths and weaknesses of each 
country's policies appear to be—whether structural or institutional. 
The value of benchmarking is that it relates the social spending levels of a country to 
other countries at similar levels of income (R2) or institutional development (R3). Making 
this ranking public information and open for debate may tend to strengthen the incentives for 




All of the data are from the IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, and each series is 
available over the period 1972–97. The safety net variable definitions are: 
Transfers to Organizations and Households 
Current transfer payments to private social institutions such as hospitals and schools, learned 
societies, associations, and sports clubs that are not operated as enterprises; current payments 
in cash (not in kind) to households, adding to their disposable income without any 
simultaneous, equivalent counterpart provided in exchange by the beneficiary, and neither 
generating nor extinguishing a financial claim; usually intended to cover charges incurred by 
households because of the appearance, or existence, of certain risks and needs. 
Social Security and Welfare 
Transfer payments (including in kind) to compensate for reduction or loss in income or 
inadequate earning capacity; sickness, maternity, and temporary disablement benefits; 
government employee pension schemes; old age, disability, or survivors’ benefits; 
unemployment compensation benefits; family and child allowances; other social assistance to 
persons and to residential institutions for children or the elderly. 
Education 
Pre-primary, primary, secondary (vocational and technical), tertiary, university, and 
subsidiary services to education. 
Health 
General and specialized hospital services; nursing and convalescent home services; clinics; 
medical, dental, and paramedical practitioners; public health affairs and services; medication; 
prostheses; medical equipment; applied research; and experimental development. 
 
The data source for the quality-of-government measures is the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG), a monthly publication of Political Risk Services. This data set has been 
compiled by Knack and Keefer (1995), where the following definitions are given: 
Repudiation of Government Contracts 
Indicates the “risk of a modification in a contract taking the form of a repudiation, 
postponement, or scaling down,” due to “budget cutbacks, indigenization pressure, a change 
in government, or a change in government economic and social priorities.” Scored 0–10, with 
higher scores for higher risks. 
Expropriation Threat 
Assessment of risk of “outright confiscation” or “forced nationalization.” Scored 0–10, with 
higher scores for higher risks. 
Corruption in Government 
Higher scores indicate “high government officials are likely to demand special payments” 
and “illegal payments are generally accepted throughout lower levels of government” and in 
the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessment, policy protection, or loans.” Scored 0–6.  
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Rule of Law 
This variable “reflects the degree to which the citizens of a country are willing to accept the 
established institutions to make and implement laws and adjudicate disputes.” Lower scores 
indicate “sound political institutions, a strong court system, and provisions for an orderly 
succession of power.” Higher scores indicate “a tradition of depending on physical force or 
illegal means to settle claims.” Upon changes in government in countries scoring low on this 
measure, new leaders “may be less likely to accept the obligations of the previous regime.” 
Scored 0–6. 
Government Bureaucracy 
Low scores indicate “autonomy from political pressure” and “strength and expertise to 
govern without drastic changes in policy or interruptions in government services”; also 
existence of an “established mechanism for recruiting and training”. Scored 0–6. 
Indian State-Level Analysis 
Public Finance Variables 
Development expenditure includes expenditure on economic and social services. Economic 
services include agriculture and allied activities, rural development, special area programs, 
irrigation and flood control, energy, industry and minerals, transport and communications, 
science, technology, and environment. Social services include education, medical and public 
health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, housing, urban development, labor and 
labor welfare, social security and welfare, nutrition, and relief on account of natural 
calamities. Health, education, food subsidies, and calamity relief expenditures are just a 
component of social expenditures. The primary source for state-level information on taxes 
and expenditures is an annual publication, Public Finance Statistics (Ministry of Finance, 
Government of India). This information is also collated in the Reserve Bank of India’s 
annual publication Report on Currency and Finance. 
Public Food Distribution 
Issues/public distribution of food grains (both from central and state governments) divided by 
(interpolated) state population measured in tons per person. The source is the Bulletin on 
Food Statistics, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Directorate of Economics and Statistics. 
State Income Per Capita 
The primary source for data on state income is an annual government publication Estimates 
of State Domestic Product (Department of Statistics, Ministry of Planning). The primary 
sources for the Consumer Price Index for Agricultural Laborers (CPIAL) and Consumer 
Price Index for Industrial Workers (CPIIW), which are used to deflate the agricultural and 
non-agricultural components of state domestic product, respectively, are a number of 
Government of India publications including the Indian Labor Handbook, the Indian Labor 
Journal, the Indian Labor Gazette and the Reserve Bank of India's Report on Currency and 
Finance. Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996) have further corrected CPIAL and CPIIW to take 
account of interstate cost-of-living differentials and have also adjusted CPIAL to take 
account of rising firewood prices. Using their data allows us to put together a consistent and 
complete series on real total, agricultural, and non-agricultural state income for the period 
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Poverty and Inequality 
We use the headcount and gini measures for the rural and urban areas of India’s 16 major 
states, spanning 1957–58 to 1991–92 put together by Ozler, Datt, and Ravallion (1996). 
These measures are based on 22 rounds of the National Sample Survey (NSS), which span 
this period. 
Voter Turnout 
The percentage of eligible voters in the state that actually voted in the last elections for the 
state legislature. This data is from Butler, Lahiri, and Roy (1991). 
Variance of Social Spending 
The variance of social spending that cannot be explained by the variance of state income and 
natural calamities. 
Deviation from State Mean of Level of Social Spending 
The deviation from state means of social spending, controlling for mean income levels and 
the occurrence of natural calamities. 
Construction of the Shock Variables 
In the cross-country analysis, we constructed a “shock to GDP variable,” which is essentially 
a residual from a standard growth regression. It thus proxies for how far a country is from its 
long-run sustainable growth level. The form of the growth regression is standard, being taken 
from the growth literature. We simply regress log GDP on initial GDP, population growth, 
and capital per worker. A similarly constructed variable is used in the Indian state-level 
analysis. 
A second set of shock variables is constructed only for the Indian analysis. The variables 
are intended to capture the deviations of social expenditures from their long-run stable paths. 
The methodology is detailed in Wei (1997). The two variables are constructed by regressing 
each type of expenditure on state income growth and state natural disasters, and forming the 
mean and variance of the estimated residuals.  
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